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Abstract III 
Abstract  
Platform ecosystems are a growing trend in various industries and many companies that rely 
on this organizational structure have seen unprecedented growth rates in recent years. 
Compared to traditional service providers, platforms do not offer products or services directly 
to their customers, but almost exclusively through complementors who develop and deliver 
complementary content. Platforms therefore create value by enabling and coordinating 
interactions between the demand and the supply side. As these platforms are two-sided 
markets, they are characterized by distinct cross-side network effects, meaning that each side 
of the market derives externalities from the participation of the respective other group.  
Crowdfunding platforms rely on this concept and facilitate transactions between individuals 
who seek funding for a specific project or venture and prospective investors. Crowdfunding 
platforms are, however, special as the transactions made via the platforms are particularly 
risky for end-users because of a high level of information asymmetry existing between the 
market sides. Though a certain level of information asymmetry exists between the distinct 
market sides in every two-sided market, a number of factors amplify this problem in the 
crowdfunding context. For instance, there is usually little to no publicly available information 
such as customer reviews to evaluate the investments ex-ante. The creators of crowdfunding 
campaigns are therefore able to overstate quality or withhold information as they control the 
flow of information towards potential investors. Furthermore, many of the projects that are 
published on crowdfunding platforms are still in their infancy, making it difficult to accurately 
predict project outcomes. Compared to other types of two-sided markets, the issue of 
information asymmetry is also more difficult to resolve in crowdfunding because mechanisms 
such as reputation systems that are frequently applied in other contexts to mitigate this issue 
are less relevant on crowdfunding platforms. The actual utility of crowdfunding projects is 
therefore difficult to ascertain at the time the investment decision has to be made and 
dynamics of crowdfunding are thus different from those in other platform settings. Many open 
questions still remain with respect to the optimal market design of crowdfunding platforms in 
order to mitigate information asymmetries. 
Against this backdrop, four research studies have been conducted to investigate how the 
behaviors and actions of the distinct groups of market participants (i.e., platform provider, 
project creators, backers) influence the decision-making of potential backers on crowdfunding 
platforms. The first study is concerned with the effects actions taken by platform providers 
can have for the decision-making of backers. More specifically, it is examined how relaxing 
the input control for crowdfunding projects on Kickstarter affected the decision-making of 
backers. The second and third study are concerned with the role of social buzz and 
contribution behavior by previous backers. While the second study is focused on the dynamic 
interplay of social buzz, prior-contribution behavior, and the respective effects on backer 
decision-making, the third study describes the repercussions of non-genuine social media likes 
for project creators. The final study is focused on the influence project creators can have on 
backers by signaling certain personality traits through their project description and video. 
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Overall, this thesis highlights that, as a result of the high level of information asymmetry on 
crowdfunding platforms, prospective backers seek alternative information and signals to use 
for decision support in the face of uncertainty. Platform providers and project creators may 
use the results to better understand how and why certain actions or behaviors of market 
participants on crowdfunding platforms affect the decision-making of prospective backers. 
The findings may therefore help platform providers to optimize the market design of 
crowdfunding platforms in order to avoid information-related market failure in the long term. 
  
Zusammenfassung V 
Zusammenfassung 
In den vergangenen Jahren haben Plattform-Ökosysteme in den verschiedensten Branchen 
stetig an Bedeutung gewonnen und viele Unternehmen konnten durch diese 
Organisationsstruktur enorme Wachstumsraten erreichen. Plattformen unterscheiden sich 
von anderen Unternehmen dadurch, dass sie dem Kunden Produkte oder Dienstleistungen 
nicht direkt, sondern fast ausschließlich über die sogenannten Komplementäre anbieten. Die 
Hauptaufgabe der Plattformen ist dabei, die Interaktionen und Transaktionen zwischen der 
Nachfrage- und der Angebotsseite des Marktes zu koordinieren. Da diese Plattformen 
zweiseitige Märkte sind, existieren indirekte Netzwerkeffekte zwischen den Marktseiten, 
sodass diese sich gegenseitig in ihrem Nachfrageverhalten beeinflussen. 
Crowdfunding-Plattformen bauen auf dieses Konzept auf und ermöglichen Transaktionen 
zwischen Personen, die für die Finanzierung eines bestimmten Projektes oder einer 
Geschäftsidee Investoren suchen. Crowdfunding-Plattformen unterscheiden sich jedoch von 
anderen Plattformen, da die Transaktionen für die Personen auf der Nachfrageseite des 
Marktes aufgrund hoher Informationsasymmetrien besonders riskant sind. Obwohl 
Informationsasymmetrien in den meisten zweiseitigen Märkten die Transaktionen zwischen 
den Marktseiten beeinflussen, ist dieses Problem im Crowdfunding-Kontext durch eine Reihe 
von Faktoren besonders ausgeprägt. So gibt es beispielsweise kaum öffentlich zugängliche 
Informationen wie zum Beispiel Kundenbewertungen, die potenziellen Investoren 
ermöglichen würden, die Projekte oder Geschäftsideen vorab zu bewerten. Die Ersteller von 
Crowdfunding-Kampagnen sind daher in der Lage, die Qualität ihres Projektes oder ihrer 
Geschäftsidee übertrieben darzustellen oder wichtige Informationen zurückzuhalten, da sie 
den Informationsfluss zu den potenziellen Investoren steuern können. Viele der Projekte oder 
Geschäftsideen, die auf Crowdfunding-Plattformen präsentiert werden, sind zudem oft noch 
wenig ausgereift, wodurch sich die tatsächlichen Erfolgschancen nur schwer einschätzen 
lassen. Während in vielen anderen zweiseitigen Märkten Mechanismen wie Bewertungs- und 
Reputationssysteme eingesetzt werden, um die Informationsasymmetrien zwischen den 
Marktseiten zu verringern, lassen sich die meisten dieser Mechanismen aufgrund der 
spezifischen Besonderheiten von Crowdfunding-Plattformen hier nicht einsetzen. Für die 
potenziellen Investoren ist es daher extrem schwierig, die tatsächliche Qualität eines Projektes 
oder einer Geschäftsidee richtig einzuschätzen, bevor die Investitionsentscheidung getroffen 
werden muss. Die Dynamiken auf Crowdfunding-Plattformen unterscheiden sich daher von 
denen in anderen Plattform-Ökosystemen und es existieren noch viele offene Fragen in Bezug 
auf das optimale Marktdesign von Crowdfunding-Plattformen, um die 
Informationsasymmetrien zwischen den Marktteilnehmern zu reduzieren. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund wurden vier Forschungsstudien durchgeführt, um zu untersuchen, 
wie die Verhaltensweisen und Entscheidungen der einzelnen Gruppen von Marktteilnehmern 
(d. h. Plattformbetreiber, Projektersteller und Investoren), die Entscheidungsfindung 
potenzieller Investoren auf Crowdfunding-Plattformen beeinflussen.  
Zusammenfassung VI 
In der ersten Studie wird untersucht, welche Auswirkungen die Entscheidungen von 
Plattformbetreibern haben können. Genauer gesagt wird analysiert, wie sich die Dynamiken 
auf der Crowdfunding-Plattform Kickstarter dadurch verändert haben, dass der 
Plattformbetreiber eine Lockerung der bisher strengen Eingangskontrolle für neue Projekte 
durchgesetzt hat. Die zweite Studie befasst sich mit der Signalwirkung des 
Unterstützungsverhaltens und digitaler Mundpropaganda bisheriger Investoren für die 
Entscheidungsfindung zukünftiger Investoren. Auch die dritte Studie untersucht die 
Auswirkungen digitaler Mundpropaganda im Crowdfunding-Kontext, geht dabei jedoch 
konkret auf die Effekte gefälschter „Gefällt mir“-Angaben für bestimmte Crowdfunding-
Projekte auf der Plattform Kickstarter ein. In der vierten Studie wird analysiert, wie die 
Projektersteller durch das Signalisieren bestimmter Persönlichkeitsmerkmale auf Basis der 
Projektbeschreibungen und des Kampagnenvideos das Investitionsverhalten der Unterstützer 
beeinflussen können. 
Zusammengenommen zeigen die Ergebnisse der Studien, dass, als Folge der hohen 
Informationsasymmetrien zwischen Projekterstellern und Investoren auf Crowdfunding-
Plattformen, potenzielle Investoren alternative Signale und Informationen suchen, die ihnen 
die Entscheidungsfindung erleichtern. Plattformbetreiber und Projektersteller können die 
Ergebnisse somit nutzen, um besser zu verstehen, wie sich das Verhalten der Gruppen von 
Marktteilnehmern auf potenzielle Investoren auswirkt. Die Erkenntnisse können daher 
verwendet werden, um das Marktdesign von Crowdfunding-Plattformen insoweit zu 
optimieren, dass Informationsasymmetrien abgebaut werden und ein Marktversagen dadurch 
auf lange Sicht vermieden wird. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Research Question 
In recent years, platform-based business models have emerged as a prevalent organizational 
structure in many markets and industries. Platforms differ from traditional service providers 
in that they do not offer products or services by themselves and directly to their customers 
(platform end-users), but almost exclusively through so-called complementors who develop 
and deliver complementary content (e.g., apps, add-ons, plug-ins, modules, or extensions) via 
the platform. Prominent examples for such platforms include app stores such as the Apple 
App Store, which bring together app developers and smartphone users, and gaming platforms 
such as Steam, which bring together game developers and gamers. As these platforms are 
two- or multi-sided markets (cf., Economides and Katsamakas 2006; Eisenmann et al. 2006), 
they are characterized by distinct cross-side network effects, as each side derives externalities 
from the participation of the respective other group (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005; Rysman 
2009; Ondrus et al. 2015). That is, only a platform that attracts sellers (complementors) will 
attract buyers (end-users) and vice versa. Creating favorable conditions for these network 
effects to emerge is thus at the core of platform management and platform providers face the 
enduring challenge to facilitate interactions and transactions between the market sides in 
order to create and maintain a thriving platform ecosystem (Rochet and Tirole 2003; Bakos 
and Katsamakas 2004).  
Based on the concept of two-sided markets, crowdfunding platforms have become a 
prominent example of a successful platform-based business model and a wide variety of 
different crowdfunding platforms has emerged over the last few years. On these platforms, 
project creators can be considered the complementors who provide the complementary 
content for the platform in the form of crowdfunding campaigns, which, in turn, are 
financially supported by the end-users called backers. Crowdfunding enables project creators 
to collect relatively small financial contributions from a large number of backers through an 
open call on the internet (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012). It thus creates a large, relatively 
undefined network of project stakeholders and consequently decreases the importance of 
more traditional investors such as angel investors or venture capitalists. As a result, the 
volume of the crowdfunding industry is predicted to surpass that of the venture capital 
industry in 2016 (Massolution 2015). 
Compared to other types of two-sided markets, crowdfunding platforms are special because 
the transactions made via the platforms are particularly risky for end-users. The relationship 
between backers and project creators in crowdfunding can be considered from the perspective 
of principal-agent theory in order to examine this issue. The theory is concerned with the 
contractual relationship between a principal and an agent in which problems arise if the two 
contractual partners have different interests and information between them is asymmetrically 
allocated (i.e., the agent having more information), so that it becomes difficult for the 
principal to motivate the agent to act on his or her behalf (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
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Eisenhardt 1989). In most crowdfunding models, the backer (acting as the principal) provides 
financial resources to the project creator (acting as the agent) with the expectation of receiving 
an adequate and attractive return on the investment (Norton 1995; Ley and Weaven 2011). 
However, the market design of crowdfunding platforms gives backers little control to ensure 
that the project creator uses the funds collectively invested by the backers for the purpose they 
were originally intended for, as a number of factors leave backers with a serious information 
disadvantage. First, given that there is little to no publicly available information such as 
customer reviews to evaluate the investment ex-ante, backers’ primary source of information 
is the project description the creator has published on the crowdfunding platform. Even 
though this content allows prospective backers to develop an attitude towards the campaign 
and the respective project, this attitude is potentially biased due to the fact that it stems from 
a single source of information (Burtch et al. 2013). As project creators alone control the flow 
of information towards the backers, assessing the project creators’ true motives as well as their 
determination and trustworthiness is particularly difficult for potential backers. While venture 
capitalists and angel investors disproportionately focus on local investments in order to avoid 
such issues by meeting entrepreneurs face-to-face as part of their due diligence process 
(Agrawal et al. 2016), this is rarely an option in online crowdfunding as it is neither possible 
nor feasible for potential backers. Project creators are therefore able to overstate quality or 
withhold information, putting backers at a disadvantage in the transaction (Mavlanova et al. 
2012). The information asymmetry between backers and project creators will thus lead to 
issues of adverse selection, meaning that transactions are being made that would most likely 
not occur under perfect information (Akerlof 1970). Second, many of the projects published 
on crowdfunding platforms are still in their infancy, making it difficult for project creators, 
who are often unexperienced, to accurately predict project outcomes (Agrawal et al. 2014). 
Third, issues of moral hazard may arise (cf., Stiglitz 2000), meaning that project creators take 
greater risks because they might not necessarily have to fear legal consequences if they do not 
deliver a return on the backers’ investments so that backers ultimately have to bear the costs 
if projects or ventures fail (Mollick 2014). Finally, while other platforms can address the issue 
of information asymmetry through a variety of established market mechanisms, the issue is 
more difficult to resolve in crowdfunding. For example, platforms such as eBay or Airbnb 
foster repeated transactions between complementors and end-users, making reputation a 
critical market mechanism on these platforms. However, as a crowdfunding campaign is most 
often a one-off process for the project creator, similar mechanisms can rarely be found on 
crowdfunding platforms. 
As a consequence, the project creator often possesses information that the backer does not 
have and the backer is unaware of the characteristics (e.g., reliability) and behavioral 
intentions of the project creator. The actual utility of crowdfunding projects is therefore 
difficult to ascertain at the time the investment decision has to be made, as the motives and 
capabilities of project creators remain inscrutable to potential backers. Furthermore, backers 
can be less certain that they will actually receive a return on their investment and have less 
information about the object they are investing in compared to transactions in other types of 
two-sided markets, in which the product or service already exists (Agrawal et al. 2014; 
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Belleflamme et al. 2014). While a certain level of information asymmetry exists between the 
distinct market sides in every two-sided market, this issue is therefore amplified in the 
crowdfunding context and the dynamics of crowdfunding are thus different from those in 
other platforms settings. 
As crowdfunding platforms only started to address a wider audience in the last few years, 
many open questions still remain with respect to the optimal market design of crowdfunding 
platforms in order to avoid information-related market failure in the long term. To influence 
the information asymmetry between project creators and backers, different mechanisms can 
be applied on the part of the platform provider, project creators as well as backers and these 
market design mechanisms are thus of great interest to researchers and practitioners alike. 
The thesis contributes to this area of research by examining how the behaviors and actions of 
the distinct groups of market participants (i.e., platform provider, project creators, backers), 
triggered by specific market design mechanisms, influence the decision-making of potential 
backers on crowdfunding platforms. 
RQ: How do the behaviors and actions of the distinct groups of market participants in 
crowdfunding influence the decision-making of potential backers? 
To contribute to answering this overall research question, four studies were conducted. The 
respective articles are included in this thesis and were previously published in information 
systems (IS) research outlets. The structure of this thesis is discussed in detail in the next 
section. 
1.2 Thesis Structure and Synopses 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the overall 
research context is presented in chapter 2, which concludes with a description of how the 
thesis is positioned in the research context. In order to answer the overall research question, 
four different studies were conducted and published in peer-reviewed outlets across four 
research articles. These articles constitute the chapters 3 to 6 and were slightly revised from 
the original published version in order to provide a consistent layout throughout the thesis. 
Figure 1-1 gives an overview of the dynamics that are examined in the individual articles and 
shows how they are positioned in the overall research context. Article 1 (chapter 3) deals with 
the effects of relaxing screening processes for projects on a crowdfunding platform on the 
behavior and decision-making processes of the market participants. In articles 2 and 3 
(chapters 4 and 5), the effects of genuine and non-genuine social information in the form of 
social buzz and prior-contribution behavior on the decision-making of backers on 
crowdfunding platforms are investigated. The study described in article 4 (chapter 6) is 
focused on how the performance of crowdfunding campaigns is affected by the personality 
traits project creators signal via their project description and video. Chapter 7 concludes the 
thesis with a summary of the contributions to research and practice. 
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Figure 1-1 Overview of the Dynamics Examined in the Research Articles 
In the following, short summaries of each of the four research articles (i.e., chapters 3 to 6) 
are provided, which include the motivation for the respective study, main findings, as well as 
the contribution to answering the main research question raised in the thesis. The summaries 
and the articles are written from the first-person-plural point of view (i.e., we) in order to 
express that these studies were conducted with co-authors and therefore also reflect their 
opinions. 
Article 1 
The Effects of Relinquishing Control in Platform Ecosystems: Implications from 
a Policy Change on Kickstarter 
The platform provider of a crowdfunding platform naturally has the most power to influence 
the dynamics within the platform ecosystem. By making deliberate choices about decision 
rights, ownership, and control through platform governance mechanisms, the platform 
provider is able to influence the behavior of the market participants and their interactions, 
thereby contributing to the rise or fall of the platform. Drawing on IS control theory, we 
analyzed the effects that relaxing the previously stringent approval process for campaigns on 
Kickstarter, one of the dominant reward-based crowdfunding platforms, had for the decision-
making processes of project creators and especially backers. Analyzing over 67,000 
crowdfunding campaigns under conditions of a natural experiment, we show that the policy 
change in respect to the input control for campaigns led to a sharp increase in the number of 
campaigns available on the platform, while their average quality decreased. Before the policy 
change, being allowed to publish a campaign on Kickstarter could be considered a quality 
signal in itself, as passing the input control was a greater challenge for low-quality projects. 
The increasing number of campaigns on the platform therefore led to higher uncertainties for 
backers in respect to the quality of the individual projects, potentially further increasing the 
information asymmetries between the market sides. However, the results also suggest that by 
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eliminating the inherent quality signal of the platform, the importance of the remaining 
signals increased and characteristics such as whether the campaign contained a video became 
more important for the potential backers’ evaluation of campaigns. This study therefore 
contributes to answering the overall research question by showing that the policy design 
decisions on crowdfunding platforms can have a substantial impact on the dynamics among 
platform stakeholders, but also that decision cues are fragile and even subtle changes can 
have drastic consequences for the decision-making processes of backers. 
Article 2 
Understanding the Dynamic Interplay of Social Buzz and Contribution Behavior 
within and between Online Platforms – Evidence from Crowdfunding 
The study presented in the second article of the thesis is concerned with the effects the 
behaviors and actions of backers have on the decision-making of future backers. These effects 
are, however, not limited to internal platform dynamics. We therefore focused on the 
reciprocal relationship between social buzz on Twitter and Facebook, prior-contribution 
behavior on the crowdfunding platform Indiegogo, and the decision-making of backers on the 
same platform. By employing the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) methodology to analyze 
more than 6,300 crowdfunding campaigns, we show a positive influence of social buzz on 
project backing, implying that social buzz around a specific crowdfunding campaign is an 
important signal for potential backers to use for decision support. We also observe that backers 
try to minimize their risk of investing without receiving a reward and therefore invest in 
campaigns that are already successful in terms of the number of backers, suggesting strong 
positive feedback cycles on the crowdfunding platform. These results therefore highlight the 
importance of the behavior and actions of preceding backers for the decision-making of future 
backers, though biases such as herd behavior or informational cascades might also arise from 
following the actions of others. 
Article 3 
The Emergence and Effects of Fake Social Information: Evidence from 
Crowdfunding 
The study presented in article 2 has revealed that social information such as social buzz has a 
significant effect on the decision-making in the crowdfunding context as it allows backers to 
better assess the quality of campaigns before investing. This effect might, however, also 
incentivize project creators to game the system by creating fake data in favor of their own 
campaign in order to deliberately mislead backers. The study described in article 3 contributes 
to signaling theory by showing why non-genuine social information might have an effect on 
consumer decision-making. This study is therefore concerned with the emergence and effects 
of fake social information in the form of non-genuine Facebook Likes in the crowdfunding 
context. Specifically, we captured unnatural, artificially created peaks in the number of 
Facebook Likes that a specific crowdfunding campaign received and observed subsequent 
campaign performance. Analyzing more than 35,000 campaigns on the platform Kickstarter, 
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we found that 1.6% of all campaigns receive fake Facebook Likes. Our results show that fake 
Facebook Likes have a very short-term positive effect on the number of backers funding the 
respective crowdfunding campaign. However, this short-term peak is followed by an 
immediate, sharp drop in the number of backers funding the campaign reaching levels that 
are lower than prior to the occurrence of the non-genuine social information. Though the 
analysis therefore shows that non-genuine social information does, in fact, influence the 
investment decisions of backers, overall, manipulation activities have a negative effect on 
backing behavior. Thus, creating non-genuine social information can virtually backfire, as the 
campaign creators achieve the opposite of what they originally intended. This study therefore 
contributes to answering the overall research question by showing that signals, which are 
expected to reduce information asymmetries between project creators and backers, can be 
manipulated but the manipulation might not have the intended effects. 
Article 4 
Personality Matters: How Signaling Personality Traits Can Influence the 
Adoption and Diffusion of Crowdfunding Campaigns 
Prior research has shown that investors such as venture capitalists and angel investors base a 
lot of their investment decision on the entrepreneurs themselves and consider specific 
personality traits prior to investing (MacMillan et al. 1985; Sudek 2006; Cardon et al. 2009; 
Chen et al. 2009). In order to determine whether backers on crowdfunding platforms go 
through similar decision-making processes prior to investing, the study presented in the final 
article of the thesis is concerned with the role of personality in the crowdfunding context. 
Drawing on the five-factor model of personality (FFM) and based on a sample of over 33,000 
crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter, we analyzed whether the campaigns of project 
creators who are able to signal certain personality traits through their project description and 
video are more likely to succeed and to be shared via social media. The results show that 
project creators who are able to convey openness and agreeableness are more likely to succeed 
with their campaigns compared to those signaling neuroticism. The findings demonstrate that 
potential backers, as part of their vetting process, pay close attention to the way project 
creators present themselves and their projects on crowdfunding platforms.  
 
In addition to the publications listed above, the following articles were also published or 
submitted for publication during my time as a Ph.D. candidate. These articles are, however, 
not part of the thesis:  
Wessel, M., Thies, F., and Benlian, A. "The Implications of Increasing Platform Openness: 
Exploratory Evidence from a Policy Change on Kickstarter," (under review at the Journal of 
Information Technology). 
Thies, F., Wessel, M., and Benlian, A. "The Implications of Relaxing Input Control for 
Entrepreneurial Crowdfunding Initiatives — Evidence from a Natural Experiment on 
Kickstarter," (under review at the Information Systems Journal). 
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Thies, F., Wessel, M., and Benlian, A. 2016. "Effects of Social Interaction Dynamics on Platforms," 
Journal of Management Information Systems (33:3), pp. 843–873. 
Wessel, M., and Thies, F. 2015. "The Effects of Personalization on Purchase Intentions for Online 
News: An Experimental Study of Different Personalization Increments," 23nd European 
Conference on Information Systems. Münster, Germany. (Best Paper Award - Full Research 
Paper). 
Wessel, M., Thies, F., and Benlian, A. 2015. "A Lie Never Lives to Be Old: The Effects of Fake 
Social Information on Consumer Decision-Making in Crowdfunding," 23nd European Conference 
on Information Systems. Münster, Germany. 
Stadler, M., Thies, F., Wessel, M., and Benlian, A. 2015. " Erfolg von Crowdfunding-Kampagnen 
frühzeitig erkennen: Erfolgsprädiktoren auf Kickstarter und Indiegogo," Wirtschaftsinformatik 
Proceedings. 
Thies, F., and Wessel, M. 2014. "The Circular Effects of Popularity Information and Electronic 
Word-of-Mouth on Consumer Decision-Making: Evidence from a Crowdfunding Platform," 
22nd European Conference on Information Systems. Tel Aviv, Israel. 
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2 Research Context 
In this chapter, the research context of the thesis is presented in order to clarify the 
fundamental concepts. To do so, the first two sections 2.1 and 2.2 provide an introduction to 
the concepts of platforms and two-sided markets. Based on this theoretical foundation, the 
crowdfunding concept is introduced (section 2.3) and possible issues that might lead to 
market failure in this context are discussed (section 2.3.3). Based on these preceding sections, 
the positioning of the thesis in the research context is presented (section 2.4), concluding this 
chapter. 
2.1 Platform Definitions and Distinctions 
Platforms have become a ubiquitous phenomenon affecting almost all industries today, either 
within or across organizations. A platform has been generally defined as “a set of stable 
components that supports variety and evolvability in a system by constraining the linkages among 
the other components” (Baldwin and Woodard 2009, p. 19). Over the last two decades, two 
distinct but related types of platforms (product versus industry platforms) have emerged. The 
rise of these platform types has been accompanied by three separate but related waves of 
research in the field of product development (e.g., Wheelwright and Clark 1992; Meyer and 
Lehnerd 1997), technology strategy (e.g., Cusumano and Gawer 2002), and industrial 
economics (e.g., Rochet and Tirole 2003; Armstrong 2006). More recently, a separate stream 
of research has started to evolve in the IS field, as the notion of platforms is expanding beyond 
its traditional scope and becoming an all-pervasive trend in browsers, mobile app markets, 
web services, social media, online marketplaces, and gaming consoles (Tiwana et al. 2010; 
Tiwana 2014). 
Initially, the term platform was used in the context of product development. Here, product (or 
internal) platforms are projects focused on increasing productive efficiency by producing 
variety at lower costs, thereby achieving economies of scale while allowing mass 
customization (Gawer 2009). Wheelwright and Clark (1992) introduced the term platform in 
this setting to refer to products that meet the needs of a core group of customers but are 
designed "for easy modification into derivatives through the addition, substitution, or removal of 
features” by deploying specific components in order to serve specific market niches 
(Wheelwright and Clark 1992, p. 5). Product platforms therefore provide a common structure 
upon which companies can efficiently develop and produce an entire product family and are 
thus especially common in sectors that involve manufacturing such as the automotive or 
consumer electronics industry (e.g., Gawer and Cusumano 2014).  
In a second wave of research, industry (or external) platforms have been explored from the 
perspective of technology strategy, which are different from product platforms in that they 
provide a foundation in form of a product, service, or technology upon which outside firms 
are encouraged to build their own innovations. Product platforms and industry platforms 
therefore differ in respect to their scope, meaning that industry platforms are open to outside 
firms and managing a balance between retaining control and devolving autonomy to the 
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outside firms has triggered a separate stream of research (e.g., Boudreau 2010; 2012; Benlian 
et al. 2015; Ondrus et al. 2015). Researchers also suggested different potential benefits of the 
two platform types. While the strategic intent behind implementing a product platform is to 
increase efficiency in product development processes through the reuse of common parts, 
allowing the production of a large number of derivative products, providers of industry 
platforms capture value from external, complementary innovations (Gawer 2009). An 
industry platform therefore becomes ever more valuable and increasingly difficult to dislodge 
by rivals or new market entrants as the number of its complementary innovations rises. This 
platform type therefore led to a shift towards a platform-centric competition among the 
platform providers, rather than between standalone systems or products. Many examples for 
industry platforms can be found in the computer industry and other information-technology 
industries where few dominant platforms compete intensively for the platform leadership 
within their market segment (Cusumano and Gawer 2002). 
One of the most distinguishing features of industry platforms compared to product platforms 
is the potential emergence of network effects (or network externalities), meaning that with 
more users adopting the platform, the more valuable the platform becomes for its participants. 
This feature triggered a separate wave of research as industrial economists and IS scholars 
have adopted the platform concept and use the term to refer to products, services, or 
technologies that mediate transactions between and within the distinct groups of platform 
participants in two-sided (or multi-sided) markets (e.g., Rochet and Tirole 2003; 2004; 
Armstrong 2006; Eisenmann et al. 2006; Rochet and Tirole 2006; Tiwana et al. 2010; Tiwana 
2014; Benlian et al. 2015). Though this research considers a more general scope (e.g., credit 
card payment networks or web services), it builds on the prior waves of research to explain 
the dynamics of platform competition. As this specific stream of research is extended by the 
research projects included in this thesis, it is considered in more detail in section 2.2. 
Despite the different contexts platforms have evolved in, the fundamental architecture of all 
platforms is identical. Every platform architecture contains core components with low variety 
to allow high reusability and a set of peripheral components or modules with high variety but 
low reusability (Tushman and Murmann 1998; Baldwin and Woodard 2009; Tiwana et al. 
2010). While the stable low-variety components constitute the platform itself, the high-variety 
components complement the platform’s core functionalities by interoperating with the core 
components through pre-specified interfaces. These peripheral components have therefore 
often been described as complements in the extant literature, while the developers of these 
complements have been referred to as complementors (Gawer and Cusumano 2014). 
Collectively, a platform and its complements (and complementors), functioning as a unit, 
form a platform ecosystem (Cusumano and Gawer 2002). 
2.2 Two-Sided Markets and Network Effects 
Many of the most successful products, services, or technologies that have refined entire 
industries over the last few decades are platforms that bring together two or more distinct 
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groups of market participants in a network and mediate interactions between them1. These 
two-sided (or multi-sided) markets are characterized by network effects that exist between 
the distinct groups of market participants. While network effects are a common phenomenon 
for many technologies such as the telephone, where every adopter benefits from a growing 
overall user or installed base (Katz and Shapiro 1985), two-sided markets are special because 
these externalities may exist both within as well as across the distinct market sides (Figure 
2-1). Cross-side (or indirect) network effects therefore exist if either side of the market derives 
benefits from the participation of members on the respective other side (Bakos and 
Katsamakas 2004). Same-side (or direct) network effects, however, exist if these benefits arise 
from the participation of members on the same side of the market. These externalities can be 
both positive as well as negative. For example, developers in a mobile app market benefit 
from a rising number of mobile phone users on the other side of the market, potentially 
leading to a higher number of downloads or sales. The mobile phone users also profit from 
an increasing number of developers, as they can expect higher numbers of apps and thus more 
choice. Though the cross-side network effects in this example are therefore positive, the same-
side network effects on the developer side of the market will likely be negative, as too many 
developers may discourage others from making the investment to join. 
 
Figure 2-1 Value Creation and Network Effects in Two-Sided Markets 
The literature on two-sided markets has, so far, been mainly focused on these network 
externalities (e.g., Bakos and Katsamakas 2004; Eisenmann et al. 2006; Tucker and Zhang 
2010) and the coordination problems that arise from them, primarily in respect to pricing 
(e.g., Rochet and Tirole 2003; Parker and Van Alstyne 2005; Armstrong 2006; Rysman 2009). 
                                                   
1 There is no consensus among researchers on whether all two-sided markets can also be considered 
platforms. While Eisenmann et al. (2006, p. 2) define all “products and services that bring together groups of 
users in two-sided networks” as platforms, Gawer and Cusumano (2014, p. 422) highlight that not all two-
sided markets are platforms in the traditional sense. The argument is that two-sided markets that purely 
facilitate an exchange or trade (e.g., dating bars) do not stimulate an external innovation based on an 
underlying platform. 
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Due to the interdependencies between the market sides, a chicken-and-egg problem may arise, 
as end-users only come aboard if complementors provide a sufficient number of complements 
and vice versa (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005). A common strategy to overcome this problem 
is to follow a divide-and-conquer pricing strategy by subsidizing one side of the market 
(divide), while recovering losses from the respective other (conquer), in order to grow both 
(Caillaud and Jullien 2003). Platform providers can therefore internalize the externalities 
between the market sides by setting prices more efficiently (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005). 
Determining which side to subsidize based on cross-price elasticities is therefore an essential 
element of platform management.  
Opportunities to create two-sided markets may arise in situations in which “there are 
externalities and in which transaction costs, broadly considered, prevent the two sides from 
solving this externality directly” (Schmalensee and Evans 2007, p. 154). Platforms such as Uber 
and Lyft could therefore emerge because they provide a technology to match an independent 
driver owning an under-used asset in form of a vehicle with a passenger willing to pay to 
employ the asset. Prior to the existence of these platforms, the transaction costs involved in 
matching passengers with drivers (e.g., for searching, contacting, contracting, paying) 
inhibited the development of such a peer-to-peer transportation market. 
Though two-sided markets are common in old-economy industries (e.g., advertising-supported 
media), the internet and especially the world wide web (web) have accelerated this trend and 
there are many examples of companies that, by relying on this organizational structure, have 
seen unprecedented growth rates. By focusing on enabling interactions and eventually 
transactions between the distinct sides of the market, two-sided markets are fundamentally 
different from traditional product or service offerings. In the traditional value chain, the value 
is created from left to right (figuratively speaking), where costs are on the left and revenue is 
on the right (Eisenmann et al. 2006). In contrast, while managing the market sides in two-
sided markets may create costs on either side, both sides can also generate revenue for the 
platform provider (Figure 2-1), though as discussed above, one side is often subsidized (Hagiu 
2014). Many industries that have previously been characterized by a vertical integration, 
meaning that companies control the entire value chain either through contract or direct 
ownership, have been disrupted by or are increasingly moving towards a two-sided market 
business model (Hagiu and Wright 2015). For example, Uber and Airbnb have disrupted the 
traditional taxi service and hotel industries without owning any vehicles or real estate, 
respectively. 
2.3 Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding allows project creators or entrepreneurs to collect financial contributions from 
supporters through an open call, mostly on the internet, without standard financial 
intermediaries (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012; Mollick 2014; Cholakova and Clarysse 
2015). The concept is built on the broader concept of crowdsourcing, which involves engaging 
the crowd to generate ideas or solutions for corporate activities (e.g., Poetz and Schreier 2012; 
Bayus 2013; Huang et al. 2014). Crowdfunding, however, is focused on reaching a monetary 
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(project) goal by convincing the crowd to individually contribute small financial investments 
instead of choosing the traditional fundraising approach of receiving large contributions from 
a small number of investors. Crowdfunding platforms can therefore be considered two-sided 
markets, as they facilitate these transactions and network externalities exist between the two 
market sides (see section 2.3.2). In this setting, the crowdfunding platform itself is used to 
exchange information on the projects ought to be financed through the so-called 
crowdfunding campaigns, while also providing the necessary infrastructure for payments and 
the communication between the market sides. In crowdfunding platform ecosystems, the 
campaigns can therefore be considered the compliments, provided by project creators or 
entrepreneurs (complementors) and supported by backers (end-users). 
Over the last few years, several different crowdfunding platforms have emerged and four 
distinct models of crowdfunding have been distinguished: equity-based, lending-based, 
reward-based, and donation-based (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014). These four models 
mainly differ with respect to the return backers can expect from their contribution, which can 
either be financial, materialistic, idealistic, or philanthropic in nature (Ahlers et al. 2015). 
Equity- and lending-based crowdfunding markets, for instance, offer financial returns for 
backers, either indirectly through company equity or directly through interest. In reward-
based crowdfunding, backers can expect non-financial tangible benefits for their investment. 
Finally, in donation-based crowdfunding markets, backers cannot expect any financial or 
tangible returns and thus pledge due to altruism and warm glow (Andreoni 2006). 
All four crowdfunding models have generally shown strong growth over the last few years, 
leading to a considerable volume of the crowdfunding market, which is predicted to surpass 
that of the venture capital industry in 2016 (Massolution 2015). The research projects 
included in this thesis have, however, been invariably focused on reward-based crowdfunding 
as a research setting, because in order to answer the overall research questions, this model 
can be considered the most suitable one from a research perspective. First, equity-based 
crowdfunding has, in the past, been surrounded by several legal controversies that restricted 
the global proliferation of this model. While these issues have been partially resolved by 
national initiatives such as the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act in the United 
States, platforms focused on equity-based crowdfunding such as SeedInvest generally still 
offer very few investment opportunities simultaneously. The reason is that these platforms 
apply rigorous screening and due diligence processes before allowing projects to seek funding 
via their platform for legal reasons (SeedInvest Technology 2015b). Equity-based 
crowdfunding platforms are therefore considerably less dynamic (i.e., focused on long-term 
investments of at least 5-7 years) and more complex compared to the other models. Decision-
making processes on these platforms therefore tend to be slower due to the heightened 
regulations and higher average investment amounts (SeedInvest Technology 2015a). Second, 
while the lending-based crowdfunding model has received considerable attention among 
researchers so far (e.g., Galak et al. 2011; Herzenstein et al. 2011b; Allison et al. 2013; Allison 
et al. 2015; Moss et al. 2015), on platforms such as Kiva.org backers are often not focused on 
receiving a return on their investment and rather invest due to prosocial motives (Allison et 
Research Context 13 
al. 2015). Other lending-based crowdfunding platforms such as Prosper.com are not project-
oriented and rather coordinate the financing of personal loans for individuals. Finally, as no 
tangible returns can be expected in donation-based crowdfunding, effects of asymmetric 
information on the decision-making of backers will be less severe in this setting and prior 
research has often rather focused on possible bystander or crowding-out effects that may arise 
in this setting (Burtch et al. 2013). 
2.3.1 Specific Characteristics of Reward-Based Crowdfunding 
The campaign is the primary source of information for backers in all crowdfunding models, 
allowing them to vet the investment before committing. Most reward-based crowdfunding 
platforms use the same content elements and a common structure made up of two separate 
sections to present campaigns as illustrated in Figure 2-2. The top section is designed so that 
potential backers can easily and quickly retrieve the most fundamental information about the 
campaign and the respective project. This section consists of the campaign title, possibly a 
tagline or short description, a video or pictures highlighting the most important project 
characteristics, campaign statistics (i.e., funding goal, amount already invested, number of 
backers, remaining time, etc.), geographical location, relevant tags or categories, buttons to 
share the campaign on social media, and a short profile of the project creator(s). Should 
potential backers deem the campaign interesting after considering the basic information in 
the top section, they can scroll down in order to retrieve more extensive information from the 
bottom section. This section contains a detailed description of the project that often includes 
additional pictures to show product prototypes and a timeline of critical project milestones as 
well as a list of risks and challenges that need to be addressed in order to achieve a successful 
project outcome. Backers are also able to access project updates and comments via this 
section. Updates are written by project creators to clarify certain aspects of the project and 
respond to frequent inquiries from backers, while comments can be used by backers to discuss 
certain aspects of the project with fellow backers or the project creator. Finally, the bottom 
section also contains a list of the rewards backers can expect as a return on their investment, 
depending on the investment amount (see Figure 2-2).  
Prior research on reward-based crowdfunding has found that the rewards backers receive as 
a return on their investment are a central reason for them to invest (value for money), while 
other, more intrinsic motives such as helping others, being part of the community, and 
supporting the cause also exist (Gerber and Hui 2013; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014; 
Cholakova and Clarysse 2015). The rewards can range from small tokens of appreciation (e.g., 
a thank-you card) for an investment of a few dollars to an early access to the product that is 
being developed for an investment of hundreds of dollars, therefore essentially allowing the 
project creators to sell products that do not yet exist (Belleflamme et al. 2014). By offering 
the rewards and selling them to backers, the project creators attempt to reach the campaign’s 
funding threshold set at the beginning of the campaign runtime. As most reward-based 
crowdfunding platforms follow the all-or-nothing (AON) funding model, project creators will 
only be able to receive any of the capital raised if the threshold is reached. Project creators 
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therefore have a motive to overstate quality or withhold information in order to persuade as 
many backers as possible to invest. Backers thus face high uncertainties as to the actual quality 
of the project and the comprised rewards, which remains highly unpredictable at the time of 
the investment. If no other trustworthy information is available, market failure situations such 
as adverse selection and moral hazard may arise, caused by the asymmetric information 
between project creators and backers. This issue is discussed in more detail in section 2.3.3. 
 
Figure 2-2 Common Structure and Content Elements of Campaigns on Reward-Based 
Crowdfunding Platforms 
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2.3.2 Network Effects on Crowdfunding Platforms 
On crowdfunding platforms, project creators and backers constitute the two sides of the 
market, while their relationship is facilitated and managed via the platform itself. One-to-
many relationships are established between individual project creators and a certain number 
of backers, once the backers support the project creator’s campaign on the platform 
financially. Backers, in turn, expect some kind of return on their investment, provided that 
the financial support is not considered a donation. Each side of the market therefore depends 
on the participation of the respective other side so that they exert cross-side network effects 
on each other (see Figure 2-3).  
The external effects of backers on project creators are unambiguously positive, as a larger 
crowd of backers increases the chances for project creators to reach their desired funding goal. 
Given that most crowdfunding platforms attract very different types of projects that are 
assigned to specific categories such as art, design, games, or technology, it can be assumed 
the preferences of potential backers visiting the platforms are also rather heterogeneous 
(Rochet and Tirole 2003; Armstrong 2006). Crowdfunding platforms therefore need to 
facilitate coordination by guiding backers to the most appropriate campaigns in order to make 
use of the externalities backers exert on project creators and in order to avoid coordination or 
market failures (Belleflamme et al. 2015). As agent heterogeneity is often limited in other 
platform settings (e.g., Uber or Airbnb), facilitating coordination between the market sides is 
far less complex, making the matching problem trivial in these markets (Fung and Hsu 2015). 
 
Figure 2-3 Value Creation and Network Effects on Crowdfunding Platforms 
The external effects in the opposite direction, from project creators to backers, are rather 
ambiguous. First, as more project creators correspond with more campaigns being available 
on the platform, it becomes increasingly more likely that potential backers encounter 
campaigns that correspond with their personal preferences and tastes. However, if the 
crowdfunding platform fails to guide potential backers to campaigns according to their 
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preferences, more campaigns being available on the platform might lead to higher search costs 
for backers or failing campaigns due to a suboptimal allocation of backers to campaigns (see 
Belleflamme et al. (2015, p. 16) for a stylized example). Furthermore, everything else being 
equal, more campaigns reduce the average funding amount each project creator can expect 
from the crowd, decreasing the likelihood that any given campaign will achieve its funding 
threshold. As depicted in Figure 2-3, the cross-side network effects of project creators on 
backers can therefore be positive as well as negative, while the positive effects are likely to 
prevail. 
Same-side network effects can also be expected to be present on crowdfunding platforms 
within the respective market sides. With a rising number of project creators on the platform 
and therefore an intensifying competition, it will become increasingly difficult for an 
individual project creator to gather a sufficient number of backers to surpass the funding 
threshold, suggesting that the same-side network effects among project creators are negative. 
In contrast, effects among backers will primarily be positive. As the goal of backers is to 
support campaigns that eventually are successful in reaching the funding threshold so that a 
return on the investment can be expected, backers benefit from the participation of other 
backers as they increase the campaign’s likelihood of success. Backers can also derive 
externalities from the participation of other backers through their funding decisions. As the 
information asymmetry between project creators and backers might be high, more backers 
investing in a specific campaign could be seen as a quality indicator. However, biases such as 
bandwagon effects that might arise in these situations could have negative consequences for 
subsequent backers. These issues are discussed in more detail in section 2.3.3. 
2.3.3 Dynamics and Asymmetric Information Problems on Crowdfunding 
Platforms 
Similar to other two-sided markets, decision-making processes on crowdfunding platforms are 
characterized by asymmetric information between the two market sides. In crowdfunding, 
project creators will, in most cases, have considerably more information about their project 
and its quality than backers. Backers are only aware that some projects on the platform are of 
good quality, while the rest is of bad quality (Akerlof 1970). Compared to other platforms 
that are two-sided markets, the problem of asymmetric information is, however, more severe 
in the crowdfunding context and two main issues might arise. First, all investment decisions 
on crowdfunding platforms are being made before the actual quality of the project can be 
effectively evaluated after the campaign has ended (similar to experience goods). 
Transactions on other platforms such as eBay and Airbnb are often sequential and many 
transactions can be made and rated over a short period of time, allowing individuals on the 
buying side of the market to learn from the experiences of their predecessors. eBay or Airbnb 
are also designed so that market participants are incentivized to build up a reputation and 
trust with each other by rating the performance of the respective other party after each 
transaction. Though biases might arise in such reputation systems (e.g., Ye et al. 2014; Zervas 
et al. 2015), they have become a widespread and successful measure to prevent fraud and 
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similar issues in platform settings. As a crowdfunding campaign is most often a one-off process 
for the project creator, similar reputation mechanisms can rarely be found on crowdfunding 
platforms. It is therefore particularly difficult for backers to distinguish between low-quality 
and high-quality projects, as they are unable to assess the true quality and could thus make 
suboptimal choices due to the potentially biased information provided by project creators. 
Second, though outright fraud occurs on crowdfunding platforms as project creators make use 
of the high level of information asymmetry by overstating quality or withholding information, 
thus passing off a low-quality project as a higher-quality one, project creator incompetence 
and general project risks can be considered to be more serious issues (Tomboc 2013; Agrawal 
et al. 2014). With the exception of equity-based crowdfunding, raising funds through 
crowdfunding platforms is still subject to little regulation. While the more traditional sources 
of funding such as venture capitalists and angel investors would address quality, legal, and 
ethical issues during a vetting process, especially reward-based crowdfunding platforms often 
allow project creators to bypass intensive screening processes, leading to relatively high failure 
rates. On the popular reward-based crowdfunding platform Kickstarter, 9% of project creators 
fail to deliver the promised rewards to backers, while those who deliver are often unable to 
adhere to the estimated delivery date (Mollick 2015). These problems arise as project creators 
are often inexperienced and projects are posted on the platforms in an early stage of their 
development, when there are still significant uncertainties concerning their outcomes, making 
the project plan that is posted on the platform a “little more than an educated guess” (Tomboc 
2013, p. 267).  
Though backers have, in the past, been rather optimistic about project outcomes and the 
project creators’ ability to deliver the promised rewards (Agrawal et al. 2014; Mollick 2015), 
the mentioned issues make it increasingly difficult for backers to distinguish between good 
and bad investments. Consequently, backers could become reluctant to invest higher amounts 
in order to reduce their risk in the face of uncertainty, making the crowdfunding platform less 
attractive for project creators with innovative and complex projects that require more funding. 
The information asymmetry between project creators and backers could therefore potentially 
lead to market failure situations such as adverse selection (ex-ante) and moral hazard (ex-
post), meaning that value-creating transactions between the markets sides (see Figure 2-3) 
will no longer be executed (Agrawal et al. 2014). As the information problem therefore 
threatens the crowdfunding business model, signals, factors, strategies, and biases that affect 
the level of information asymmetry between project creators and backers on crowdfunding 
platforms are of considerable interest for scholars and practitioners alike. Table 2-1 lists 
mechanisms that can be applied on the part of any of the three groups of market participants 
and that could be possible determinants of the level of information asymmetry on 
crowdfunding platforms. While some of the mechanisms have already been examined in prior 
research (see Table 2-1), many remain uninvestigated in the crowdfunding context so far, 
despite their relevance in other platform settings. The studies described in the articles that are 
included in the thesis therefore examine mechanisms that have been left unexplored, or 
underexplored, in prior research.  
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Table 2-1 Possible Determinants of Information Asymmetry on Crowdfunding Platforms 
When looking at Table 2-1, it becomes evident that the role of platform providers in 
influencing information asymmetries has been largely overlooked so far. However, the 
provider of a crowdfunding platform naturally has the most power to influence the dynamics 
within the platform ecosystem. Platform providers, acting as intermediaries between project 
creators and backers, play an important role, as they create and enforce platform governance 
mechanisms by making deliberate choices about decision rights, ownership, and control with 
respect to the platform in order to appropriately engage the other platform stakeholders 
(Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013; Benlian et al. 2015). For instance, platform providers can 
enact screening or input control mechanisms for projects submitted to a crowdfunding 
platform based on specific rules in order to ensure a certain level of quality on the platform, 
thereby reducing investment risks for backers.  
Project creators and backers can also try to solve the problems of asymmetric information 
directly through signaling (e.g., Spence 1973; 2002) or screening (e.g., Stiglitz 1975) without 
relying on the platform provider as an intermediary to regulate the transactions. Signals are 
actions taken by the informed agent (i.e., project creator) in an attempt to reveal private 
information to the principal (i.e., backer). In crowdfunding, project creators can, for example, 
try to mitigate uncertainties by signaling competence through experience or education. With 
Market participants Mechanism Literature examples 
Platform providers 
Applying industry regulations – 
Certification  – 
Insurances – 
Platform rules and policy design – 
Press and social media – 
Recommender systems – 
Reputation systems – 
Screening and input control Weiss et al. (2010) 
Project creators 
Portfolio effects  Freedman and Jin (2011) 
Social capital, social networks, and social media Lin et al. (2013) 
Trust Duarte et al. (2012) 
Other information or signals (e.g., funding goal, 
funding period, geographical location, personality 
traits, rhetorical techniques, video, fake signals) 
Herzenstein et al. (2011b); 
(Mollick 2014); Allison et al. 
(2015); Moss et al. (2015) 
Backers 
Herd behavior and informational cascades based on 
prior contributions 
Herzenstein et al. (2011a); 
Zhang and Liu (2012) 
Social media – 
Syndicates Agrawal et al. (2016) 
Note: The literature mentioned covers all four models of crowdfunding. Parts of the list have been adopted from Agrawal 
et al. (2014); Beaulieu et al. (2015); Belleflamme et al. (2015). 
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screening, on the other hand, the principal attempts to learn as much as possible about the 
agent and tries to incentivize the agent to disclose private information. However, as an 
individual backer can exert little control over project creators, screening will rarely be 
expedient in the crowdfunding context. Prospective backers can, instead, observe the actions 
taken by their predecessors in an attempt to reduce their own investment risk in the face of 
uncertainty about the proposed new project. Rational herd behavior or informational cascades 
may therefore evolve on crowdfunding platforms, meaning that backers will tend to 
contribute to campaigns that have already received a lot of support from the community either 
in terms of funding or in terms of social buzz, as this support implies superiority over other, 
less successful projects. This means that backers can, intentionally or unintentionally, steer 
the decision-making processes of future backers through their own contribution behavior.  
2.4 Positioning of the Thesis 
Though crowdfunding, in the modern sense of the term, dates back to the early 2000's when 
the first platform ArtistShare for creative artists was started, the concept only gained 
mainstream success around 2010 after platforms with a wider appeal such as Kickstarter and 
Indiegogo were launched. Most crowdfunding platforms are therefore still relatively new 
means to raise capital and the whole industry is still in its infancy. Many open questions 
remain with respect to the optimal market design in order to avoid market failure in the long 
run. As the information asymmetry between project creators and backers can be considered 
one of the main issues in this respect (see section 2.3.3), market design mechanisms that help 
to prevent information-related market failures are of great interest to researchers and 
practitioners alike (Agrawal et al. 2014). Despite the importance of reducing information 
asymmetry in the crowdfunding context and though a number of previous studies exist, the 
research is still far from conclusive. Belleflamme et al. (2014) explicitly call for further 
research in order to resolve asymmetric information issues on crowdfunding platforms, while 
linking the crowdfunding topic with the ongoing research on platforms and two-sided 
markets. This topic provides the common problem domain for the articles included in the 
thesis and the thesis contributes to this research area by examining how the behaviors and 
actions of the three distinct groups of market participants (i.e., platform provider, project 
creators, and backers) influence the decision-making processes of future backers.  
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Managing platform ecosystems requires the providers to maintain a delicate balance between 
retaining control and devolving autonomy to complementors in order to encourage 
contribution and innovation. In this study, we make use of a policy change that abolished the 
previously mandatory approval process for campaigns on Kickstarter, one of the dominant 
reward-based crowdfunding platforms. Analyzing a total of 67,384 Kickstarter campaigns 
under conditions of a natural experiment, we find that abolishing the input control was a 
double-edged sword for Kickstarter’s ecosystem: While the average platform revenue 
increased after the policy change, it became more volatile, and while project diversity 
increased, average campaign quality decreased. Project creators are now confronted with an 
even higher level of competition, while backers face greater uncertainties about campaign 
quality, which shifts their focus to alternative quality signals. The new strategy might threaten 
Kickstarter’s unique status as a high-quality platform in the striving business of crowdfunding. 
Keywords 
Crowdfunding, platform ecosystems, platform openness, policy change, input control, two-
sided markets, natural experiment 
  
                                                   
2 The work described in this chapter and chapter 5 was supported by a grant from the Dr. Werner Jacksta ̈dt 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the last few years, the concept of crowdfunding has attracted considerable attention among 
practitioners and scholars alike. It enables the creators of entrepreneurial, social, or creative 
projects to fund their efforts by collecting rather small contributions from a large number of 
individuals through an open call on the internet (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012; Mollick 
2014). The success of the crowdfunding concept can largely be attributed to the numerous 
crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo that provide the necessary 
infrastructure to facilitate transactions between the distinct user groups. Like other two-sided 
markets (also referred to as multi-sided platforms), these platforms primarily create value by 
enabling interactions between groups of customers or other stakeholders, creating cross-side 
network effects among them (Eisenmann et al. 2006). In the context of crowdfunding, the 
platform provider, together with project creators (also referred to as complementors), and 
project backers (end-users) form a platform ecosystem (Cusumano and Gawer 2002). 
Though economics and strategies for two-sided markets have been the subject of a variety of 
publications in research areas such as marketing, economics, and information systems in the 
past (e.g., Rochet and Tirole 2003; Armstrong 2006; Rysman 2009), little is known about 
what constitutes healthy and viable platform ecosystems in the context of crowdfunding. 
Specifically, governing crowdfunding platforms requires the owners of the platform to 
manage a delicate balance between retaining control and devolving autonomy to the project 
creators in order to encourage them to contribute appealing crowdfunding campaigns 
(Boudreau 2010; Tiwana et al. 2010; Boudreau 2012). In fact, one of the key differential 
factors between the major crowdfunding platforms that exist today is their approach towards 
input control. Input control is a form of formal control or gatekeeping that “represents the 
degree to which the platform owner uses predefined objective acceptance criteria for judging” 
which campaigns and project creators are allowed into their platform ecosystem (Tiwana 
2014, p. 123). For instance, Indiegogo and Kickstarter, the largest reward-based 
crowdfunding platforms today, have taken different approaches to openness in terms of the 
input control they apply. While Indiegogo is completely open in that the platform does not 
apply any input control mechanisms for project creators and thus allows any individual or 
organization to start a campaign on their platform, Kickstarter has, from its beginning, chosen 
to apply input control with a rigorous green-lighting process, meaning that every campaign 
has to be approved by Kickstarter staff manually before it can be published on the platform. 
These approaches to input control applied by Kickstarter and Indiegogo can be compared to 
those taken by Apple and Google in the mobile app market. While Google’s Play Store, similar 
to Indiegogo, does not apply input control mechanisms apart from security checks, Apple’s 
App Store is well known for enacting strict policies to control the quality of apps published on 
the platform. Though applying such mechanisms is costly and can lead to lower numbers of 
apps or campaigns available on the platform, in turn, they have made being published on 
platforms such as Apple’s App Store and Kickstarter a quality signal in itself (Mitroff 2012).  
In June 2014, however, Kickstarter implemented a policy change and now allows project 
creators, similar to Indiegogo, to start campaigns on their own terms without requiring any 
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approval from Kickstarter staff. Kickstarter motivated the change with the expectation that it 
would make the platform easier to use and open it up to new kinds of projects (Strickler 
2014). While Kickstarter did not reveal the strategic intentions behind the decision to abandon 
the screening process, the platform has, in the past, lost lucrative projects to competing 
platforms such as Indiegogo due to the previously strict policies (Jeffries 2014; Kelion 2014). 
However, not imposing any input control to ensure quality might lead to a fragmented 
platform flooded with low-quality content (Coughlan 2004; Bresnahan and Greenstein 2014). 
The policy change gives us the unique opportunity to study the health of Kickstarter’s 
ecosystem before and after this shock, which is considered to be endogenous to the platform 
provider Kickstarter but exogenous for the other platform participants, namely, project 
creators and backers. We want to understand the effects Kickstarter’s decision to remove the 
high entry barriers—and thus to open their formerly rather closed platform—had on the 
platform ecosystem by analyzing how backers and project creators reacted to the change and 
how potential drivers of campaign success changed in response. The policy change thus allows 
insights into the effects that input control mechanisms have on the success of crowdfunding 
platforms. Our research is guided by the following research questions: 
RQ1: How does relinquishing input control affect the platform participants and their behavior? 
RQ2: How are the drivers of campaign success affected by the change in input control? 
Analyzing a total of 67,384 Kickstarter campaigns that cover the period from December 2013 
to December 2014, we found that abolishing input control was a double-edged sword for 
Kickstarter’s ecosystem: While we see a strong increase in the average number of new 
campaigns per day and a significant rise in Kickstarter’s revenue, the policy change led to 
lower average campaign quality and success rates, making the platform less attractive for 
project creators and backers alike.  
Our study contributes to the IS control and still nascent platform ecosystem literature in three 
important ways. First, ours is one of the first studies to conceptualize and examine input 
control as a formal control mechanism and to show how its abolishment affects platform 
participants and their behavior. Prior IS research has focused on output, process, and clan 
control, but inadvertently neglected input control (e.g., Kirsch et al. 2002; Choudhury and 
Sabherwal 2003). Our study therefore complements previous IS control studies and 
demonstrates that input control gains a newfound relevance in platform markets. Second, we 
add to the growing stream of research on the implications of policy changes on the dynamics 
within platform ecosystems (e.g., Claussen et al. 2013; Burtch et al. 2015). In this regard, our 
study is the first to examine the effects of a policy change in respect to control mechanisms 
under conditions of a natural experiment. Finally, and more broadly, our study also shows 
that policy changes can significantly shift the relative importance of signals for the decision-
making of platform users. Therefore, for the providers of platform ecosystems, it is important 
to realize that decision-making processes of users can not only be affected by adjusting 
governance strategies but also that decision cues are fragile and even subtle changes can have 
drastic consequences for the dynamics among platform stakeholders. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First, the theoretical background is laid 
out, followed by a description of the research context. Next, we describe our data and research 
methodology and our descriptive as well as econometric evidence. In the concluding section, 
we discuss the implications for research and practice and point out the paper’s limitations, as 
well as promising areas for future research. 
3.2 Theoretical Background 
3.2.1 Governance and Control in Platform Ecosystems 
Similar to other platform providers, the owners of crowdfunding platforms face the challenge 
of aligning their own objectives with those of the other stakeholders within the platform 
ecosystem, namely, the project creators and backers. Cross-side network effects among the 
distinct groups of stakeholders typically characterize these platform ecosystems, as each side 
derives positive externalities from the participation of the respective other groups (Bakos and 
Katsamakas 2004; Benlian et al. 2015). For instance, the success of a crowdfunding platform 
strongly correlates with the availability of compelling campaigns that attract a sufficient 
number of interested backers. However, project creators will only be willing to contribute 
campaigns if the platform provides sufficient incentives to do so, such as a reasonable 
commission on profit (Rochet and Tirole 2003). The platform providers therefore need to 
create and enforce governance mechanisms by making deliberate choices about decision 
rights, ownership, and control with respect to the platform and by establishing regulating 
guidelines and rules in order to appropriately engage other platform stakeholders 
(Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013; Benlian et al. 2015). Platform governance is generally 
defined as “who makes what decisions about a platform”, where the main challenge for platform 
providers is to “retain sufficient control to ensure the integrity of the platform while relinquishing 
enough control to encourage innovation” (Tiwana et al. 2010, p. 679).  
Though platform governance can be studied from three distinct perspectives (Tiwana et al. 
2010), namely, decision rights, ownership, and control, we focus on the latter perspective in 
this study, as the decision rights and ownership mainly reside with the platform owner in the 
context of crowdfunding and remain unaffected by the policy change. Control refers to 
mechanisms used by controllers in the attempt to influence controlees so that they act and 
behave in accordance with the controller’s objectives and goals (Ouchi 1979; Kirsch 1997). In 
the context of crowdfunding, the platform owner serves as the controller, while the project 
creators can be referred to as the controlees.  
In previous research, two main categories of control have been distinguished, namely, formal 
and informal control (e.g., Kirsch 1996). Within formal control, two distinct modes, output 
(also referred to as outcome) and process (also referred to as behavior) control, have been 
observed (e.g., Ouchi 1979; Eisenhardt 1985). While output control requires the controlee to 
reach a certain goal or objective given by the controller in order to be rewarded, process 
control requires the controlee to adhere to specified procedures and routines during the 
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process and doing so is rewarded. In contrast, informal control modes do not require specific 
incentives to align the goals of controller and controlee as shared norms and values exist 
(Kirsch et al. 2002). Within informal control, self and clan control have been distinguished 
(e.g., Ouchi 1979; Kirsch 1996). Self-control occurs when controlees define and monitor their 
own goals achievement and reward or punish themselves accordingly. Clan control is similar 
to self-control with the exception that a group of controlees, rather than an individual 
controlee, embrace the same values and commit to achieving group goals (Kirsch et al. 2002). 
Though the concept of control originates from organizational theory, it has attracted 
considerable attention among IS scholars (e.g., Kirsch 1997; Kirsch et al. 2002; Tiwana and 
Keil 2009). Yet, it has only been applied in the context of platform ecosystems quite recently 
and with a strong focus on software-based ecosystems (e.g., Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 
2013; Goldbach et al. 2014; Wareham et al. 2014). According to Tiwana (2015), the relevance 
of the mentioned formal and informal control mechanisms in this context is decreasing due 
to redundancy and costliness. For instance, process control is often obsolete in platform 
settings, as platform owners are ultimately interested in the finished complement and are not 
directly affected by costs complementors have to bear, because the relationship between the 
platform provider and complementors is not the classical principal-agent relationship (i.e., 
the complementor is not hired by the platform provider) (Tiwana et al. 2010). Furthermore, 
it has been argued that clan control requires a relatively stable ecosystem in terms of 
complementors and that formal and informal control mechanisms are “less viable in loosely 
coupled organizational structures” (Tiwana 2015, p. 4). Therefore, in loosely coupled 
ecosystems that exhibit high fluctuations in terms of the complementors, like mobile app and 
crowdfunding platforms do, the providers often focus their efforts with respect to control 
mechanisms on input control. Input control can be defined as the degree to which platform 
owners use predefined rules and policies to judge whether a compliment should be allowed 
into the platform (Cardinal et al. 2004; Tiwana et al. 2010). Although scant literature exists 
that considers input control in different forms and contexts (e.g., Snell 1992; Cardinal et al. 
2004; Boudreau 2010; Liu et al. 2014), prior IS research has mainly focused on output, 
process, and clan control, overlooking the increasing relevance of input control (e.g., Kirsch 
et al. 2002; Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003). 
Consequently, there are two gaps in the literature. First, the question of how the presence or 
absence of input control affects platform ecosystems in general and crowdfunding platforms 
in particular remains largely unexplored. Second, different configurations of control 
mechanisms in platform ecosystems have been mainly explored theoretically or in lab 
experiments and thus there is a lack of real-life cases and longitudinal studies in this context. 
3.2.2 Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding, which builds on the broader concept of crowdsourcing (e.g., Poetz and 
Schreier 2012; Bayus 2013; Huang et al. 2014), allows individuals or organizations to reach 
a monetary (project) goal by receiving small financial contributions from a large number of 
individuals instead of choosing the traditional approach and receiving large contributions 
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from a small number of investors. Crowdfunding enables project creators to collect 
contributions from a large number of project backers through an open call, mostly on the 
internet, without standard financial intermediaries (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012; 
Mollick 2014). Over the last few years, a variety of different crowdfunding platforms have 
emerged and four distinct models of crowdfunding have been distinguished: donation-based, 
reward-based, lending-based, and equity-based (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014). These four 
models mainly differ with respect to the return backers can expect from their contribution to 
a campaign, which can either be financial, materialistic, idealistic, or philanthropic in nature 
(Ahlers et al. 2015). In donation-based crowdfunding markets, for instance, backers can 
expect no tangible return and thus pledge for a campaign due to altruism and warm glow 
(Andreoni 2006). In comparison, equity- and lending-based crowdfunding markets offer 
financial returns for the backers, though these returns might not always be the central reason 
to invest (Allison et al. 2013). Finally, in reward-based crowdfunding, backers can expect a 
non-financial tangible benefit for their investment. The rewards can range from small tokens 
of appreciation (e.g., a thank-you card) for an investment of a few dollars to an early access 
to the product developed for an investment of hundreds of dollars (Belleflamme et al. 2014). 
Previous research has found these rewards to be a central reason for backers to participate in 
reward-based crowdfunding (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014). Consequently, reward-based 
crowdfunding does not attract investors in the classical sense, but rather consumption-
oriented backers, interested in the project or in supporting the cause.   
Though research has been undertaken with respect to all four types of crowdfunding, the 
dynamics of reward-based and lending-based crowdfunding have received the most attention 
among researchers so far. Most of this prior work has been focused on identifying 
informational cues (i.e., signals) considered by backers when making investment decisions on 
crowdfunding platforms. In this respect, researchers highlighted the importance of geography 
(e.g., Agrawal et al. 2011; Lin and Viswanathan 2015), the project creator’s social network 
(e.g., Agrawal et al. 2010; Lin et al. 2013), electronic word-of-mouth (e.g., Thies et al. 2014), 
and social information on the platform (e.g., Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014). Though all these 
papers offer valuable contributions, no prior work has provided insights into the effects 
changes in control mechanisms can have on the dynamics within crowdfunding platforms nor 
have the goals of the platform providers and the effects of their decision-making been 
considered. This study therefore is an initial step towards understanding these dynamics and 
the effects of a policy change in this context under conditions of a natural experiment. 
3.3 Research Context 
Our study focuses on Kickstarter, which is one of the leading reward-based crowdfunding 
platforms today. The platform empowers project creators to launch their campaigns and 
acquire funding, customers, and supporters from all over the world. Since its launch in 2009, 
8.4 million people have pledged almost $1.7 billion, funding over 80,000 projects (Kickstarter 
2016b). Prominent examples of projects that published their campaigns on Kickstarter include 
one of the first smartwatches called Pebble, which sold its one millionth watch in December 
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2014, a music player by Neil Young, a full-length movie by Zach Braff, and the Oculus Rift, a 
virtual reality head-mounted display, which was acquired by Facebook in 2014 for 
approximately $2 billion, less than two years after their Kickstarter campaign. 
3.3.1 Economics of Reward-Based Crowdfunding 
3.3.1.1 Goals of the Platform Provider, Project Creators, and Backers 
A goal of every platform owner is to create and exploit as many monetization opportunities 
as possible (Claussen et al. 2013). As crowdfunding platform owners mainly generate revenue 
through transaction-based fees3, managing the demand and the supply side is at the core of 
platform management. Since higher numbers of high-quality campaigns are attractive to 
backers, allowing more campaigns onto the platform seems beneficial for Kickstarter. In turn, 
a high number of campaigns might, however, represent an entry barrier for additional 
complementors (Hagiu 2011). Furthermore, as Kickstarter follows the all-or-nothing funding 
model, where only campaigns that reach their funding goal receive funds and thus generate 
revenue for Kickstarter, campaign quality and funding success are crucial. Thus, simply 
allowing more campaigns onto the platform might not yield any increase in revenue for the 
platform. 
The goals of project creators, on the other hand, are more diverse. Most obviously, project 
creators try to gather as much funding as possible or as much as they require. Furthermore, a 
successful campaign does not only enable the creators to finance their venture or project, but 
it also validates that there is a market for their idea. Hence, the campaigns themselves can 
also have a certain marketing effect for the respective project, as press attention potentially 
follows crowdfunding campaigns (Shane and Cable 2002; Burtch et al. 2013; Mollick 2014). 
Similar to early stage investors that, besides financial support, typically offer advice, 
governance, and prestige (Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002), 
crowdfunding communities also provide additional services to the creators, including 
mentorship to newcomers and feedback on the campaign presentation (Hui et al. 2014). 
Though the rewards have been found to be a central reason for backers to participate in 
reward-based crowdfunding (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014), just like the rewards, the actual 
goals of backers can be extremely heterogeneous (Mollick 2014). Nevertheless, all campaign 
backers may be thought of as individuals making an investment decision based on their 
expectation for success and the appeal of the respective campaign (Agrawal et al. 2011). 
Previous research has shown that backers respond to signals of quality across all crowdfunding 
models and regardless of their expectations for tangible or financial returns (Mollick 2014; 
Burtch et al. 2015).  
                                                   
3 When we refer to revenue, this only includes the transaction-based fees the crowdfunding platform 
charges. 
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3.3.1.2 Drivers of Campaign Success 
Since investments in crowdfunding campaigns are highly uncertain, potential backers often 
need to make their investment decisions based on limited and potentially biased information 
provided by the project creator. Therefore, drivers of success for crowdfunding campaigns, 
such as quality signals, have been of great interest to scholars so far (e.g., Mollick 2014; Ahlers 
et al. 2015). The assumption is that these signals reveal the underlying quality of a project, 
ensuring that projects with a higher quality receive more funding compared to those with a 
lower quality (Mollick 2014). According to signaling theory, quality signals can only be 
credible if a project creator offering a low quality has higher costs acquiring them compared 
to a project creator offering a high quality (Spence 1973; Kirmani and Rao 2000; Connelly et 
al. 2011). Hence, prior to the policy change, being allowed to publish a campaign on 
Kickstarter could be considered a quality signal in itself, as passing the input control was a 
greater challenge for low-quality projects. As higher information asymmetry increases the 
relevance of quality signals, the omission of this inherent quality signal should increase the 
importance of the remaining signals. Thus, our goal is to assess the reaction of the crowd to 
the omission of the input control and to determine how the policy change affected the relative 
impact of the remaining quality signals on the backers’ decisions to fund a campaign.  
Mollick (2014) gave an early assessment of the role of quality in crowdfunding and identified 
several signals that influence campaign success. As crowdfunding offers a wide range of 
quality signals, we will present them in two stages. We first consider the level of preparedness 
of the creator as a signal of quality (Chen et al. 2009). Hence, we examine three signals that 
are determined before the campaign is launched on the platform. First, did the creator 
produce a video for his campaign? Uploading a video is strongly recommended by Kickstarter, 
claiming that campaigns that do not contain a video have a much lower success rate compared 
to those that do (Kickstarter 2016a). Second, we evaluate the preparedness by looking at the 
description length (DL) of the campaign, the underlying intuition being that a longer and 
more detailed description can reduce the information asymmetry better than a shorter 
description. Third, given that not only length but also the quality of the description serves as 
a signal, we checked for spelling errors (SE) as the lack of proofreading implies reduced 
preparedness and generally lower quality (Mollick 2014). To identify spelling errors, we 
matched the project description against the list of the 4,260 most commonly misspelled words 
in Wikipedia articles4 (Wikimedia Foundation 2016).  
Next, we turn to quality signals relevant during the funding period. Again, we use three quality 
signals that are based on prior research. First, another recommendation from the platform 
provider is to add “updates that build momentum” (Kickstarter 2016a). Furthermore, updates 
indicate a prepared creator (Mollick 2014) and also serve as a communication tool. Updates 
are often used to clarify certain aspects of the project and respond to frequent inquiries from 
the community. We therefore include the update frequency (UF) as a measure of quality. 
                                                   
4 Words that could yield false positives (i.e., words that are correct in other contexts) were removed from 
the list. 
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Second, the success of social media led to a strong presence of what is referred to as social 
information in electronic markets, which has become an important signal for consumers to 
use for decision support. Qualitative (e.g., electronic word-of-mouth) as well as quantitative 
(e.g., download rankings) social information has been shown to affect consumer decision-
making during online purchases (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Duan et al. 2008b), 
helping them to overcome the information asymmetry for products whose value is difficult to 
ascertain before purchase (Akerlof 1970). In this regard, Thies et al. (2014) examined effects 
of social buzz on the likelihood of success of crowdfunding campaigns. Their findings show 
that social buzz (especially Facebook shares) positively influences campaign backing in the 
future. We therefore included Tweets on Twitter (TTW) and Facebook Shares (FBS) as quality 
signals. 
As our final measure of quality, we employ a quality signal that cannot be altered by the 
project creators directly. Following Mollick (2014), we determined whether the project’s 
campaign was a so-called Staff Pick (SP), meaning that the campaign was featured on 
Kickstarter’s homepage and was added to a separate list of campaigns recommended by the 
platform. This special promotion offered by the platform itself is reserved for campaigns that 
are selected by Kickstarter staff because they are particularly compelling with respect to the 
video, description, rewards, or the project idea (Kickstarter 2016a).  
3.3.2 Policy Change on Kickstarter 
Project creators who are interested in publishing a campaign on Kickstarter have to go through 
a process of creating an account with the platform and then setting up their campaign by 
filling out an online form several pages long. To start a campaign, the project creator is then 
required to upload a photo, add a title and a description, outline the comprised rewards, and 
is encouraged to provide a campaign video and additional information. Once this process has 
been completed, the quality of the finished campaign is evaluated by Kickstarter staff based 
on a set of rules and policies defined by the platform. This formal input control applied by 
Kickstarter is rather unique in the context of reward-based crowdfunding, but regularly 
applied in software-based platform ecosystem such as Apple’s App Store. Despite this control 
mechanism project creators had to subject themselves to, Kickstarter has become one of the 
leading crowdfunding platforms over the last few years. Still, creators of lucrative projects 
regularly decided to publish their campaign on a different platform such as Indiegogo after 
being rejected by Kickstarter due to the strict rules and policies (Jeffries 2014; Kelion 2014).  
In June 2014, Kickstarter altered its strategy with respect to the control mechanisms by 
implementing a policy change regarding their approval process for campaigns that entailed 
two major changes (Strickler 2014). First, the control mechanisms the project creators had to 
subject themselves to prior to the change were replaced with an algorithm verifying that the 
campaign fulfills the basic requirements (e.g., has a description). Second, the previously 
elaborate list of rules and policies was reduced to only three rules, requiring campaigns to be 
shareable, honest, and within the confines of reward-based crowdfunding (Strickler 2014). 
Kickstarter announced this policy change with the following statement: 
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 “We want creators to have the support and freedom they need when building their 
projects. That’s why we’re introducing a feature called Launch Now. It gives creators a 
simple choice: go ahead and launch your project whenever you’re ready, or get feedback 
from one of our Community Managers first.” (Strickler 2014)   
What motivated Kickstarter to implement such a major policy change and move from a curated 
to a more open platform despite its popularity and success? Though excluding low-quality 
campaigns from the platform is an error-prone and expensive process, moving from authority-
based platform governance with rules and policies to a more trust-based governance that is 
based on the assumption that the controlee has a strong intrinsic motivation to reach the 
desired goal (i.e., a high-quality campaign) can, in fact, unbalance the ecosystem (de Reuver 
and Bouwman 2012). While it is likely that, after the policy change, an increasing number of 
campaigns will be published on the platform due to the removed control mechanisms, letting 
a thousand flowers bloom might have negative effects for the ecosystem. The uncontrolled 
variance in the quality of campaigns can lead to a situation where, ultimately, the platform 
provider has to bear the negative costs of the poor quality provided by the complementors 
(Wolter and Veloso 2008). For example, during the Atari shock in the 1980s, Atari’s platform 
was flooded with low-quality video games due to its inability to control quality, which 
ultimately led to bankruptcy (Coughlan 2004). At the same time, platform ecosystems must 
employ mechanisms to leverage autonomy to complementors in order to generate a sufficient 
number of high-quality and innovative complements that foster user adoption and let the 
market determine winners and losers (Wareham et al. 2014).  
As Kickstarter’s policy change was not announced beforehand, giving backers as well as 
creators no time to adapt their strategies prior to the change, it can be assumed endogenous 
for the platform owner but exogenous for project creators and backers. This setting therefore 
offers a unique opportunity to examine how intentionally relinquishing control over a 
platform affects the dynamic relationship among the different stakeholders, which we 
examine in the remainder of this paper. To identify the dynamics caused by the policy change, 
we use descriptive as well as econometric evidence. 
3.4 Data and Methodology 
We collected a unique, daily time series dataset that covers the period from December 4th 
2013 to December 3rd 2014, and contains a total of 67,384 Kickstarter campaigns that started 
within this timeframe. The policy change (PC) was enacted from 3rd of June onward, giving 
us 6 months of data before and after the policy change. We chose this time span to adequately 
control for seasonality and time trend effects. For each campaign, our dataset includes the 
start date and performance indicators such as the number of backers and the amount of 
funding the campaign received. Furthermore, we recorded indicators for the campaign’s 
quality such as whether it contains a video, the length of the project description, social buzz, 
and update frequency.  
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Our data is suitable for our purposes for several reasons. First, this natural experiment-like 
change of control mechanisms allows for similar identification as for field experiments 
(Goldfarb and Tucker 2011; Tucker and Zhang 2011; Claussen et al. 2013). Second, we have 
data on campaigns before and after the policy change, which lets us isolate its effect. Third, 
as we have data on every campaign that ran on the platform in the specific period, we are 
able to avoid selection or survivor biases. Finally, Kickstarter is one of the most prominent 
crowdfunding platforms, making the results relevant for the entire industry.  
Our applied research method is twofold. We first consider descriptive and illustrative evidence 
for the effects of the policy change on Kickstarter with regard to key metrics of the ecosystem. 
We then continue with a negative binominal regression (NB) to test how the rule change 
moderated the relative importance of the drivers of campaign success, measured by the total 
number of campaign backers. Variable definitions, abbreviations, summary statistics—before 
and after the policy change—and pairwise correlations for all numerical variables are given 
in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2. To check for robustness of our model results and to rule out 
alternative explanation for the observed effects of the policy change, we conducted a number 
of robustness checks that are described in detail in the respective section below. 
3.4.1 Descriptive Evidence 
We first look at the development of the ecosystem before and after the policy change based 
on the descriptive statistics. Given that the policy change is exogenous for project creators and 
backers, we can use this quasi-experimental setting to draw inferences from changes in 
numbers once the policy change (PC) is enacted. Since Kickstarter offers creators the 
opportunity to choose from eight different currencies, we converted all monetary values to 
USD based on the respective average exchange rate of 2014. Drawing from the numbers of 
Table 3-1, we observe a general decline of performance as well as quality indicators on the 
campaign level, while on the platform level a general increase of the key indicators is 
prevalent. 
First, the average number of backers a campaign receives decreases by almost 40%. This 
decline is also mirrored in a decreased average funding of campaigns, formerly at almost 
$10,000, now plummeting to a mere $6,644. On the other hand, these declining numbers 
could be a result of the decline in quality, evident by the campaign’s quality indicators and 
drivers of success. For instance, after the policy change, only 61% of all campaigns contained 
a video, down from 80%. Also, update frequency, description length and Facebook shares 
underwent a sharp decrease. The exceptions here are Twitter tweets and the percentage of 
campaigns that contained spelling errors. While tweets rose on average after the policy 
change, spelling errors declined, which is supposedly due to the shorter descriptions and the 
consequently lower susceptibility to spelling mistakes. The decreased percentage of 
campaigns that reach their funding goal further supports the argument for the declining 
average quality and the quick reaction of the crowd to the policy change.  
Next, we take a closer look at the key indicators on a platform level. As mentioned before, the 
goal of the platform owner is to create monetization opportunities. While we observe a general 
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decline in quality and funding on a campaign level, platform indicators suggest that the policy 
change indeed increased platform revenue, as the increased number of campaigns 
compensated for the lower average revenue per campaign. Still, the variance of the weekly 
revenue sharply increased, pointing towards less predictable revenue streams for the platform. 
Table 3-1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Total Before PC After PC Change 
Mean (SD) 
Backers Number of campaign backers 94 (678) 123 (884) 78 (524) -37% 
Pledged Amount Amount the campaign 
accumulated in USD 
$7,844 
(77,486) 
$9,942 
(78,393) 
$6,644 
(76,938) 
-33% 
Pledge Goal Target amount of the 
campaign in USD 
$47,260 
(1,197,845) 
$33,174 
(719,147) 
$55,313 
(1,399,756) 
+67% 
Duration Funding duration in days 32.7 (11.1) 32.4 (10.7) 32.9 (11.3) +2% 
Staff Pick (SP) Dummy is 1 if the campaign is 
a Staff Pick; 0 otherwise 
0.11 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.11 (0.32) -8% 
Video Dummy is 1 if the campaign 
contains a video; 0 otherwise 
0.68 (0.5) 0.80 (0.4) 0.61 (0.5) -24% 
Description Length (DL) Length of the campaign 
description in characters 
3,512 
(3,748) 
3,998 
(3,807) 
3,234 
(3,685) 
-19% 
Spelling Errors (SE) Dummy is 1 if the description 
contains error(s); 0 otherwise 
0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) -3% 
Update Frequency (UF) Number of daily updates the 
creator posts 
0.14 (0.28) 0.18 (0.34) 0.11 (0.23) -39% 
Facebook Shares 
(FBS) 
Number of Facebook shares 
the campaign received 
325.29 
(4,463) 
374.30 
(6,033) 
297.28 
(3,242) 
-21% 
Twitter Tweets (TTW) Number of tweets on Twitter 
the campaign received 
81.7 (646.9) 76.5 (667.6) 84.7 (634) +11% 
Success Rate Percentage of campaigns that 
reach their pledge goal 
0.33 (0.47) 0.42 (0.49) 0.29 (0.45) -31% 
Account Age Days between account 
creation and start of 
campaign 
262 (379) 278 (367) 252 (385) -9% 
Platform Revenue per 
Campaign 
5% commission for 
successful campaigns 
$342 (3,865) $437 (3,906) $288 (3,779) -34% 
Weekly Platform 
Revenue 
Average weekly revenue $480,524 
(190,879) 
$444,663 
(156,406) 
$501,026 
(205,242) 
+13% 
Total Platform 
Revenue 
Cumulative revenue during 
observational period 
$2.31e+07 $1.07e+07 $1.24e+07 +16% 
N per Day New campaigns per day 242.7 (9.5) 163.0 (53.2) 288.4 (127.7) +77% 
Observations Number of campaigns 67,384 24,511 42,873 +75% 
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To further illustrate this development, Figure 3-1 shows the average number of new 
campaigns on Kickstarter during our observational period. The underlying data for Figure 3-1 
and Figure 3-2 was averaged on a weekly level as well as the 6-month period before and after 
the policy change to create a clearer representation. We observe that prior to the policy 
change, the number of new campaigns was significantly lower and underwent a sharp increase 
shortly after the enactment. Figure 3-1 also plots the average revenue the platform generates 
with a single campaign during our observational period. Here, we notice the sharp decline 
after the policy change. Two distinctive effects of the policy change are shown in Figure 3-1. 
First, the removal of the entry barrier enabled more project creators to publish their campaign 
on the platform, increasing the variety of choice for potential backers. On the other hand, as 
the number of campaigns rose, the average funding per campaign declined. This indicates 
that the increased absolute number of campaigns was not necessarily accompanied by an 
increased absolute number of backers. 
 
Figure 3-1 Effects of the Policy Change on Count and Revenue of Campaigns 
Figure 3-2 combines the two graphs from Figure 3-1 and plots the total weekly revenue as 
well as the average of the average before and after the policy change against the start date of 
the respective campaigns. We identify a small increase in weekly platform revenue. However, 
the increased revenue is accompanied by an increased variance of it, making it less 
predictable, and suggesting a development towards a more blockbuster-based ecosystem 
(Rosen 1981). This is also reflected by the platform revenue of $664,261 that was generated 
with the campaign of The Coolest Cooler that started shortly after the policy change. 
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Figure 3-2 Effects of the Policy Change on Platform Revenue 
Overall, we see a decline in average campaign quality (i.e., fewer updates, fewer videos, 
shorter descriptions), as well as higher and allegedly more unrealistic funding goals and a 
decreased success rate. Still, the numbers also suggest higher total revenues for the platform 
provider when looking at the absolute numbers, which denotes that the higher number of 
campaigns compensated the lower success rate and average funding amount per campaign. A 
possible explanation for the decline in quality could be the time creators invest on the platform 
before starting their campaign. Creators that familiarize themselves with the platform longer 
can be expected to contribute a more appealing campaign. We therefore looked at the account 
age of creators and witness a strong decline in the average number of days an account exist 
before the campaign is launched. Furthermore, after the policy change, almost 25% of all 
creator accounts have been in existence for a week or less before their campaign launched, 
up from 13%. It could be argued that these inexperienced and hasty project creators are a 
major driver of the decline in campaign quality. To further deepen our understanding of the 
implications of the policy change, especially for project creators and backers, we will now turn 
to our econometric analysis. 
3.4.2 Econometric Evidence 
Our econometric analysis focuses on the effects of the policy change for the drivers of success 
for crowdfunding campaigns. To do this, we employ a negative binominal regression (NB) to 
test how the rule change affected the drivers of campaign success and their signaling effects 
on prospective backers’ pledge behavior by using the number of backers as our dependent 
variable. We chose the number of backers as our main proxy for success as we are more 
interested in the actual backer’s decision of whether to fund the project or not, instead of in 
the absolute investment amount, especially as the individual funding amount is strongly 
driven by the material rewards offered by the project creator. Still, the correlation between 
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backers and funding amount is relatively high, which makes it possible to infer the overall 
success of a campaign from the number of backers. 
We use a robust negative binominal regression instead of a Poisson regression as our 
dependent variable is a significantly overdispersed count variable (Long 1997; Cameron and 
Trivedi 2005) and the equidispersion restriction of the Poisson model is relaxed here (Greene 
2008). Still, all results are robust to the Poisson specification. Our model is then formalized 
as follows: 
E yi xi,εi = exp (α+xiβ+εi)	
where yi denotes the number of backers, xi represents project specific independent variables 
and control variables, while εi acts as the error term.  
Table 3-2 Pairwise Correlations for Numerical Variables 
We included several controls in our model to account for alternative explanations. All 
numerical variables and their correlations are given in Table 3-2. First, we used a category 
dummy for all 15 project categories on Kickstarter, ranging from art to film, fashion, music, 
and technology. We further implemented a time dummy for each month to control for possible 
seasonality effects and the general growth trend of crowdfunding platforms. Additional 
controls are the campaign duration to account for the exposure length and the natural 
logarithm of its funding goal. Our baseline model (1) furthermore includes all aforementioned 
drivers of success, including the description length, update frequency, and social buzz 
measures. We then added the dummy variable PC in model 2 to indicate the policy change. 
The dummy turns from 0 to 1 if the campaign started after the input control was revoked. In 
order to model the moderating effect of the policy change on the relationship between project 
success drivers and campaign backing, we then subsequently include all potential drivers of 
project backers as main effects as well as in interaction terms with the rule change in models 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Backers 1.00           
2 Duration 0.00 1.00          
3 LN (Pledge Goal) 0.10* 0.21* 1.00         
4 Staff Pick 0.16* -0.03* 0.11* 1.00        
5 Video 0.08* -0.02* 0.23* 0.20* 1.00       
6 LN (Description Length) 0.13* 0.01 0.31* 0.23* 0.38* 1.00      
7 Spelling Errors 0.01* 0.02* 0.05* -0.00 0.01* 0.012* 1.00     
8 Update Frequency 0.22* -0.15* 0.04* 0.26* 0.22* 0.31* 0.02* 1.00    
9 LN (Facebook Shares) 0.20* 0.00 0.21* 0.33* 0.43* 0.40* -0.00 0.38* 1.00   
10 LN (Twitter Tweets) 0.22* 0.01* 0.24* 0.34* 0.35* 0.39* 0.01* 0.40* 0.71* 1.00  
11 Policy Change (PC) -0.03* 0.02* -0.05* -0.01 -0.20* -0.15* -0.01 -0.12* -0.09* -0.04* 1.00 
Note: t statistics are omitted for brevity. * p < 0.05. 
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(3) to (7). The interaction term then lets us discern if each quality indicator became a more 
important driver of success after the policy change. Respectively, if the signaling power of the 
alterable signal was enhanced after the inherent quality signal was attenuated. 
Table 3-3 Negative Binominal Regression on Campaign Backing 
Based on the results of the model (2) in Table 3-3, we can confirm the conclusion drawn from 
our descriptive evidence that the policy change caused a decline in the number of backers. 
The policy change decreases the number of backers by a factor of 0.59, with all other variables 
held constant. We calculated this incidence rate ratio from exponentiating the policy change 
variable’s coefficient (Long 1997). Incidence rate ratios for other variables were calculated in 
the same way. In the subsequent models, we see that quality indicators generally became 
more important after the policy change, indicated by the positive and significant coefficients 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Category (Control) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month (Control) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Duration -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
LN (Pledge Goal) -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
Staff Pick 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.39*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 
Video 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.19*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 
LN (Description Len.) 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.1*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
Spelling Errors -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
Update Frequency 2.37*** 2.34*** 2.35*** 2.35*** 2.35*** 2.34*** 1.99*** 2.35*** 2.36*** 
LN (Facebook Shares) 0.39*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.33*** 0.4*** 
LN (Twitter Tweets) 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 
Policy Change (PC)  -0.89*** -0.92*** -1.06*** -1.33*** -0.89*** -1*** -1.23*** -0.99*** 
PC x Staff Pick   0.22***       
PC x Video    0.23***      
PC x LN (DL)     0.06***     
PC x Spelling Errors      -0.01    
PC x Update Frequency      0.77***   
PC x LN (FBS)        0.12***  
PC x LN (TTW)         0.07*** 
BIC 533,904 533,469 533,412 533,367 533,429 533,481 533,183 532,519 533,259 
Log Likelihood -266,752 -266,529 -266,495 -266,472 -266,503 -266,529 -266,380 -266,049 -266,418 
chi2 70,292 70,508 71,528 70,439 70,463 70,516 72,647 71,993 72,271 
N 67,384 67,384 67,384 67,384 67,384 67,384 67,384 67,384 67,384 
Note: t statistics are omitted for brevity. A constant is calculated but not reported. * p <0 .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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of the interaction terms in models (3) to (7). The positive effect of being a Staff Pick from the 
platform or having a video increased by a factor of 30%, while the importance of the 
description length only increased by about 10%. The exception here is spelling errors, which 
did not increase in signaling strength. Still, it is the only negative signaling in our analysis. 
The biggest gain in explanatory power compared to the baseline model, indicated by the lower 
BIC, was achieved in models (7) through (9), which incorporated the interaction terms with 
update frequency, Facebook shares, and Twitter tweets highlighting the increased importance 
of social buzz and community interaction after the policy change. Here, the signaling effect of 
Twitter tweets as well as Facebook shares became, again with all other variables held constant, 
approximately 10% stronger. 
In summary, we have gathered strong evidence that the rule change indeed incentivized 
creators to publish lower quality campaigns on the platform as the input control mechanism 
was removed. On the other hand, the increased number of campaigns compensated for the 
lower quality with regard to platform revenue by sheer volume. Additionally, we found strong 
empirical evidence that the removal of an important quality signal encourages users to put 
more emphasis on the remaining quality indicators.   
3.4.3 Robustness Checks 
To check for the robustness of our models, we conducted six sets of robustness checks. All 
tests resulted in similar significance levels and identical directions of all relevant coefficients. 
First, we ran an OLS regression with the natural logarithm of the monetary project funding as 
the dependent variable. Second, we implemented a dummy variable that turned to one if the 
campaign reached or exceeded its funding goal. We then ran a probit regression with this 
dummy as the dependent variable to further validate our results. Third, we also ran a Poisson 
regression with the original specification, again resulting in the same directions and 
significance of all relevant coefficients. Fourth, we excluded all campaigns whose funding 
period coincided with the policy change. Fifth, as Kickstarter removed a number of rules on 
the same date the policy change was enacted and therefore allowed certain projects onto the 
platform after the policy change that were previously prohibited, we excluded all campaigns 
that would not have been possible prior to the policy change based on the subcategories they 
were listed in for a further robustness check. Furthermore, in the weeks following the policy 
change, Kickstarter added two new campaign categories to the website, namely, Crafts and 
Journalism. For a further robustness check, we also removed all campaigns from our analysis 
that were listed in these two categories. Finally, we shrank the observed time period around 
the policy change by moving to a time window first from 12 to 6 months and then down to 3 
months. Specifications show that our results persist over these shorter time frames as well. In 
order to control for rival explanations, we included control variables in our main regression 
as well as in all other robustness checks, including campaign categories, general time trends, 
campaign durations, and funding goals. All of our results can therefore be considered to be 
robust with regard to alternative explanations and campaign success measurements. 
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3.5 Discussion 
Our analysis of the policy change on Kickstarter with respect to the abolishment of input 
control yielded several interesting results. Corresponding to our first research question, we 
find that the policy change had a profound impact on each of the platform’s stakeholders and 
the dynamic relationships among them. According to the announcement published by 
Kickstarter to explain and justify the policy change, one of the main goals was to allow “more 
diverse ideas to thrive on Kickstarter” (Strickler 2014). While our results show that this goal 
was achieved with an increase of 77% in the number of new campaigns per day after the 
policy change, it is accompanied by a decrease in average campaign quality. We see that, as a 
reaction to the policy change, almost all quality signals that can be influenced directly (e.g., 
campaign video) or indirectly (e.g., Facebook shares) by the project creator see a strong 
decrease. It thus seems that the screening process was not automatically substituted by any 
informal control mechanism such as clan or self-control that would have encouraged project 
creators to define and monitor their own goals or embrace group values and therefore commit 
themselves to higher quality campaigns. This is not surprising, as posting a campaign on the 
platform is not a long-term commitment for project creators and Kickstarter therefore does 
not provide a stable ecosystem in terms of complementors, which is required to deploy clan 
control (Ouchi 1979). Kickstarter recently started trying to prolong the relevance of the 
platform for project creators with a new feature called Spotlight, which turns every successful 
campaign into a showcase and web shop for the respective project (Kickstarter 2015c). This 
might be a first attempt to establish a shared vision for the platform among the different 
stakeholders. Currently, however, Kickstarter leaves the complementors broad latitude to 
decide what and how they want to contribute to the platform, which makes it difficult to 
ensure coordination (i.e., who contributes what campaigns) and task completion (i.e., 
publishing high-quality campaigns), since leaving the platform is as easy as joining (Gulati et 
al. 2012, p. 576). Our results confirm this, as we see that after the policy change, the project 
creators publish their own campaign more quickly after creating their account with the 
platform, meaning that they invest less time to familiarize themselves with the platform and 
possible success factors.  
For our second research question, we examined how the drivers of campaign success were 
affected by the policy change. We find that after the policy change, all of the inspected quality 
signals—with the exception of the absence of spelling errors—became more important for the 
potential backers’ evaluation of campaigns. This effect was to be expected, as being able to 
publish a campaign on Kickstarter is not a valid quality signal in itself anymore. Considering 
this and the decrease in campaign quality, it is not surprising that we see a lower average 
success rate after the policy change and a widening gap between the project creators’ 
expectations (pledge goal) and the amount their campaigns eventually accumulate (pledged 
amount). Though this means that, on average, individual campaigns generate less revenue 
for the platform provider, also making the platform less lucrative for complementors, the data 
shows that this drop is compensated for by the increase in the number of campaigns.  
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While the true intentions behind the policy change remain hidden, exploiting as many 
monetization opportunities as possible is at the core of platform management (Claussen et al. 
2013). Even though this goal was therefore achieved with the policy change, we see that, due 
to Kickstarter’s all-or-nothing funding model, the apparent increase in platform revenue is 
more dependent on fewer blockbuster campaigns, evident by the rise in market concentration 
towards a smaller percentage of campaigns that gather most of the funding. Though 
relinquishing control over the platform should help turn Kickstarter into a long tail market, 
where niche complements contribute substantially to the platform’s revenue due to their sheer 
volume (Anderson 2006; Elberse 2008), the platform provider inhibits this development 
through the all-or-nothing funding model, which is not compulsory on the platform of 
Kickstarter’s strongest competitor Indiegogo. 
3.5.1 Theoretical Contributions 
Our study makes three important contributions to the IS control literature and to the emerging 
research on platform ecosystems. First, previous IS control studies have focused almost 
exclusively on output, process, and clan control, but inadvertently neglected input control 
(e.g., Kirsch et al. 2002; Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003). Ours is one of the first studies to 
conceptualize and examine input control as a formal control mechanism and to show how its 
abolishment affects critical performance indicators on platforms, such as financial 
performance and project diversity as well as end-user and complementor participation. As a 
result, we were not only able to analyze the impact of the input control change on an 
aggregate platform level, but also on a more granular level for different platform stakeholders. 
Our study thus complements previous IS control studies and demonstrates that input control 
(or the lack thereof) can have tremendous financial and behavioral effects on platforms. 
Second, we add to the growing stream of research on the implications of policy changes on 
platform ecosystems (e.g., Claussen et al. 2013; Burtch et al. 2015) by showing how adjusting 
a critical platform governance mechanism can affect an entire platform ecosystem and what 
dynamics unfold on the part of the different stakeholders. To the best of our knowledge, our 
study is also the first in a crowdfunding ecosystem to examine the effects of a sophisticated 
control change under conditions of a natural experiment. We believe, however, that our 
insights are not strictly limited to this context, as input control mechanisms are a ubiquitous 
phenomenon in platform ecosystems overall. Finally, and more broadly, our study also shows 
that policy changes can have significant effects on platform signaling, by demonstrating that 
changes in platform governance mechanisms can significantly shift the relative importance of 
signals for platform users and have considerable consequences for the overall dynamics 
among platform stakeholders. As such, our findings highlight that quality signals (i.e., users’ 
decision cues) on platforms are fragile and vulnerable to (internal and external) shocks rather 
than static and stable over time. 
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3.5.2 Practical Implications 
Beyond the theoretical contributions of this paper, we also see a variety of practical 
implications that should be considered by the providers of crowdfunding platforms and 
project creators. 
3.5.2.1 Providers of Platform Ecosystems 
For the providers of platform ecosystems, it is important to realize that changes in governance 
mechanisms can have a substantial influence on decision-making processes of users and 
complementors. It is therefore crucial for the platform providers to develop a deep 
understanding of the complementors’ (project creators’) goals, strategies, and capabilities that 
might be affected by any policy changes and of any potential areas of conflict that might arise 
(Yoffie and Kwak 2006). For example, after the policy change, Kickstarter attracted a number 
of campaigns likely to be hoax that may be seen as a form of rebellion against the new relaxed 
policies (Lecher 2014).  
Prior research has found that it is a managerial challenge to exercise enough control over a 
platform to ensure integrity while relinquishing enough control to encourage innovation (e.g., 
Boudreau 2010; Tiwana et al. 2010; Boudreau 2012; Tiwana 2015). In this respect, platform 
providers can either enact hard input control mechanisms based on rules and policies or 
incentivize complementors through soft stimuli. Though Kickstarter became successful before 
the policy change despite the screening process and managed to provide a high average 
campaign quality due to this mechanism, such mechanisms can also “be counterproductive in 
a nascent market in which consumer preferences are not (yet) settled” as innovative 
complements might fail to comply with any established criteria (Claussen et al. 2013, p. 199). 
Though the platform’s rising revenue seems to confirm that the decision to abolish input 
control was the appropriate approach for Kickstarter, the decreasing average campaign quality 
suggests that the policy change has the potential to backfire in the long run. The platform 
provider should employ other, soft mechanisms to encourage project creators to contribute 
higher quality campaigns in the future. Facebook, for instance, managed to increase the 
average quality of third party apps offered on the platform by rewarding highly engaging apps 
with further opportunities to engage users (Claussen et al. 2013). Though Kickstarter offers a 
similar mechanism with the so-called Staff Picks, there is no clear and democratic path to 
becoming featured by Kickstarter that would ensure equal access for every project creator and 
motivate them  to invest in higher quality campaigns (cf., Kickstarter 2015b). 
3.5.2.2 Project Creators 
For project creators, the easier access to the platform seems attractive, but goes along with 
stronger competition due to the increased number of rival campaigns. Though crowdfunding 
campaigns on Kickstarter are most often unique and therefore do not compete for backers 
directly, each campaign has to compete with all other campaigns running at the same time 
for the attention of the prospective backers browsing Kickstarter. This is particularly true 
within the distinct categories (e.g., technology or design) that are used on the platform to sort 
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and rank campaigns. Furthermore, being able to publish a campaign on Kickstarter could 
previously be regarded an important and inherent quality signal, which no longer exists after 
the policy change. This further increases the competition for project creators with campaigns 
on other platforms. Consequently, the policy change increases the focus on the quality of 
individual campaigns and on the ability of the project creators to raise the awareness for their 
campaigns (e.g., through marketing), as the market solely determines winners and losers after 
the policy change and the increased number of campaigns makes it more difficult for the 
project creators to stand out of the crowd. 
3.5.2.3 Backers 
After the policy change, prospective backers have more choice, which possibly attracts 
individuals who previously did not participate in crowdfunding. On the other hand, this goes 
along with increased search costs and information asymmetry (Bakos 1997), as being able to 
publish a campaign on the platform is not a valid quality signal in itself anymore and backers 
therefore have to consider other quality signals in order to evaluate whether to pledge for a 
specific campaign. Our results confirm this, as we were able to show that due to the policy 
change, backers shifted their attention to other prevalent quality signals such as social buzz. 
3.6 Limitations, Future Research, and Conclusion  
While our study provides important insights and contributions to both research and practice 
in the context of platform ecosystems and control mechanisms, it is exploratory in several 
respects and we acknowledge certain limitations that need to be considered when interpreting 
the results and implications. First, our data is aggregated on a campaign level, meaning that 
we can only observe the aggregate behavior of backers and not the choices made by 
individuals. Furthermore, our data did not allow us to compare the characteristics of backers 
(e.g., demographics) before and after the policy change. Future studies could therefore focus 
on the backers’ perspective to determine how the abolishment of input control mechanisms 
and the subsequent increase in variation and decrease in quality of a platform’s complements 
influences decision-making on an individual level. Second, though we study one of the most 
prominent crowdfunding platforms, we only observe a specific time frame in its evolution 
within a still young and very dynamic market. Therefore, one should be cautious when 
extrapolating our findings to other, more mature platform ecosystems. Third, even though we 
deliberately chose to observe a rather long period before and after the policy change to avoid 
focusing on short-term dynamics, it remains unclear how long the measured effects persisted 
after the abolishment of the input control mechanisms. Finally, input control mechanisms are 
just one of multiple ways platform providers can relinquish or exercise control over 
complementors. Nevertheless, we believe that our study offers unique insights into the various 
effects and dynamics a platform owner can provoke when altering control mechanisms.  
In conclusion, our overarching finding is that Kickstarter’s policy change regarding the 
abolishment of input control was a double-edged sword for the platform’s ecosystem. On the 
one hand, it increased the number and variety of campaigns, which is in line with the platform 
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provider’s expectation and might attract a higher number of backers in the future, therefore 
increasing platform revenue and prominence. On the other hand, the benefit of the increased 
number of campaigns is diminished, as Kickstarter’s all-or-nothing funding model mitigates 
the marginal utility of additional campaigns. Furthermore, Kickstarter might lose its distinct 
status as a high-quality crowdfunding platform due to the decreasing average quality and 
success rates. Prospective project creators might therefore turn to rival platforms with more 
attractive funding conditions in the future.  
This study contributes to the emerging literature on governance strategies for platform 
ecosystems and the role of input control in this context. We hope that our results provide 
impetus for further analysis of governance strategies for loosely coupled platform ecosystems 
and give actionable recommendations to platform providers and project creators in the 
crowdfunding context. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Crowdfunding allows individuals and organizations to raise funds for a diversity of projects 
through an open call on the internet. Compared to the traditional approach of fundraising, 
crowdfunding is focused on collecting rather small contributions from a large number of 
individuals. According to an industry report, the combined crowdfunding market was worth 
about $5 billion and achieved a growth rate beyond 80% in 2013 (Kartaszewicz-Grell et al. 
2013). The recent success of crowdfunding platforms such as Indiegogo and Kickstarter has 
made crowdfunding an increasingly attractive alternative for sourcing capital and has resulted 
in significant attention for the concept among academics as well as practitioners.  
As crowdfunding platforms are two-sided markets, network effects between the project 
creators and supporters (backers) are prevalent (Eisenmann et al. 2006). While project 
creators seek to attract backers by creating compelling campaigns, prospective backers often 
need to make their investment decisions based on limited and potentially biased information 
provided by the creator. Furthermore, there is usually no legal obligation for the creator of a 
reward-based crowdfunding campaign to actually deliver the advertised merit (Mollick 2014). 
Fortunately, today’s social web offers information that helps prospective backers to evaluate 
the trustworthiness of a crowdfunding project. In this regard, prior-contribution behaviors, in 
the form of the number of previous backers, and social buzz, equivalent to eWOM on social 
media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, are important quality signals for a campaign. 
Inferring project quality from these signals leads to informational cascades, an information-
based explanation for herd behavior that occurs when individuals who face a certain decision 
choose to follow the actions of others who faced the same decision earlier on, instead of taking 
a decision based on their own private information (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; 1998; Duan et 
al. 2009). 
Previous research has shown that informational cascades occur regularly on the internet, 
especially when adopting goods whose value can only be ascertained after the purchase (e.g., 
Duan et al. 2009). Likewise, Zhang and Liu (2012) and (Herzenstein et al. 2011a) have found 
that in equity- and lending-based crowdfunding markets, individuals tend to contribute to 
projects that already have a lot of support from the community to reduce their own risk in the 
face of uncertainty about the proposed new project. (Burtch et al. 2013) have shown that in 
donation-based markets, prior contribution leads to a substitution effect, as potential backers 
see less “need” to support the specific project, as it has already received sufficient attention. 
However, it remains unclear what dynamics prevail in reward-based crowdfunding markets 
and whether positive or negative informational cascades occur. Furthermore, to our best 
knowledge, no prior work has examined the dynamic interplay of eWOM and contribution 
behaviors, and the resulting cross-platform effects in reward-based crowdfunding markets in 
depth and thus our current understanding of the underlying dynamics is far from conclusive 
(Thies and Wessel 2014). Our research is further motivated by Burtch et al. (2013) who called 
for additional research on reward-based crowdfunding platforms and explicitly suggested 
investigating popularity indicators, behavioral signals, and subsequent project performance. 
Furthermore, Veit et al. (2014) call for additional research on the proactive role of consumers 
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and the effects of social recommendations.  
Against this background, we focus our research on the reciprocal relationship between social 
buzz, prior-contribution behavior, and consumer decision-making. Additionally, we 
investigate the interplay of social buzz and project backing also in different project categories. 
In doing so, we are able to distinguish between campaign characteristics such as funding 
success and project orientation, which provides further valuable insights for prospective 
creators of campaigns, potential supporters as well as IS scholars. The objective of our study 
is to address the discussed gaps guided by the following research questions: 
RQ1: What are the relative impacts of eWOM and prior-contribution behavior on the outcome of 
crowdfunding campaigns? 
RQ2: How do these impacts vary for crowdfunding campaigns that reach their funding goal 
compared to those that do not? 
RQ3: How do these impacts vary for crowdfunding campaigns in the distinct categories Cause, 
Creative, and Entrepreneurial? 
To investigate the dynamic interplay between social buzz and contribution patterns over time, 
we have assembled daily project level data from Indiegogo.com, one of the largest reward-
based crowdfunding platforms. Our social buzz measures were collected from, the biggest 
unidirectional and bidirectional social networks on the web. Our empirical analysis is 
conducted using the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) approach (Dewan and Ramaprasad 
2014).  
Our study offers useful contributions to research and practice. First, it is among the first large-
scale empirical studies to capture both intra- and cross-platform information flows that 
operate through users’ contribution and sharing behaviors. In doing so, we are not only able 
to identify strong intra-platform feedback loops, but also observe cross-platform effects in the 
form of social buzz that play an important role in predicting the success of crowdfunding 
campaigns. Second, we were able to reveal an inverse relationship between eWOM and 
contribution behaviors on online platforms. While the social buzz has a positive effect on 
project backing, the effect is negative in the reverse direction. Third, by examining how social 
buzz influences the outcome of crowdfunding campaigns, this study gives platform providers 
and project creators important insights into the critical role of social media within different 
project categories. More broadly, our study enriches social media and IS platform research by 
disentangling the interdependencies between quality signals within and across platforms.  
4.2 Theoretical Background 
4.2.1 Contribution Behavior on Crowdfunding Platforms 
Crowdfunding builds on the concept of crowdsourcing, which at its core allows individuals or 
organizations to reach a monetary (project) goal by receiving small financial contributions 
from a large number of individuals instead of choosing the traditional approach and receiving 
Dynamic Interplay of Social Buzz and Contribution Behavior 45 
large contributions from a small number of creditors. Crowdfunding enables project creators 
to collect contributions from a large number of project backers through an open call—mostly 
on the internet (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012). The reasons for project creators to choose 
crowdfunding are manifold and not limited to financial aspects. The success of platforms such 
as Kickstarter and Indiegogo has also made crowdfunding a tool that enables the creators of 
entrepreneurial, creative, or social projects to validate their ideas on a large scale through the 
outcome of their campaign. Thus, a successful campaign does not only enable the creators to 
finance their venture or project, but it also validates that there is a market for it. Furthermore, 
the campaigns themselves can also have a certain marketing effect for the respective project 
(Shane and Cable 2002; Burtch et al. 2013; Mollick 2014). 
On the other hand, we also see a variety of incentives for backers to “pledge” for a certain 
crowdfunding campaign. These incentives mainly depend on the return the backers can expect 
from their contribution, which can either be material, idealistic, or philanthropic in nature 
(Ahlers et al. 2015). Most campaigns, for example, offer at least one option that allows a 
donation without a material return. In our study, we focus on reward-based crowdfunding, as 
it is by far the most popular concept of crowdfunding today, but so far little empirical research 
has been devoted to it (Mollick 2014). Compared to donations, rewards have an increased 
complexity and level of uncertainty, as there are a number of conditions that have to be met 
before backers can eventually receive the reward. A fundamental condition is that sufficient 
funds are raised within the pre-arranged campaign runtime. Even though project creators on 
Indiegogo receive funds regardless of whether the funding goal is reached, not collecting 
enough funds will make it difficult for most creators to implement their project ideas. 
Furthermore, the backer’s investment cannot be put on the same level with a purchase, since 
there is usually no legal obligation for the project creator to produce and deliver the reward 
to the backer (Mollick 2014). The dynamics of crowdfunding are thus somewhat different 
from those in a traditional e-commerce setting between a seller and a buyer. Backers act as 
patrons and customers at the same time (Agrawal et al. 2011) and thus have a certain interest 
in the success of the crowdfunding campaign. Furthermore, backers can be less certain that 
they will actually receive the return on their investment and they have less information about 
the object they are investing in compared to a regular buying situation, in which the product 
or service already exists and can be inspected thoroughly. The primary source of information 
for a potential backer is therefore the campaign description the creator has published on the 
platform. This description almost always includes a short video, showing the creator, possibly 
some sort of prototype, the finished product or other important aspects of the campaign. Even 
though this content allows the backer to develop an attitude towards the campaign and the 
rewards comprised, this attitude is potentially biased due to the fact that all information stems 
from a single source. Consequently, rewards of crowdfunding campaigns can be seen as 
experience goods, whose value can only be ascertained by consuming them after the campaign 
has ended, rather than search goods, whose characteristics and features can easily be 
evaluated prior to purchase (Nelson 1970). The quality of the reward thus remains relatively 
vague at the time the backer decides whether or not to pledge for a specific campaign. We 
therefore argue that other evidence for the trustworthiness and quality of a campaign becomes 
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increasingly important for the potential backer’s evaluation. More specifically, we distinguish 
between two potential sources of information, namely, eWOM in the form of shares and 
tweets the campaign receives on Facebook and Twitter, and prior-contribution behavior in the 
form of the total number of backers. 
4.2.2 Electronic Word-of-Mouth 
Word-of-mouth (WOM) is informal interpersonal communication between not commercially 
affiliated consumers about commercial content such as brands, products, or services (Arndt 
1967; Bone 1995). Previous research found a significant influence of WOM on consumers’ 
information search, evaluation, and decision-making (e.g., Engel et al. 1969; Lynn 1987; 
Richins and Root-Shaffer 1988), as it “influences attitudes during the pre-choice evaluation of 
alternative service providers” (Buttle 1998). Furthermore, it has been shown that WOM can be 
more relevant than traditional marketing channels, such as advertising, in raising the 
awareness for innovation and in convincing the receiver to try out new products (Buttle 1998). 
WOM referrals have also been shown to have significantly longer carry-over effects than 
traditional marketing actions (Trusov et al. 2009), and a single WOM message can potentially 
influence a multitude of receivers (Lau and Ng 2001). One of the main reasons for the success 
of WOM is the increased perceived reliability, credibility, and trustworthiness compared to 
communication initiated by organizations themselves (Arndt 1967; Brown et al. 2007).  
The advent of the internet has drastically increased consumers’ options for exchanging 
opinions about products and services and offers them a large array of possibilities to engage 
in a specific form of WOM called electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM). While traditional 
(offline) WOM allows the consumer to evaluate and share opinions, eWOM also allows them 
to share and consume digital products at the same time. Still, it has been argued that the 
consumer motives that have been identified as being relevant for traditional WOM are also 
expected to be relevant for eWOM (Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004). According to Hennig-Thurau 
et al. (2004) eWOM is “any positive or negative statement made by potential, actual, or former 
customers about a product or company, which is made available to a multitude of people and 
institutions via the internet”. The opportunities that are available for consumers to share their 
opinion, preferences, or experiences online are manifold and a multitude of possible channels 
such as product review websites, blogs, online communities, and social networking websites 
are available. Due to their constant presence and accessibility, social networking websites such 
as Twitter and Facebook in particular have been used to generate enormous amounts of 
eWOM messages.  
The receiver’s response to an eWOM message received via these channels depends on two 
sequential cognitive processes, namely, awareness and persuasiveness. The awareness effect 
can be explained by the sheer volume of eWOM, making it more likely for a receiver to be 
informed about the content (Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Liu 2006). Only after the receiver is 
aware of the content, does a cognitive process start, evaluating the message’s credibility by 
examining the message’s valence and the receiver’s social ties with the sender. Previous 
research has found that tie strength, homophily, and source credibility in particular affect the 
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persuasiveness of eWOM messages (Brown et al. 2007; Chu and Kim 2011). Tie strength can 
help to encourage eWOM, as individuals in strong tie relationships tend to interact more 
frequently, exchange more information, and have a greater impact on the recuperative 
behavior, compared to those in a weak tie relationship (Brown and Reingen 1987; Brown et 
al. 2007). Homophily explains group composition in terms of the similarity of members’ 
characteristics (Brown et al. 2007), while source credibility is defined as the perceived 
competence of the source. Compared to traditional WOM, which is based on face-to-face 
transmission, tie strength, homophily, and source credibility may be more difficult to ascertain 
online (Brown et al. 2007).  
In the context of crowdfunding, eWOM is likely to be of great importance for the success of a 
crowdfunding campaign, as it raises awareness for the project without requiring financial 
investments, and can be central in persuading potential backers to invest. Without eWOM, 
the campaign description remains the central source of information for the potential backer, 
who might be uncertain about the actual utility of the proposed project. While the total 
number of previous backers enables potential backers to infer the success of the campaign 
directly, it does not offer any information about the potential backer’s strength of relationship 
with the previous backers. Consequently, for those individuals who take into account their 
social network when making an investment, it might be more appropriate to use eWOM for 
decision support.  
Although there is a growing body of literature on crowdfunding, the role of popularity 
information, eWOM, and especially the interplay among the different salient indicators 
remains largely unexplored in the context of crowdfunding. Thus far, crowdfunding itself has 
mainly attracted academics from disciplines such as finance and entrepreneurship 
(Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012; Belleflamme et al. 2014; Mollick 2014). A notable 
exception in the information systems (IS) literature is the empirical examination of social 
influences of prior-contribution behavior by (Burtch et al. 2013). However, they examine 
reinforcement and substitution effects of prior contribution and do not take into account the 
influence of social buzz surrounding the campaign. Furthermore, their work is based on a 
crowdfunding market focused on public goods (donation-based crowdfunding), and thus the 
applicability to reward-based crowdfunding markets is limited. We therefore intend to 
advance the current literature by examining the dynamic effects that popularity information 
and social buzz have on the outcome of campaigns in reward-based crowdfunding markets. 
4.3 Research Model and Hypotheses Development 
In this section, we develop the theoretical rationale for our proposed research model. As 
shown in Figure 4-1, H1 and H3 focus on intra-platform effects, while H2 and H4 address 
cross-platform effects between social media and crowdfunding platforms and vice versa. We 
derive the first sets of hypotheses, H1 and H2, based on theory related to eWOM effectiveness 
in social media. We then develop H3 and H4, which are focused on the impact of prior 
contribution on future-contribution behavior and eWOM. 
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Figure 4-1 Research Model 
4.3.1 eWOM Effectiveness in Social Media 
Once a receiver becomes aware of an eWOM message via social media, its persuasiveness is 
evaluated based on its valance and the receiver’s social ties with the sender (Brown and 
Reingen 1987; Liu 2006). First, in the context of crowdfunding, the majority of eWOM 
messages can be expected to have a positive valence, as sharing a campaign via social media 
creates higher visibility for the campaign in any case. Messages with a negative sentiment will 
be rare, as consumers could not have had negative experiences with the offered product or 
service during the campaign runtime. Besides, as most investments in crowdfunding 
campaigns will be made based on hedonic rather than utilitarian motives, eWOM messages 
with a negative sentiment will be less likely to have an impact on the receiver anyway (Sen 
and Lerman 2007). Second, social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter allow 
the receivers of eWOM messages to evaluate tie strength, homophily, and source credibility 
easily because this information can be conveniently accessed, making social networking sites 
an ideal vehicle for eWOM (Chu and Kim 2011). Consequently, eWOM messages received via 
Facebook and Twitter can be expected to be credible signals for the receiver. However, 
receiving a persuasive message may not necessarily coincide with an actual response by the 
receiver. The effectiveness of eWOM describes the ability of eWOM messages to influence the 
receivers’ behaviors, e.g. in terms of purchase intention.  
In this study, we distinguish two outcomes of effective eWOM, namely, the retransmission of 
a message related to a specific crowdfunding campaign in the receiver’s own network and the 
receiver’s financial investment in the respective crowdfunding campaign. We expect these two 
outcomes to be sequential in their timing and to differ in their magnitude, due to the different 
motives and risks associated with them, which will be discussed in the following. After 
receiving a message via Facebook or Twitter, the receiver evaluates whether to retransmit it 
or not. Generally, consumers tend to share eWOM messages in their own social network 
before an actual purchase for two important reasons. First, for self-representation or self-
enhancement purposes (Wojnicki and Godes 2008), where content is shared by consumers 
because it may reflect favorably on them as a sender (Berger and Milkman 2012). 
Crowdfunding projects are most often technically innovative, socially responsible, or very 
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creative and thus are ideal for reflecting positively on the sender when shared via social media. 
Second, since a high perceived risk when a making purchase or investment decision leads to 
more extensive information gathering (Gemünden 1985), consumers tend to seek peer 
evaluation in situations of uncertainty by sharing specific content and evaluating the 
responses. Uncertainty is further increased, when consumers cannot try out products before 
making purchases (Benlian and Hess 2011). This is also consistent with the findings of King 
and Balasubramanian (1994), showing that other-based preference formation is particularly 
important for experience goods (Dewan and Ramaprasad 2014).  
As mentioned, evaluating the actual utility of crowdfunding campaigns is difficult for potential 
investors due to the limited information provided in the campaign description, making peer 
evaluation a vital component for the decision-making of a potential backer. Therefore, both 
consumer motives for sharing and retransmitting messages can be expected to be critical for 
the diffusion of eWOM surrounding specific campaigns. Consequently, since it has been shown 
that a single eWOM message can potentially influence a multitude of receivers (Lau and Ng 
2001), we expect that a positive shock, meaning an increase, in the number of shares on 
Facebook or tweets on Twitter will generate additional eWOM on the respective platform, 
creating intra-platform effects in the form of positive feedback loops: 
H1a: A positive shock in the number of shares a specific crowdfunding campaign receives on 
Facebook will lead to additional Facebook shares for the respective campaign in the next period. 
H1b: A positive shock in the number of tweets a specific crowdfunding campaign receives on 
Twitter will lead to additional tweets for the respective campaign in the next period. 
Previous research has highlighted the importance of positive WOM in the diffusion of new 
products (e.g., Arndt 1967; Mahajan et al. 1984). Specifically, it has been argued that with 
higher perceived risk associated with the early adoption of new products, consumers tend to 
rely more on WOM, as it is perceived as more reliable, credible, and trustworthy compared to 
communication initiated by organizations themselves (Arndt 1967; Brown et al. 2007). 
Crowdfunding is different from a regular buying situation, as the investment is often required 
without an existing product or service, further increasing perceived risk and ultimately the 
importance of eWOM messages. Consequently, consumer motives that have been identified 
in previous research as being relevant for facilitating the investment decisions of consumers 
based on eWOM (e.g., Liu 2006; Dhar and Chang 2009) may not necessarily apply in the 
context of crowdfunding.  
We argue that, due to the innovativeness of crowdfunding projects, potential backers will not 
actively search for certain campaigns, but will rather “stumble upon” them when using social 
media. In this context, weak ties have been shown to have an important bridging function 
that allows information to disseminate and spread among distinct groups (Granovetter 1973; 
Chu and Kim 2011). Even though weak ties are essential in the process of finding new content, 
potential backers will be reluctant to rely on them for decision support. Strong ties, on the 
other hand, constitute a firmer and closer relationship and are thus equally important, as they 
provide a substantive decision support. Since Twitter is modeled as a directed graph, meaning 
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that the connections among the members of the network are unidirectional (weak ties), 
whereas Facebook is modeled as an undirected graph with bidirectional connections (strong 
ties), differences in their effectiveness are to be expected. Therefore, eWOM volume on both 
Facebook and Twitter should influence the receiver’s investment decisions in a positive way: 
H2a: A positive shock in the number of shares for a specific campaign on Facebook will attract 
additional backers for the respective campaign in the next period. 
H2b: A positive shock in the number of tweets for a specific campaign on Twitter will attract 
additional backers for the respective campaign in the next period. 
4.3.2 Informational Cascades on Crowdfunding Platforms 
Informational cascades offer an information-based explanation for herd behavior and occur 
when individuals who face a certain decision choose to follow the actions of others instead of 
taking a decision based on their own private information (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; 1998). 
Such a situation may arise when the individual facing the decision has imperfect knowledge 
of the product’s quality and thus infers its utility by observing the actions of predecessors 
(Duan et al. 2009). Consequently, informational cascades emerge in situations of sequential 
decision-making and if the actions (but not the decision-making processes) of other 
individuals are observable (Huck and Oechssler 2000). These situations may arise frequently 
on crowdfunding platforms, as the only available source of information is the campaign 
description published by the campaign creator, which might be limited in scope, imperfect, or 
biased. Uncertainty is further increased due to a lack of face-to-face interaction with the 
creator or the possibility to trial the product or service before investing (Benlian et al. 2012). 
Prospective backers thus infer the product’s utility by observing prior-contribution behavior, 
for example, based on popularity information displayed on the platform in form of the total 
number of previous backers. Popularity information has been found to have a positive 
influence on subsequent sales performance, e.g. in the context of online software adoption 
(Duan et al. 2009).  
Previous research on the effects of prior-contribution behavior on the decision-making of 
potential backers has found that in donation-based crowdfunding markets, the “marginal 
utility contributors gain from giving to a particular project is diminished” through the 
contribution of other backers (Burtch et al. 2013). The reason is that potential backers see 
less “need” to contribute as others have already supported the campaign, leading to negative 
downward informational cascades and ultimately a stagnation of contribution. Also, projects 
on Indiegogo sometimes have a limited number of material rewards available, which can be 
sold out before the funding period is over. Running out of these particular attractive rewards 
might lead to a stagnation of contributions for already successful campaigns.  
On the other hand, in equity- and lending-based crowdfunding markets, backers rather invest 
in projects that already have a lot of support, which signals a superior quality. Consequently, 
supporting an already successful project becomes a “rational” decision for backers in order to 
reduce their own risk (Herzenstein et al. 2011a; Zhang and Liu 2012). Hence, already popular 
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campaigns receive an additional popularity boost, leading to positive upward informational 
cascades. To our best knowledge, this (intra-platform) effect has not yet been empirically 
investigated in reward-based crowdfunding markets, and it remains unclear whether one can 
expect positive upward or negative downward informational cascades—or neither. However, 
we hypothesize that the intentions of backers in reward-based crowdfunding markets are 
similar to those in equity- and lending-based crowdfunding markets, as receiving a reward 
can be seen as the primary objective in all three markets. The risk of not receiving a reward 
for the investment might be rather high, as the project creators do not have to choose the “All 
or Nothing” model where the funds invested in an unsuccessful project are reimbursed to the 
investor. Consequently, creators of campaigns that do not reach the designated funding goal 
will still receive the funds invested in the campaign but might be unable to deliver the rewards 
comprised to the backers due to the lack of funding. Thus, backers try to minimize their risk 
of pledging without receiving a reward and invest in campaigns that are already successful in 
terms of the number of backers, leading to a reinforcement effect on the crowdfunding 
platform. We thus expect to identify informational cascades and propose that: 
H3: A positive shock in the number of backers supporting a specific crowdfunding campaign will 
attract additional backers for the respective campaign in the next period. 
Similarly, backers try to further increase the likelihood of the campaign becoming successful 
after their investment in order to secure their reward. As a result, it becomes rational for them 
to create additional eWOM by spreading the campaign in their respective network to attract 
other backers and therefore reduce their own investment risk. Thus, even though backers of 
a specific campaign will not receive their reward until after the campaign has ended, the 
perceived personal relevance of the project and the reward to the backer (Dholakia 1997), 
which is referred to as product involvement, will already be rather high due to anticipation 
and higher perceived risk when making the investment. This product involvement has been 
identified as a central driver of WOM (Dichter 1966; Sundaram et al. 1998), as recommending 
products and services to others reduces the tension caused by the consumption experience 
(Dichter 1966). Finally, for self-enhancement purposes, actual and potential backers of a 
specific campaign will rather choose to share a project in their own network that has already 
attracted plenty of backers, as popular and positive content reflects more favorable on the 
sender (Berger and Milkman 2012). We therefore expect to see positive cross-platform effects 
from the crowdfunding platform to social media: 
H4a: A positive shock in the number of backers supporting a specific crowdfunding campaign will 
lead to additional shares for the respective campaign on Facebook in the next period. 
H4b: A positive shock in the number of backers supporting a specific crowdfunding campaign will 
lead to additional tweets for the respective campaign on Twitter in the next period. 
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4.4 Research Methodology 
4.4.1 Model and Variables 
As we examine the interactions between social buzz and contribution behavior, we first 
conduct Granger causality tests to examine the potential endogeneity between the dyads of 
our key variables, backers, Facebook shares, and tweets (Granger 1969). Next, we employ a 
panel vector autoregressive approach using daily project level data (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988). 
Panel vector autoregressive models are used to capture interdependencies among multiple 
time series and are suitable for studying the relationships between a system of interdependent 
variables without imposing ad hoc model restrictions, including exogeneity of some of the 
variables, which other econometric model techniques require (Adomavicius et al. 2012). 
Vector autoregressive models have, for example, proven to be especially useful for describing 
the dynamic behavior of economic and financial time series and forecasting (Zivot and Wang 
2007). In marketing research, PVAR modeling has for example been used to analyze the 
effects of marketing investments on sales performance (Dekimpe and Hanssens 1995) or to 
investigate the relationship between an artist’s broadcast behavior in social media and sales 
performance (Chen et al. 2015).  
The main challenges of our model setup are the simultaneous mutual influences of the 
different variables of interest, namely, the number of backers and the number of social media 
shares on Facebook and Twitter. Consistent with (Dewan and Ramaprasad 2014), we 
distinguish the mutual effects by focusing on the orthogonalized impulse-response functions, 
which show the response of one variable of interest in the next period (e.g. Facebook shares) 
to an orthogonal shock of one standard deviation in another variable of interest in the current 
period (e.g. number of backers). By orthogonalizing the response, we are able to identify the 
effect of one shock at a time, while holding other shocks constant. This technique combines 
the traditional VAR approach, which treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, with 
the panel-data approach, which allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity (Love and 
Zicchino 2006). When applying the VAR procedure to panel data, a certain restriction must 
be imposed. The underlying structure must be the same for each cross-sectional unit. Since 
this constraint is likely to be violated in practice, usually fixed effects are introduced. As the 
fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to the lags of the dependent variables, we 
use forward mean-differencing, also referred to as the “Helmert procedure” (Arellano and 
Bover 1995). This procedure removes only the forward mean and preserves the orthogonality 
between transformed variables and lagged regressors. We can then use lagged regressors as 
instruments and estimate the coefficients by a generalized method of moments (GMM) (Love 
and Zicchino 2006). Our PVAR Model is then specified for each project as, 
backerst
facebooksharest
tweetst
=
β11
t-j β12
t-j β13
t-j
β21
t-j β22
t-j β23
t-j
β31
t-j β32
t-j β33
t-j
backerst-j
facebooksharest-j
tweetst-j
J
j=1
+
εbackers,t
εfacebookshares,t
εtweets,t            (1) 
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where backerst, facebooksharest and tweetst denote daily project funders, shares on Facebook 
and tweets on Twitter. The number of backers of a project (backerst) is our proxy for the 
project’s commercial success, while shares on Facebook and tweets on Twitter represent 
eWOM. Even though it might be argued that the amount of funding a project received is a 
more suitable indicator of its success, we deliberately chose the number of backers as our 
dependent variable due to the following reasons. First and foremost, our intention was to 
examine the impact the behavior of individual crowdfunding users has in the overall system, 
which is also reflected in our theoretical approach. Using the funding amount instead of 
backers would, in our opinion, not correctly reflect user behavior and the dynamic 
relationship. Second, in the long term, knowing how many individuals are interested in a 
certain crowdfunding project might be more relevant to the creator of the project than 
reaching a short-term financial goal. Finally, the correlation between backers and funding 
amount is extremely high, allowing to infer the campaign’s success from the number of 
backers.  
J is the order of the model, which can be determined using the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC). Thus, in the project success analysis, today’s backers are a function of past shares on 
Facebook, past tweets on Twitter, past backers, and an error term. In the PVAR Model, the 
coefficients represent the relationship between the lagged values of each variable and the 
variable on the left-hand side of the equation. The appropriate order, or lag length, of 1 was 
determined by using the AIC, following the standard approach in VAR literature (Holtz-Eakin 
et al. 1988; Love and Zicchino 2006). Specifically, we had to calculate the AIC for each cross-
section and take the modal value of the optimal lag among all cross sections, following Dewan 
and Ramaprasad (2014). To analyze the impulse-response functions, an estimation of 
confidence intervals is required. Since we construct the matrix of the impulse-response 
function from the estimated VAR coefficients, their standard errors must be taken into 
account. We therefore calculate standard errors of the impulse-response function and 
generate confidence intervals with Monte-Carlo simulations. In practice, we randomly 
generate a draw of coefficients of model (1) using the estimated coefficients and their 
variance-covariance matrix and re-calculate the impulse-responses. We repeat this procedure 
1,000 times (we also ran the calculation with a larger number of repetitions and obtained 
similar results). Finally, we also calculate variance decompositions, which show the 
percentage of the variation in one variable that is explained by the shock of another variable.  
4.4.2 Dataset 
Our cross-section project-level data was collected from Indiegogo.com, which is among the 
largest and most prominent crowdfunding platforms on the web. Specifically, the data covers 
the period from November 15, 2013 to March 24, 2014, resulting in approximately 186,500 
data points. Data on every project available was gathered automatically with a self-developed 
web crawler to retrieve time-series data of all projects on the website in a daily routine. 
Besides the dependent variables of project backers, we gathered additional information on 
every project to create meaningful subsamples of our dataset. The categorical indicators of 
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each project primarily include the general orientation of the campaign (Creative, Social, or 
Entrepreneurial), and we further marked every project as successful that reached or exceeded 
its funding goal. We choose this threshold, as projects tend to either fail by a large margin or 
surpass their funding goal (Mollick 2014).  
Table 4-1 Summary Statistics 
As mentioned earlier, for our study, we consider two types of social buzz: shares on Facebook 
and tweets on Twitter. Based on the application programming interfaces (API) of Facebook 
and Twitter we collected the daily data for the number of shares and tweets a specific 
campaign had received in the last 24 hours to construct our eWOM measurements. In order 
to quantify the volume of social buzz correctly, we only considered shares and tweets that 
contained a direct hyperlink to the crowdfunding campaign on Indiegogo. To account for 
potential deadline and commiseration effects, we only analyzed projects that were covered 
during their complete life cycle (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014). Furthermore, campaigns that 
showed unnatural peaks in shares or tweets on a single day had to be excluded. Even though 
natural eWOM peaks can be expected when a project receives major attention in other 
channels, such as blogs or news sites, these peaks are then followed by an increased and then 
gradually declining number of shares and tweets over time. On the contrary, unnatural peaks 
do not show these subsequent effects and therefore imply fraudulent actions such as 
purchasing shares and tweets, which would have distorted the results. These unnatural peaks 
were therefore identified if the number of additional shares or tweets exceeded the threefold 
standard deviation, were higher than 500, and occurred on a single day. 
We expect circularity effects to be present only in flourishing campaigns and therefore split 
our dataset in winning and losing campaigns. A split-sample PVAR analysis for each project 
topic was then only performed for successful campaigns. This results in a dataset including 
6,340 projects, of which 27.7% were successful, had an average funding duration of 29 days, 
and approximately 186,500 observations. Summary statistics are presented in Table 4-1 for 
the full dataset and each subsample. 
 Total  Winner Loser Creative 
(Winner) 
Social 
(Winner) 
Entrepreneurial 
(Winner) 
 Mean (SD) 
Backers 46.36 
(289.35) 
83.31 
(542.10) 
32.17 
(48.49) 
103.99 
(758.31) 
56.28 
(100.52) 
95.68 
(177.42) 
Facebook 
(#Shares) 
245.58 
(443.38) 
281.45 
(595.01) 
231.80 
(368.13) 
292.20 
(656.25) 
251.85 
(524.58) 
366.92 
(532.18) 
Twitter 
(#Tweets) 
26.59 
(151.85) 
29.06 
(201.18) 
25.64 
(127.97) 
32.08 
(184.94) 
25.01 
(233.20) 
31.37 
(89.04) 
Received 
Funding 
$3,465 
($13,696) 
$6,001 
($27,717) 
$2,491 
($4,659) 
$7,007 
($28,795) 
$4,709 
($21,096) 
$6,489 
($11,173) 
N (Projects) 6,340 1,759 4,581 877 737 145 
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4.5 Results 
To conduct both Granger Causality as well as PVAR analysis, the variables in question must 
be stationary. We therefore employ a Phillips-Perron unit root test for panel data (Phillips and 
Perron 1988). Results are presented in Table 4-2 and indicate that all of the variables are 
indeed stationary. 
Table 4-2 Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
Next, we conducted the Granger causality test to validate our PVAR approach. Table 4-3 
presents the results that strongly support our research approach by giving clear evidence of 
bidirectional causality in each pair of dependent variables. We can therefore analyze our 
variables as a fully dynamic system through PVAR analysis (Trusov et al. 2009).  
Table 4-3 Granger Causality Tests 
4.6 Main Results 
To test our research hypotheses, we estimate the coefficients of the system given in (1). 
Results from the PVAR analysis for all models, including the split-sample analysis, are reported 
in Table 4-4. We first examine the results for the complete model and all hypotheses before 
discussing the details of the split-sample analysis in the subsequent section. Our first 
hypotheses H1a and H1b stated that, for the total model, a positive shock in social buzz, 
measured in shares and tweets within a social network, leads to additional shares or tweets 
within the respective platform. We find strong support for these two intra-platform 
hypotheses, implying a strong reinforcement effect of social buzz within each social network 
platform. Additionally, we can observe higher coefficients for the bidirectional network 
(Facebook) compared to the unidirectional counterpart (Twitter). This implies, 
unsurprisingly, that users rather share content and seek peer evaluation from a bidirectional 
network with generally stronger ties compared to a more impersonal network such as Twitter.  
 P-Statistic: Inv. Chi2 p-Value 
Backers 1.33e+05 0.0000 
Facebook (#Shares) 1.67e+05 0.0000 
Twitter (#Tweets) 1.44e+05 0.0000 
Note: Phillips-Perron unit-root is appropriate as it allows unbalanced data. The null hypothesis that the panels contain 
unit roots is rejected for all variables. 
 Backers Facebook Twitter 
Backers - 43.46 (0.001) 9.05 (0.01) 
Facebook (#Shares) 8.43 (0.01) - 13.15 (0.001) 
Twitter (#Tweets) 8.89 (0.01) 21.85 (0.001) - 
Note: The results reported are CHI2 statistics with p-values in parentheses. Granger causality tests are performed with 1 
lag for consistency with the PVAR Models (as selected by AIC). 
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For our second set of hypotheses, H2a and H2b, we seized the opportunity to shed light on 
the direct cross-platform effects of social buzz on subsequent contribution behavior by 
additional backers. In our model, we are able to estimate the effect of yesterday’s social buzz 
on Twitter and Facebook on today’s number of backers of a campaign. Results show that there 
is a significant and positive effect of yesterday’s Facebook shares on today’s backers. 
Surprisingly, we see no effect for tweets in our model. Thus, results show strong support for 
H2a while H2b has to be rejected. This again gives us further reason to believe that users trust 
recommendations from their personal and bidirectional network more than the rather 
impersonal investment suggestions from a unidirectional network. This emphasizes the 
importance of strong ties in the crowdfunding context. We checked for robustness of the 
effect, as the influence of Twitter might be mediated through Facebook shares, but cross-
platform effects between Facebook and Twitter are virtually non-existent, as seen in Table 
4-4.  
Table 4-4 PVAR Results for Split-Sample Analysis 
Our third hypothesis was based on the theory of informational cascades, eWOM, and the 
assumption that backers try to minimize their risk of pledging without receiving a reward and 
invest in campaigns that are already successful in terms of the number of backers. We observe 
a strong positive response of the number of backers to a shock of their own lagged value. This 
positive and significant response supports the argument on positive upward informational 
cascades within platforms and suggests a strong self-reinforcement effect of popularity 
information for crowdfunding projects, in support of H3. Furthermore, we see that each 
 Total Winner Loser Winner: 
Creative 
Winner: 
Social 
Winner: 
Entrepreneurial 
Response to: Response of dependent variable: Backers 
Backers-1 0.556*** 0.514*** 0.922*** 0.484*** 0.899*** 0.892*** 
Facebook-1  0.052*** 0.094*** 0.001 0.125*** 0.002 0.015*** 
Twitter-1  -0.002 -0.071* 0.001 -0.255*** 0.001 -0.083*** 
Response to: Response of dependent variable: Facebook 
Backers-1 -0.200*** -0.218*** -0.016 -0.243*** 0.069 -0.053 
Facebook-1  0.951*** 0.968*** 0.926*** 0.997*** 0.883*** 0.950*** 
Twitter-1  0.002 -0.032 0.002 -0.114* -0.025 -0.147* 
Response to: Response of dependent variable: Twitter 
Backers-1 -0.053** -0.048* 0.034*** -0.067*** 0.197*** 0.013 
Facebook-1  0.006* 0.001 0.001 0.016** -0.066*** 0.009* 
Twitter-1  0.898*** 0.855*** 0.904*** 0.906*** 0.765*** 0.753*** 
Note: PVAR Model is estimated by GMM. Reported numbers show the coefficients of regressing the column variables on 
lags of the row variables. Heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 
0.1%, 1%, and 5% respectively.  
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additional backer does not only support a project financially but also increases its reputation, 
leading to a multiplying effect. 
For our last set of hypotheses, H4a and H4b, we argued for a cross-platform reinforcement 
effect of additional backers in the current period leading to additional social buzz in the next 
period. In other words, we expect supporters of a project to spread their investment decision 
among their peers, as it reflects positively on them and creating additional social buzz should 
further secure their investment. Contrary to our expectations, results in Table 4-4 show the 
exact opposite response of Facebook shares and tweets to an increased number of backers in 
the preceding period. A possible explanation for this relation might be that users spread the 
information about a project mainly prior to the investment in order to receive feedback from 
their peers and are not inclined or permitted by the social network platform to share it twice. 
On the other hand, backers might simply discover the project via social media and do not see 
an incentive to spread it further, creating a possible crowding-out effect (Roberts 1984; 
Andreoni 1990), meaning that as the level of contributions rises, backers perceive the project 
to be sufficiently financed and therefore see no need to promote the project any further. 
Additionally, we observe ambiguous effects, as the coefficient for successful social projects is, 
in fact, positive for tweets, while it is negative for creative projects’ Facebook shares as well 
as Tweets. Following the argument from above, a possible crowding-out effect exists for 
creative projects, while social projects do not suffer from it. Moreover, these results suggest 
that backers seek feedback from their peers before supporting creative projects, while social 
and entrepreneurial campaigns do not require this evaluation process. 
4.6.1 Split-Sample Analysis 
Our analysis continues by exploring how the orientation and the success of the project are 
reflected in the relationship between backers’ contribution behavior and social buzz. Results 
from the split-sample analysis in Table 4-4 show interesting differences between the types of 
projects. First, we can see that the relationship regarding the effect of eWOM across platforms 
is virtually non-existent for projects that fail to reach their funding goal, while the 
reinforcement effect within a platform still holds regardless of the success. These results imply 
that for crowdfunding campaigns, social buzz can be a crucial success factor.  
Looking at the split-sample on project topics, we see distinct differences. For instance, the 
reinforcement effect of prior-contribution behavior within the crowdfunding platform is much 
weaker for creative projects compared to social and entrepreneurial campaigns, while the 
social buzz effect from Facebook shares is significantly stronger. This result suggests that 
creative projects profit more from Facebook shares as a marketing tool, which is not 
surprising, as these projects often include films, music, and other forms of art which are 
popular, and consumers tend to share positive content for self-representation purposes 
(Wojnicki and Godes 2008). This is also reflected in the coefficients for the internal platform 
effect of Facebook shares, which is highest for creative projects and lowest for social projects, 
which are often related to negative environments or misfortunes. Presumably, users are 
reluctant to share these rather tragic or distressing campaigns. Furthermore, creative and 
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entrepreneurial projects show a positive effect of Facebook shares on the number of backers 
in the following period. However, this effect does not show for social projects, suggesting a 
strong bystander effect, in which people, in fact, promote the project in their social network, 
but do not offer any financial aid. This result is consistent with the classic literature on the 
bystander effect and public goods (Fischer et al. 2011). 
Table 4-5 Variance Decomposition of Backers 
Finally, we also present the results of a variance decomposition analysis in Table 4-5, which 
show the percentage of the variation in one variable that is explained by the shock of another 
variable, accumulated over time. The variance decomposition shows the magnitude of the 
total effect (Love and Zicchino 2006). Total effects accumulated over 4 weeks are reported, 
as longer and shorter time horizons produced equivalent results and the table corresponds to 
the calculated Impulse-Response Functions’ time frame. We only show results for backers as 
a dependent variable, as it is the most relevant variable in the context of crowdfunding. 
Results are in line with the insights from the PVAR estimation, showing that most of the 
variance of the dependent variables is explained by their own lags, suggesting a very strong 
feedback loop within the platform rather than across them and a stronger effect for Facebook 
shares compared to tweets from Twitter. Interestingly, the explanatory power of Facebook 
shares increases over time, particularly for winner campaigns, so that about 4 percent of the 
Full dataset Creative 
Days ahead Backers Facebook Twitter Days ahead Backers Facebook Twitter 
7 95.5% 4.5% 0% 7 96.1% 1.3% 2.6% 
14 92.1% 7.9% 0% 14 92.8% 2.6% 4.6% 
21 91.1% 8.9% 0% 21 91.7% 3.0% 5.3% 
28 90.7% 9.3% 0% 28 91.3% 3.1% 5.6% 
Winner Social 
Days ahead Backers Facebook Twitter Days ahead Backers Facebook Twitter 
7 95.6% 4.1% 0.3% 7 99.9% 0.1% 0.0% 
14 92.5% 7.1% 0.4% 14 99.8% 0.2% 0.0% 
21 91.4% 8.2% 0.4% 21 99.7% 0.3% 0.0% 
28 91.1% 8.5% 0.4% 28 99.7% 0.3% 0.0% 
Loser Entrepreneurial 
Days ahead Backers Facebook Twitter Days ahead Backers Facebook Twitter 
7 99.96% 0.03% 0.0% 7 97.0% 1.4% 1.6% 
14 99.9% 0.1% 0.0% 14 93.7% 3.7% 2.6% 
21 99.8% 0.2% 0.0% 21 91.6% 5.5% 2.9% 
28 99.7% 0.3% 0.0% 28 90.5% 6.5% 3.0% 
Note: Percent of variation in the backer variable explained by column variable (7, 14, 21, and 28 days ahead) for each 
subsample and main regression. 
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variance in backers is explained by Facebook shares after 7 days, and almost 10 percent after 
28 days. By comparison, the explanatory power of tweets is very weak over time, if not 
nonexistent.  
4.6.2 Impulse Response Functions 
We supplement regression estimates with an analysis of the corresponding impulse response 
functions for our basic model. Graphs of the impulse-response functions (IRFs) with 5% error 
bands and 28 periods as the time span generated by Monte-Carlo simulations are presented 
in Figure 4-2. IRFs allow us to illustrate a response of one dependent variable to one standard 
deviation shock in another dependent variable in the preceding period. 
All responses, except the response of backers to a shock in tweets, are positive but vary in 
their significance and magnitude. We see that there is a strong immediate effect of 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠234 
on 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠2, which attenuates rather quickly, while the response of 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠2 on a shock in 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠234	is weaker and recedes more slowly. Overall, a shock in 𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠234 has 
virtually no effect on the other dependent variables, while shocks in 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠234 
appear to be effective for a longer period of time, and shocks in 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠234 are very powerful 
in the short run but also decline extremely fast.  
Note: Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1,000 repetitions 
Figure 4-2 Impulse Response Functions: Responses to Intra- and Cross-Platform Shocks 
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4.7 Discussion 
Our analysis of the dynamic relationship between social media channels and contribution 
behaviors revealed interesting and surprising results on several levels. Corresponding to our 
first research question, we were able to identify an inverse relationship between social buzz 
and project support, revealing a positive impact of social buzz on subsequent campaign 
support in contrast to a negative impact of campaign support on consecutive social buzz. This 
indicates that potential backers learn about projects from their social network and demand 
feedback from their peers before investing in a project. However, backers are subsequently 
not willing or able to share the campaign with their respective social network. Furthermore, 
these effects are more definite for the bidirectional social network Facebook, compared to the 
unidirectional network Twitter, where the effects were weak, if not absent.  
For our second research question, we were able to show the critical role of social buzz for the 
outcome of reward-based crowdfunding campaigns. As shown in our split-sample analysis, 
cross-platform effects of eWOM are virtually non-existent for campaigns that fail to reach the 
desired funding goal, while successful creators are able to capitalize on the information 
distribution in social media. Even more interestingly, the relative predictive power of 
Facebook shares increases over time, especially for winning campaigns, indicating that social 
media buzz is a crucial discriminating factor for the success of crowdfunding campaigns. To 
answer our third research question, we extended our sample-split analysis to a project’s 
general orientation, and we were able to identify reinforcement effects of social buzz for 
creative and entrepreneurial projects, as well as significant bystander effects for social 
campaigns.  
Finally, we were able to illustrate intra- and cross-platform effects over time by analyzing the 
shocks triggered by social buzz and contribution behavior. We thereby could reveal that the 
impact of a positive shock in backers abates relatively fast, while the effects of a positive shock 
in social buzz decrease at a lower rate. However, the effect of social buzz is present and 
significant for a much longer time span. 
4.7.1 Theoretical Contributions 
Our study makes two unique theoretical contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is one of the first studies to capture both intra- and cross-platform information flows that 
operate through users’ contribution and sharing behaviors. In doing so, we were able to 
identify strong intra-platform feedback loops, but also witnessed that cross-platform effects in 
the form of social buzz can play an important role in predicting success of crowdfunding 
campaigns. Second, we were able to reveal a novel aspect of the relationship between eWOM 
and contribution behavior on online platforms. More specifically, we found evidence that after 
funding a project, supporters perceive the project to be sufficiently financed and therefore see 
no need to promote the campaign any further in their social network, creating an inverse 
relationship between contribution behavior and eWOM. These reciprocal effects not only 
manifest themselves on an aggregate macro-level (i.e., platform) but also on a finer-grained 
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micro-level (i.e., project categories). Our study thus contributes to social media research by 
advancing our understanding of the effectiveness, diffusion patterns, and context dependency 
of eWOM. We further believe that our insights are not limited to the crowdfunding context, 
as informational cascades and social buzz are an ubiquitous phenomenon within and between 
online platforms (Benlian et al. 2015). Overall, these insights should thus also make 
meaningful contributions to IS platform research. 
4.7.2 Practical Implications 
Our findings do not only enrich streams of research related to the dynamics of crowdfunding 
platforms and the effects of eWOM on performance measures; we also see a variety of practical 
implications that should be considered, in particular by the providers of crowdfunding 
platforms and creators of crowdfunding campaigns. First, creators should be aware that social 
buzz can be a decisive factor for their campaign’s success, as backers often learn about the 
projects in their social networks and are generally willing to spread the word about their 
investment. Therefore, creators should be ready to engage in social media marketing and 
encourage backers to further share the campaign with their peers. Still, this multiplying effect 
strongly varies between the project’s orientations. As we saw from our analysis, social projects 
are shared significantly less via social media, whereas creative projects receive much more 
attention. Second, project creators should focus on favorable aspects of the projects in their 
campaign descriptions in order to reflect positively on the messenger and encourage 
additional dissemination throughout the network. Third, as platform providers directly profit 
from successful projects, they should encourage creators as well as backers to share the 
projects with their respective social networks. Possible design improvements may include 
more prominently displayed share buttons and notifications, highlighting the beneficial effects 
of sharing a project in social networks after backing it. Fourth, our results highlight the 
predominance of Facebook compared to Twitter when it comes to eWOM effectiveness. We 
believe this can be partly attributed to the strict word limit on Twitter, the more elaborate 
display possibilities on Facebook and the generally stronger ties on Facebook, where source 
credibility tends to be higher. These findings should be taken into account for the allocation 
of marketing resources. Finally, understanding users’ sharing behavior and its impact on 
subsequent product or campaign performance are highly important for today’s businesses. We 
therefore believe that our insights on whether and why information spreads within or between 
platforms and how it ultimately affects consumer decision-making can be crucial for a firm’s 
digital strategy. 
4.7.3 Limitations, Future Research, and Conclusion 
While our study provides important contributions to both research and practice in the context 
of crowdfunding and the effects of eWOM, we acknowledge certain limitations that have to 
be considered when interpreting the results and implications. First, we were unable to take 
into account all different types of eWOM and have thus limited our analysis to messages 
spread via the two most prominent types of social media, namely Facebook and Twitter. 
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Furthermore, due to the restrictions imposed by using Vector Auto Regression models we were 
unable to capture any non-linear relationships/growth rates. Second, we focused on the 
volume of eWOM rather than on its valence. However, we see little incentives for users of 
Twitter and Facebook to share a crowdfunding project to produce negative feedback and thus 
expected the majority of eWOM messages to be positive or neutral. Still, it might be of interest 
for future research to measure the impact of positive and negative eWOM separately, possibly 
by implementing semantic eWOM analysis tools. Third, we did not differentiate between the 
sources of eWOM on Facebook and Twitter. Potentially, the characteristics of the information 
provider might reveal additional insights. These characteristics could include the number of 
friends/followers, commercial or private accounts, and expertise. Fourth, since we derived 
our insights from just one crowdfunding platform, researchers should be cautious when 
generalizing these findings to other crowdfunding and different online platforms, as they 
potentially differ from Indiegogo in funding mechanisms and project orientation. 
Nevertheless, as Indiegogo is one of the best established and widely used crowdfunding 
platforms worldwide, the patterns of results identified in this study should also have valuable 
theoretical and practical implications for other platforms. Fifth, possible seasonality effects 
were not taken into account in our analysis. Yet, we do not regard this limitation as critical, 
as we did not observe any irregularities on Christmas or any other holiday season during the 
observation period. Finally, our study focuses solely on short-term dynamics, and the long-
term interplay might differ from our insights. Overcoming these limitations might provide 
fruitful directions for future research in these fields. Promising other future research fields on 
the project level in a crowdfunding setting are comparisons of different lifecycle statuses, 
project sizes, reward structures, and individual investment amounts. Promising research 
avenues for eWOM effectiveness in this context might be the campaign complexity, sharing 
mechanisms, the individual reach of eWOM messages, and sender characteristics.  
Overall, this study is an initial step towards understanding the dynamic interplay between 
eWOM, prior-contribution behavior, and actual contribution patterns operating within and 
across online platforms. We hope that our results provide impetus for further analysis of the 
intra- and cross-platform interdependencies between social buzz and contribution behaviors, 
and give actionable recommendations to platform providers and project creators in the 
crowdfunding context.  
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In recent years, the growing success of social media has led to a proliferation of social 
information such as customer product reviews and product ratings in electronic markets. 
While this information can serve as a quality signal and help consumers to better assess the 
quality of goods before purchase, its impact on consumer decision-making also incentivizes 
sellers to game the system by creating fake data in favor of specific goods in order to mislead 
consumers deliberately. Consequently, consumers could make suboptimal decisions or choose 
to disregard social information altogether. Although few studies have been devoted to 
identifying fake quantitative social information such as fake product rankings and ratings, 
tracing and examining the effects of such fake information on consumers’ actual financial 
decision-making over time has thus far received only little research attention. In this 
exploratory study, we assess the effects of non-genuine social information on consumers’ 
decision-making in the context of reward-based crowdfunding. Specifically, we capture 
unnatural peaks in the number of Facebook Likes that a specific crowdfunding campaign 
receives on the platform Kickstarter and observe subsequent campaign performance. Our 
results show that fake Facebook Likes have a very short-term positive effect on the number of 
backers funding the respective crowdfunding campaign. However, this short-term peak is 
followed by an immediate, sharp drop in the number of backers funding the campaign 
reaching levels that are lower than prior to the occurrence of the non-genuine social 
information, leading to a total negative effect over time. We further reveal circumstances that 
foster this artificial manipulation of quality signals, including market and campaign 
characteristics. Key implications for research and practice are discussed. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The growing success of social media has led to a proliferation of social information in 
electronic markets. This social information has become a vital quality signal for consumers to 
use for decision support, as online transactions restrict the consumer’s ability to assess a 
product’s quality due to the lack of direct interaction with product and seller (Pavlou et al. 
2007). Specifically, qualitative social information such as customer product reviews as well 
as quantitative social information such as product ratings and download rankings have been 
shown to affect consumers’ decisions when making online purchases (e.g., Chevalier and 
Mayzlin 2006; Duan et al. 2008b), helping them to overcome the information asymmetry for 
products whose quality is difficult to ascertain before purchase (Akerlof 1970). 
An extremely widespread method to reflect consumer opinions in a quantitative manner is the 
use of social media buttons such as the Facebook Like button, which is present on about 30% 
of the most popular websites worldwide (Built With 2014). When placed on a website, the 
button shows a counter reflecting the number of Facebook users who have previously “liked” 
this specific web page or have shared the link to it with their peers. For subsequent visitors to 
the web page, the button thus becomes a quality signal with a high number of Facebook Likes 
reflecting that the content or the offered product is of high quality, interesting, or worth 
sharing for other reasons. However, unlike qualitative social information that is multifaceted 
and contains lots of information that can be considered by the consumer (e.g., style and 
valence), social media buttons generally contain little information on a one-dimensional scale 
and most often no information about who contributed to the total count and why. Despite its 
limited information content, prior research has shown that quantitative social information can 
have a substantial influence on consumer decision-making (e.g., Duan et al. 2009; Tucker and 
Zhang 2011). These studies, however, focused on ordinal rankings that reflect actual 
popularity of a specific product among consumers. In contrast, the counter on the Facebook 
Like button only captures preferences and does not necessarily reflect actual behavior such as 
how many consumers have bought a product or downloaded specific software. Furthermore, 
while other quantitative social information such as product ratings, similar to Facebook Likes, 
also do not necessarily reflect actual behaviors of consumers, ratings are most often 
accompanied by reviews. Consumers are therefore able to access additional contextual 
information such as who contributed the rating, which is impossible in the case of the 
Facebook Like button. Facebook Likes thus remain a relatively subjective measure of 
popularity. Nevertheless, this social information can potentially be of high relevance for 
consumers in situations in which assessing the quality of specific products is especially difficult 
(e.g., Schöndienst et al. 2012; Thies et al. 2014). This is particularly true for products and 
services financed through reward-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter. Here, 
the so-called backers (i.e., investors or funders) invest in campaigns that appeal to them in 
the hope to receive adequate tangible rewards for their investment, even though the rewards 
are not guaranteed legally (Mollick 2014). In addition to the risk of not receiving a reward at 
all, the quality of the reward remains unpredictable at the time the backers make an 
investment decision because the rewards have not been created yet. Consequently, the utility 
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of the rewards can only be ascertained after the campaign has ended, thus increasing the 
relevance of quality signals such as the Facebook Like button. 
Kickstarter encloses the Facebook Like button in the description of every crowdfunding 
campaign in order to facilitate a viral dissemination of the campaign through social media. 
This growing presence of social media and social information, however, also incentivizes 
individuals and organizations to game the system by creating fake data in favor of specific 
campaigns in order to deliberately mislead consumers (Facebook 2015). As a consequence, 
backers on Kickstarter could make suboptimal choices based on the biased information or 
could choose to disregard or underweight otherwise helpful social information by mistrusting 
this content altogether (Mayzlin et al. 2014). Faking social information has thus become a 
preeminent threat to the credibility and trustworthiness of this type of user-generated content 
(Luca and Zervas 2016). 
While there is a growing stream of research that is focused on uncovering non-genuine 
qualitative social information (e.g., Jindal et al. 2010; Hu et al. 2011; Li et al. 2011), only few 
studies have been devoted to identifying fake quantitative social information such as fake 
product rankings and ratings (e.g., Xie et al. 2012; Zhu et al. 2015). Though these studies 
offer valuable contributions, tracing and examining the effects of fake quantitative social 
information on consumer decision-making over time has been difficult because other settings 
such as e-commerce platforms do not allow researchers to easily observe consumer decision-
making after being exposed to fake social information. Against this background, we focus our 
research on the effects of non-genuine Facebook Likes on the decision-making of prospective 
backers on the crowdfunding platform Kickstarter over time. Furthermore, by examining the 
characteristics of campaigns that receive fake Facebook Likes during the campaign life cycle, 
we uncover conditions under which there is an increased probability for backers to encounter 
fake Likes—a topic which has been largely neglected in previous research on the effects of 
fake social information. The objective of our study is to address the discussed research gaps 
guided by the following research questions: 
RQ1: How does fake social information in the form of Facebook Likes affect the decision-making 
of backers on crowdfunding platforms over time? 
RQ2: Under what conditions are crowdfunding campaigns more prone to receiving fake Facebook 
Likes? 
To address these research questions, we analyzed more than 35,000 Kickstarter projects 
during their complete life cycle, covering the period from January to July 2015 and find that 
1.6% of all projects receive fake Facebook Likes. Our results show that though a short-term 
positive effect can be induced by this artificial manipulation of social information, the overall 
effect is negative. We also find that backers are more likely to encounter fake Facebook Likes 
in highly crowded categories, when the distribution of funding within a category is uneven, 
or when the competition is fiercer. 
Our results provide important contributions to research and practice. First, while previous 
studies have primarily focused on identifying qualitative fake social information such as fake 
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product reviews (e.g., Jindal et al. 2010; Li et al. 2011), ours is among the first studies to 
focus on quantitative fake social information to unravel whether and how such information 
manipulates consumer decision-making over time. While few studies exist that try to identify 
fake quantitative social information such as fake product rankings and ratings (e.g., Xie et al. 
2012; Zhu et al. 2015), our study examines actual financial consequences of fake signals in 
the form of Facebook Likes based on real-life longitudinal data and thus captures the dynamic 
and fluctuating patterns of consumer decisions over time. Second, we add to previous research 
on fake social information by uncovering conditions under which an artificial manipulation of 
quantitative social information is more or less likely to occur, giving researchers as well as 
platform providers valuable insights into the relationship between market conditions and 
unethical behavior. Finally, and more broadly, we are able to confirm that, despite the 
relatively low information content of quantitative social information and even though 
Facebook Like buttons only reflect preferences and no actual consumer behavior, consumers 
incorporate these signals into their decision-making and that non-genuine social information 
thus can have detrimental and undesirable effects. By uncovering these effects, we provide 
evidence that fake social information should not be overlooked in future studies.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First, we present the theoretical 
background and develop our hypotheses. We then continue by describing our methodology, 
including our dataset, regression models, and robustness checks. We then follow up with our 
descriptive and econometric evidence and conclude the paper with a discussion of the key 
findings, contributions and implications, and directions for further research. 
5.2 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
5.2.1 Information Asymmetry and Social Information as Quality Signals 
The quality of a product or service is often difficult to ascertain in electronic markets as the 
lack of physical contact prevents consumers from using their senses such as touch, smell, and 
taste when evaluating quality. As a result, the consumer lacks information about the product’s 
or service’s true quality until after delivery. This uncertainty associated with online purchases 
can lead to information asymmetry between buyer and seller, as the seller alone controls the 
flow of information towards the buyer and is thus able to overstate quality or withhold 
information (Mavlanova et al. 2012). This information distortion may then lead to an adverse 
selection problem where consumers, when faced with a decision between two different goods, 
make buying decisions based on price rather than quality (Akerlof 1970). 
Even though physical search costs on the internet are negligible, they may nevertheless arise 
due to the difficulty of evaluating the true quality of goods. Consequently, as consumers 
become increasingly uncertain about a product’s true quality, they may rely more on 
alternative information sources that are available. This phenomenon has been, for example, 
confirmed for brand equity (Krishnan and Hartline 2001). However, alternative information 
might only be available for established products and newness of a product or firm can thus 
Emergence and Effects of Fake Social Information 67 
make it harder for consumers to gather information on its true quality. Consequently, in these 
situations, in which the seller possesses information that the buyer does not have or in which 
the buyer is unable to evaluate the quality, the buyer can draw inferences from credible signals 
sent by the seller (Biswas and Biswas 2004). A product warranty, for example, does not 
change intrinsic attributes of a product but creates trust, which in turn may reduce uncertainty 
in buying situations (Yen 2006). Signaling theory is concerned with understanding why 
certain signals such as a product warranty might be reliable and could thus be relevant to the 
consumer in buying situations (Spence 1973).  
Prior research has shown that businesses are able to signal product quality through, for 
example, advertising and pricing (Kirmani and Rao 2000). These signals may become even 
more credible to the consumers when sent by other consumers instead of businesses (Brown 
et al. 2007). The internet allows consumers to exchange opinions and recommendations on a 
large scale through social information such as online customer product reviews. The question 
of whether social information can have an effect on the consumers’ quality perceptions and 
subsequent buying decisions has attracted scholars from a variety of research areas such as 
marketing, economics, and information systems. Prior research has shown that both 
qualitative as well as quantitative social information does, in fact, have an influence on 
consumer decision-making in many buying situations. For example, word-of-mouth has been 
shown to have a positive effect on the box office revenues of movies (Liu 2006) and positive 
customer product reviews lead to increases in book sales on Amazon (Chevalier and Mayzlin 
2006). On the other hand, research on the effects of quantitative social information such as 
download rankings and product ratings has yielded ambiguous results. For example, Duan et 
al. (2009) demonstrate that, when choosing software products, consumers are strongly 
affected by download rankings, while product ratings only have an effect on the user’s 
adoption of niche products and not for the adoption of popular ones. Furthermore, Hu et al. 
(2014) find that ratings themselves do not have a significant direct impact on sales of books 
on Amazon.com, but only indirectly through sentiments. The difference in these findings can 
be explained by the structural differences between qualitative and quantitative social 
information and between rankings and ratings. Customer product reviews, for example, allow 
consumers to express their opinions with respect to a product or service in a vivid description 
and thus contain considerably more information than a one-dimensional scale such as a 
product rating. Furthermore, compared to popularity rankings such as software download 
rankings, product ratings do not necessarily reflect actual behavior such as how many 
consumers have bought a product. The same is true for the counter on the Facebook Like 
button that captures preferences and does not necessarily reflect actual behavior. 
Nevertheless, prior research has shown that consumers perceive Facebook Likes as a quality 
signal and that they associate more Likes with a superior product or service quality 
(Schöndienst et al. 2012).  
Despite the growing relevance of social information as a quality signal for consumers, 
relatively little prior research exists on the effects non-genuine social information might have 
on consumer decision-making. While numerous studies exist that are focused on uncovering 
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non-genuine qualitative social information (e.g., Jindal et al. 2010; Hu et al. 2011; Li et al. 
2011) and few researchers also tried to detect fake quantitative social information such as 
fake product rankings and ratings through pattern recognition (e.g., Xie et al. 2012; Zhu et 
al. 2015), we still know little about the effects of fake social information and how it may 
manipulate consumer decision-making in electronic markets. One of the reasons that this 
research area is still vastly under-explored is that tracing and examining the effects of fake 
quantitative social information on consumer decision-making over time has been difficult, as 
settings such as e-commerce platforms do not allow researchers to observe consumer decision-
making after being exposed to fake social information. 
Though it is also critical for consumers and e-commerce vendors to know what market 
conditions can foster unethical behavior such as the creation of fake social information, the 
amount of research in this area is also limited to few examples. First, Luca and Zervas (2016) 
explore economic incentives to commit review fraud on the popular review platform Yelp.com 
and find that restaurants are more likely to commit review fraud when their reputation is 
weak because they either have received few reviews or recently received bad ones. Second, 
Mayzlin et al. (2014) explore and compare review manipulation activities on the popular 
travel websites Expedia.com and TripAdvisor.com. Their findings suggest that “actors that are 
differentially situated economically will indulge in promotional reviewing to a measurably 
different extent” (Mayzlin et al. 2014, p. 2448). Though these studies offer valuable insights 
on the emergence of fake qualitative social information, the identification of fake quantitative 
social information is considerably more difficult for consumers and e-commerce vendors, 
making it even more important to uncover conditions under which this artificial manipulation 
is likely to occur.  
5.2.2 Campaign, Creator, and Platform Characteristics in Reward-Based 
Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding, the study context in which we investigate our research questions, is a subset 
of crowdsourcing that enables the creators of campaigns to collect relatively small financial 
contributions from a large number of individuals through an open call on the internet 
(Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012). It thus creates a large, relatively undefined network of 
project stakeholders and consequently decreases the importance of other investors such as 
venture capitalists.  
According to an industry report, the combined crowdfunding market was worth $16 billion in 
2014 and approximately $34 billion in 2015, with a predicted growth rate of 100% in the 
following years (Massolution 2015). The growing success and increased media attention for 
crowdfunding platforms such as Indiegogo and Kickstarter has made crowdfunding an 
increasingly attractive alternative for sourcing capital as well as for marketing activities. 
Besides the benefits for campaign creators, crowdfunding also offers a variety of incentives 
for backers to “pledge” for campaigns. These incentives mainly depend on the return backers 
can expect from their contributions, which range from donations to company equity (Ahlers 
et al. 2015). On Kickstarter, the most common and salient type of return is a so-called 
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“reward”. The rewards can range from small tokens of appreciation (e.g., a thank-you card) 
for an investment of a few dollars to an early access to the product developed for an 
investment of hundreds of dollars (Belleflamme et al. 2014). Previous research has found 
these rewards to be a central reason for backers to participate in this so-called reward-based 
crowdfunding (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014). Consequently, reward-based crowdfunding 
does not attract investors in the classical sense, but rather consumption-oriented backers, 
interested in the project or in supporting the cause. In this study, we focus on reward-based 
crowdfunding, as it is by far the most widespread form of crowdfunding today (Massolution 
2015).  
Compared to other types of web services, reward-based crowdfunding is special as it allows 
us to observe the effects of fraudulent social information on the decision-making of backers 
over the complete campaign life cycle and the high uncertainty connected to the investments 
made by backers makes it the ideal vehicle to test the effects of fake Facebook Likes. This high 
uncertainty results from the lack of a legal obligation to actually deliver the rewards to the 
backers and the fact that the quality of the rewards remains highly unpredictable at the time 
the investment decision has to be made, as there is little to no publicly available and unbiased 
information about the campaigns (Mollick 2014). The dynamics of crowdfunding are thus 
different from those in a traditional e-commerce setting between a seller and a buyer. Backers 
can be less certain that they will actually receive a return on their investment and have less 
information about the object they are investing in compared to a regular buying situation, in 
which the product or service already exists.  
The primary source of information for a potential backer is the campaign description and the 
updates the creator has published. Even though this content allows prospective backers to 
develop an attitude towards the campaign and the comprised rewards, this attitude is 
potentially biased due to the fact that it stems from a single source of information (Burtch et 
al. 2013). We therefore argue that other evidence for the trustworthiness and quality of a 
campaign such as the Facebook Likes it receives becomes increasingly important for the 
potential backer’s evaluation. 
5.2.3 Fake Social Information in Electronic Markets and their Effects on 
Consumer Decision-Making in Crowdfunding 
A substantial and preeminent threat to the credibility and trustworthiness of social 
information as a quality signal is the possibility of creating fake data (Luca and Zervas 2016). 
Even though some governments have reacted to the growing trend of surreptitious advertising 
through, for example, customer product reviews and these kinds of endorsements and 
testimonials now have to be classified as advertising (Federal Trade Commission 2009), faking 
social information is still a growing trend (Sussin and Thompson 2012). Acquiring fake 
Facebook Likes is, for instance, possible by creating dedicated fake Facebook accounts that 
can then be used to “like” specific web pages or by turning to crowdsourcing marketplaces 
such as Amazon Mechanical Turk where 1,000 Facebook Likes can be acquired for as little as 
$15 (Arthur 2013).  
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Consequently, it remains challenging for providers of online services to identify social 
information that does not reflect genuine consumer opinions or behavior (Mayzlin et al. 
2014). Popular websites such as Yelp.com use algorithms to identify and mark specific reviews 
as fraudulent (Jindal et al. 2010; Li et al. 2011). On Yelp, non-genuine reviews account for 
16% of all reviews and tend to be particularly extreme (either favorable or unfavorable) (Luca 
and Zervas 2016). While consumers might be able to identify fake qualitative content due to 
its extreme nature and exaggerations contained therein, purely quantitative non-genuine 
content is generally more difficult to identify by service providers and especially by consumers 
(Xie et al. 2012; Zhu et al. 2015). This is a particular challenge in the context of Facebook 
Likes as a quality signal, as it remains obscure to the consumer whether the Likes are a genuine 
signal sent by other consumers or a non-genuine signal sent by sellers. While the low costs of 
acquiring Facebook Likes should depreciate their value as a quality signal, we argue that this 
might not necessarily be the case. As long as Facebook is able to control the spread of fake 
Likes and thus the vast majority of Likes remains genuine, providers of online services and 
consumers will often be unable to quickly identify fake Facebook Likes as such [39, 40]. 
The influence of social information on consumer decision-making is well-established in the IS 
literature (Duan et al. 2008a; 2009; Cheung et al. 2014). Prior research has, for example, 
shown that the volume of eWOM surrounding a product is an important factor influencing 
consumers’ decision-making processes and that consumers associate higher eWOM volume 
with a superior product quality (Amblee and Bui 2011). As the investment in crowdfunding 
campaigns is often required without an existing product or service, the perceived risk rises. 
This high perceived risk should increase the importance of social information, because, with 
rising search costs and scarcity of information, the relative contribution or importance of the 
remaining information may increase (Akerlof 1970). Therefore, social information such as 
Facebook Likes that contains relatively small amounts of information may be a credible signal 
in high search-cost situations such as crowdfunding platforms (Spence 2002). Thus, we expect 
fake Facebook Likes to have a positive influence on the prospective backer’s perception of a 
campaign’s quality because consumers are unable to identify them as being fake, leading to 
an increase in the number of backers in the following period. 
H1: Fake Facebook Likes will lead to an increase in the number of backers pledging for the 
campaign. 
While we expect fake Facebook Likes to positively affect the number of backers contributing 
to the campaign over time, this effect might be very short-lived. First, prior research has shown 
that an increase in genuine Facebook Likes has its biggest effect on contribution behavior of 
backers within a day (Thies et al. 2014). Second, fake Facebook Likes are unlikely to attract 
any additional visitors to the campaign web page as the fake Facebook accounts created for 
adding non-genuine Likes will not have any connections to real “friends”. Consequently, these 
fake Likes will not disseminate through Facebook’s social network and therefore no real 
Facebook users will be able to see this information. The only users potentially affected by the 
increase in the number of Likes are therefore those who see the Facebook Like button directly 
on the web page and who visit the campaign webpage anyway for other reasons. Prospective 
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backers who notice the high or increased number of Facebook Likes would thus only expedite 
their pending investment decision, which they would otherwise have taken later on, once 
other performance indicators (e.g., pledged amount, number of backers, and updates) reflect 
that the campaign is of high quality (Mollick 2014). This would mean that a decelerated 
growth would follow the positive peak in the number of additional backers. Accordingly, we 
propose that: 
H2: The positive effect of fake Facebook Likes on the number of additional backers will be followed 
by an immediate, sharp drop in the number of contributors. 
The question remains, what characteristics of crowdfunding campaigns, campaign creators, 
and platforms make it most likely for backers to encounter fake Facebook Likes? Quality 
signals can only be credible if a seller offering a low quality has higher costs acquiring them 
compared to a seller offering a high quality (Kirmani and Rao 2000). It has been shown that 
content that creates high-arousal positive emotions and is surprising, interesting, or practically 
useful is shared often among online users (Berger and Milkman 2012). As these are all 
characteristics of high-quality crowdfunding campaigns, we expect that these campaigns 
receive more Facebook Likes without any extra costs. In turn, this would mean that low-
quality campaigns would need to acquire additional Likes in different ways. The assessment 
of campaign quality and the signaling power of these indicators have received considerable 
attention in recent studies (Mollick 2014; Ahlers et al. 2015; Burtch et al. 2015). Past research 
has revealed that signals of quality across all crowdfunding models are effective, regardless 
of backer’s expectations for tangible or financial returns (Mollick 2014; Burtch et al. 2015). 
Identified indicators of campaign quality include, for example, a campaign video, updates, the 
number of Facebook friends of the creator, (Mollick 2014), the description length, spelling 
errors, and creator experience (Wessel et al. 2015a). Consequently, campaigns on Kickstarter 
that provide an entertaining video and offer a detailed and vivid description of the project, 
offer more rewards, and engage in an active communication with the community, are 
inherently more shareable (Berger and Milkman 2012). Therefore, these campaigns should 
receive more genuine Facebook Likes compared to low-quality campaigns, making it more 
likely that the creators of low-quality campaigns will try to game the system by acquiring fake 
Facebook Likes in order to artificially create a quality signal. Consequently, we expect a 
negative correlation between the quality of individual campaigns and the number of fake Likes 
they receive. 
H3: Campaign quality is associated with a lower likelihood of fake Facebook Likes. 
Second, besides the campaign quality that is critical for the backers’ evaluation of the 
campaign directly on Kickstarter, prior research has shown that a viral dissemination of the 
campaign via social media is crucial for the success of crowdfunding campaigns (Thies et al. 
2014). Previous research in this context suggests that reaching a critical mass of people who 
can spread the word about specific information (e.g., a crowdfunding campaign) is more 
important than being able to reach particularly influential people (Watts and Dodds 2007). 
Thus, when looking at the characteristics of campaign creators on Kickstarter, those 
individuals who have an extensive social network should be able to spread the word about 
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their campaign more quickly and broadly (Hinz et al. 2011), generating additional genuine 
Facebook Likes and making well-connected campaign creators less dependent on an artificial 
manipulation of Likes. We therefore argue that the extent of the social network the campaign 
creators have on Facebook negatively influences the emergence of fake Facebook Likes and 
hypothesize that: 
H4: Campaign creators with larger social networks will be less likely to fake Facebook Likes. 
Finally, when looking at the crowdfunding platform itself, it can be argued that backers will 
rarely have to choose between two similar campaigns running at the same time because 
campaigns on Kickstarter can most often be characterized as innovative and unique in respect 
to the project idea. Nevertheless, each campaign has to compete with all other campaigns 
running at the same time for the attention of prospective backers browsing the specific 
crowdfunding platform. This is particularly true within the distinct categories (e.g., 
technology or design) that are used on the platforms to sort and rank campaigns. For example, 
the most promising campaigns out of each category are listed on the front page of Kickstarter. 
Consequently, crowded categories (e.g., relatively higher number of campaigns) or 
concentrated categories (e.g., those hosting few particularly successful campaigns) will make 
it more difficult for the individual campaigns to be noticed. Prior research has shown that, as 
the intensity of competition increases, market participants invest less in satisfying market rules 
and are more likely to exhibit unethical behavior (Kulik et al. 2008; Mayzlin et al. 2014; 
Branco and Villas-Boas 2015; Luca and Zervas 2016), especially if they perform poorly 
(Schwieren and Weichselbaumer 2010). As the artificial manipulation of quality signals can 
be seen as unethical behavior and because truthfulness and honesty are among the rules that 
campaign creators have to comply with on Kickstarter, an increased competition and market 
concentration can be expected to lead to an increase in the average number of fake Likes per 
campaign. 
H5a: Fake Facebook Likes will occur more often in crowded categories. 
H5b: Fake Facebook Likes will occur more often in concentrated categories. 
Similarly, prior research has shown that inequality (e.g., with respect to income distribution) 
can foster unethical behavior such as corruption (Jong-Sung and Khagram 2005). While those 
on the high end of income distribution try to retain their status by participating in unethical 
behavior, those at the low end use unethical behavior as a means to narrow the gap between 
rich and poor (Jong-Sung and Khagram 2005). Transferring this notion to our context, 
creators that receive little funding are more prone to manipulation. This would, in turn, mean 
that categories with an uneven distribution of funds are more likely to experience fraud. We 
therefore argue that, as the inequality of funding rises within a specific category on 
Kickstarter, more campaign creators will engage in unethical behavior. 
H5c: Fake Facebook Likes will occur more often in categories that exhibit a high inequality of 
funding among the campaigns. 
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5.3 Research Methodology 
In most cases, creating fake Facebook Likes will be a decision taken and executed by the 
creators of a specific crowdfunding campaign in the hope to send a quality signal to 
prospective backers. The sudden increase (i.e., shock) in the number of Facebook Likes can 
thus be assumed to be endogenous to the campaign creators but exogenous to the platform 
providers and potential backers (Claussen et al. 2013). In order to explore the effects and 
premises of non-genuine Facebook Likes, we apply several econometric analyses and provide 
illustrations to examine our research hypotheses.  
5.3.1 Dataset and Identification of Campaigns with Fake Likes 
We collected our campaign-level data from Kickstarter, which is the leading and most 
prominent reward-based crowdfunding platform today. Since Kickstarter’s launch in 2009, 
over $1.8 billion have been pledged by more than 9 million individuals, successfully funding 
more than 90,000 projects (Kickstarter 2016b). Data on every campaign available was 
gathered automatically with a self-developed web crawler to retrieve time-series data on all 
campaigns in a daily routine. Our data covers more than 7 months from January 20 to July 
28, 2015, including more than 35,000 campaigns. 
Campaigns involved in the artificial manipulation of quality signals were identified as such 
when unnatural peaks in additional Facebook Likes occurred on a single day and dropped in 
the same way afterward. This usage of a temporal pattern is a common method for fraud 
detection (e.g., Jacob and Levitt 2003; Xie et al. 2012; Zhu et al. 2015). Jacob and Levitt 
(2003), for example, used a similar technique to detect cheating of teachers and 
administrators by monitoring score fluctuations in standardized high school tests over 
consecutive years. Even though peaks in Facebook Likes are to be expected when a campaign 
receives major attention in other channels, such as blogs or news sites, these natural peaks 
are then followed by an increased and then gradually declining number of daily Likes over 
time. Therefore, three conditions were required to safely identify manipulation: First, 
campaigns had to receive more than the threefold standard deviation of additional Facebook 
Likes in a single day (Aggarwal 2013). Second, the number of new Likes had to exceed 250, 
as the former rule is impractical for small values and vendors of Facebook Likes commonly 
sell them in quantities of at least 250 (Steuer 2013). Third, a significant drop in the additional 
number of additional daily Facebook Likes had to occur afterward. Meaning that on the 
following day, a threefold standard deviation decline has to happen. This sequential ensemble 
ensures that the additional Likes do not stem from a promotional effort and are in fact 
manipulated. Using a threefold standard deviation is a conservative approach to identify 
peaks, as in a normal distribution 99.7% of all observations are inside this interval (Aggarwal 
2013). Applying the filtering mechanism still resulted in 591 projects that were identified as 
being involved in fraudulent actions in respect to Facebook Likes. Due to the novelty of this 
approach in this area, we provide multiple robustness checks for alternative identification 
conditions. 
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5.3.2 Model and Variables 
In order to test our hypotheses, we calculated three different models: (1) a negative binominal 
regression with the number of additional backers as our dependent variable to test H1 and 
H2, (2) a probit model with the dependent dummy variable fake Facebook Likes to test H3 
and H4, and (3) a negative binominal regression with the number of campaigns that use fake 
Facebook Likes per category as the dependent variable to test H5a to H5c.  
In our first model, our dependent variable is the number of additional backers a campaign 
acquires each day, which measures the adoption rate during the life cycle of a campaign. We 
use the number of additional backers (instead of the dollar amount pledged) on each day as 
our dependent variable for the following two reasons. First, our intention was to examine the 
impact of fraudulent behavior on the individual decision to support a campaign and not the 
amount of funding a backer gives. Second, single and extremely high donations, possibly by 
the project creators themselves, might severely distort the results. Panel Poisson models are 
commonly used when the dependent variable is a count. We used negative binominal 
regression models (NBREG) in our analysis because the dependent variable is overdispersed, 
meaning its variance is bigger than its mean (Cameron and Trivedi 2013). We employ a fixed-
effects specification (Hausman and Taylor 1981) to control for unobserved heterogeneity by 
estimating effects using only within project variation. Therefore, these models drop campaigns 
with no day-to-day variation in additional backers. Our conclusions to be discussed are 
generally robust to random effects models, but the performed Hausman specification test 
suggested that fixed-effects modeling is preferred (Hausman and Taylor 1981). The following 
model specification therefore results for our baseline regression: 
 yit=αi+βxit+γzi        (1-1)	
where yit is the dependent variable describing the number of backers (y) for each campaign 
(i) on a single day (t). The individual-effects negative binominal model assumes that 𝑦;2 takes 
non-negative integer values and is overdispersed. Our independent Fake Like dummy variable 
turns from 0 to 1 after non-genuine Likes were added for a specific campaign, and is 
represented by βxit. Here, α= depicts campaign specific fixed effects controlling for all time-
invariant characteristics that might drive the number of additional backers on each day. Again, 
the time-invariant, campaign-specific heterogeneity is absorbed by the campaign’s fixed-
effects. However, as we are using a negative binominal model, we were able to include some 
time-invariant variables by using a set of panel dummies (Allison and Waterman 2002). To 
control for the possibility that additional backers decided to support a campaign because of a 
crucial update in the campaign description, we included a simple count accumulating each 
update on a given day. We also controlled for the category of a project, as some might attract 
more backers than others. 
In our baseline model (1-1), we include a before/after dummy for the occurrence of fake 
Likes, while we use a set of 11 daily dummies in our second specification of the baseline 
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regression (1-2) to create an econometric model that shows the effects 5 days before and after 
the occurrence of fake Likes (Claussen et al. 2013). 
For our second model, we use the occurrence of Fake Likes as a binary dependent variable. 
Probit models are well established and used for binary outcomes in regression analysis. Probit 
models specify the probability of an outcome as a function of one or more regressors. In our 
case, we model the probability of the occurrence of fake Likes dependent on several 
environmental factors (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Our model is therefore formalized as 
follows: 
pi=PR yi=1 xi =Φ(β1+β2xi)       (2)	
Here yi is the occurrence of fake Facebook Likes (0/1) depending on campaign characteristics 
and success factors: xi. In order to assess the proposed influence of campaign quality and 
market competition, we use several proxy variables in our regression analysis. In this respect, 
we consider several characteristics of crowdfunding campaigns that allow us to determine 
how thorough the creator prepared the campaign (Chen et al. 2009). One key element here 
is whether the campaign includes a video (Mollick 2014). Producing and uploading a video is 
also strongly recommended by Kickstarter, claiming that campaigns that do not provide a 
video have a much lower success rate (Kickstarter 2016a). 
Another indicator of quality is the number of updates to keep backers informed and engage 
frequently with the community (Agrawal et al. 2011; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014). 
Additional indicators are the creator experience (Zhang 2006), the duration of the campaign, 
and the number of offered rewards (Agrawal et al. 2011; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014). 
Furthermore, we evaluate the preparedness by looking at the description length of the 
campaign, the underlying intuition being that a longer and more detailed description can 
reduce the information asymmetry better than a shorter description. The social network of 
the creator, measured by the number of Facebook friends, reflects the initial installed base, 
the creator can rely on, to back the project and share it with their friends, and therefore 
increase dissemination (Agrawal et al. 2011; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2014). 
For our third model, we again employ a negative binominal panel regression, as we are 
modeling the number of cheaters within a project category on a single day: y=? = α= + βx=? + γz=       (3)	
Here yit is the number of projects (y) within a category (i) on a single day (t), dependent on 
the market conditions x=?, category specific fixed effects (𝛼) and an error term (z). In order to 
assess market condition and competition, we apply three different measures. First, we 
measure the daily crowdedness of each category by dividing the number of current projects 
within a category by the average number of projects per category (Chellappa et al. 2010). 
This measurement captures if a campaign competes with a relatively high or low number of 
other campaigns within their dedicated category. Second, we calculate the market 
concentration within project categories to account for the allocation of resources (Hansen and 
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Haas 2001). We used the following Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) from strategic 
management research as our measure:  
HHI= bit
2
N
i
 
where bi is the fraction of a campaign’s total backings (i.e., number of backers) in the project 
category (i) at time t. This measure ranges from 1/N to 1, where N is the total number of 
campaigns in a given category. For example, if a campaign has received all funds invested 
within a specific category, then this measure is 1 and the category is maximally concentrated 
(Hirschman 1964; Hansen and Haas 2001). The HHI captures whether a category is 
dominated by a few campaigns compared to an even distribution among all participants. 
Third, we are looking at the distribution of daily pledges across all projects within a category. 
We use the Gini coefficient to measure the inequality of distribution of pledges among projects 
in a category, which is usually applied in economic and sociology literature. The Gini 
coefficient derives from the Lorenz curves and is calculated as follows: 
G=1-
1
n
(yi-1+yi)
n
i=1
  
where i is the project’s rank order number, n is the number of total projects within a category, 
yi is the project’s received share of total pledges within its category. The Gini coefficient ranges 
from 0 to 1, where a value of 0 represents a perfectly even distribution of pledges among all 
projects, and a Gini of 1 meaning that only one project receives the total pledges in the 
category on a single day (Jong-Sung and Khagram 2005). 
5.3.3 Robustness Checks 
To check for robustness of our fake Like identification approach, we tightened the algorithm 
to determine fraudulent behavior to a fourth fold standard deviation with a threshold of 500 
Facebook Likes, resulting in 162 projects and loosened the restriction to a double standard 
deviation and a threshold of 100 leaving 2,279 projects. Both specifications produced identical 
result patterns, showing that our measurement is robust to a tighter and looser configuration.  
We also changed our primary dependent variable to the natural logarithm of the daily income 
of the project as backers differ in terms of their financial contribution to the project. 
Furthermore, we employed a clustered zero-inflated Poisson regression (ZIP) as an alternative 
estimator. All robustness checks showed the same result patterns and confirmed our model 
and choice of variables. As a robustness check for our probit regression, we used an OLS 
estimator. This analysis also confirmed the patterns of our results. 
5.4 Results 
We now present the results of our analysis, starting with the descriptive evidence, followed 
by the results for the NBREG for backing behavior, the probit regression for campaign 
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characteristics and the NBREG for market conditions. Summary statistics for our final dataset 
and all relevant variables are depicted in Table 5-1. All summary statistics, except the delta 
values, show the value of each variable at the end of the campaign life cycle. 
We present the results of our main model in Table 5-2, which provides evidence for the effects 
of fake social information on the backing behavior of the crowdfunding community. We 
continue with our probit model in Table 5-3 to show what factors of a crowdfunding campaign 
influence the occurrence of fake Facebook Likes. We conclude our analysis with the NBREG 
for market conditions (Table 5-4). 
Table 5-1 Summary Statistics for the Complete Dataset and for Campaigns that Received 
Fake Facebook Likes  
5.4.1 Descriptive Evidence 
Before we focus on answering our main research questions, we first highlight relevant 
descriptive statistics for all campaigns and for those affected by the artificial manipulation of 
Facebook Likes measured at the end of the campaign life cycle (Table 5-1). Compared to all 
Complete Dataset (N=36,543) Mean SD Min Max 
Fake Likes (Dummy) 0.016 0.13 0 1 
Facebook Likes 205.49 1,530.27 0 168,630 
Backers 63.33 619.01 0 78,471 
Accumulated funding 5,950.73 115,823 0 2.03e+07 
Funding goal  74,417.24 1,591,930 1 1.00e+08 
Campaign duration (Days) 33.04 11.64 1 73 
Number of rewards 6.41 5.62 0 146 
Description length (Characters) 2,724.99 3,195.79 0 34,667 
Video 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Updates 1.81 3.84 0 107 
Campaigns created 1.332 1.58 1 69 
Facebook friends 626.93 847.53 0 5,291 
Crowdedness 1.90 0.95 0.0031 4.16 
Inequality (Gini Coefficient) 0.66 0.14 0.23 0.91 
Concentration (HHI) 0.083 0.092 0 1 
Fake Like Campaigns (N=591) Mean SD Min Max 
Facebook Likes 2,977.12 8,351.24 263 168,630 
Backers 529.80 2,219.94 0 45,815 
Accumulated funding 48,288.99 170,824.80 0 2,950,874 
Funding goal 204,397.40 3,318,139 350 8.0e+07 
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campaigns, we observe a higher number of backers, more funding, and higher funding goals 
for the 591 campaigns that received fake Facebook Likes. 
 
Figure 5-1 Percentage of Campaigns in the Distinct Categories on Kickstarter that 
Received Non-Genuine Facebook Likes During the Campaign Life Cycle 
 
Figure 5-2 Example of Genuine and Non-Genuine Peaks in Facebook Likes 
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We continue by calculating the percentage of campaigns that engaged in the acquisition of 
fake Likes within each distinctive category as depicted in Figure 5-1. We see that certain 
categories such as Design, Comics, Film & Video, and Technology are much more prone to 
altering their Facebook Likes compared to categories such as Crafts, Journalism, Art, and 
Food. Still, competition in the latter might be less fierce, which could mitigate the need for 
unethical behavior. 
As we are using a panel dataset, we are able to identify the exact date a campaign received 
the non-genuine Facebook Likes. Figure 5-2 shows the growth of Facebook Likes for two 
separate campaigns from our dataset over the campaign life cycle and serves as an illustrative 
example for the distinct peak that can be observed when non-genuine Facebook Likes are 
acquired compared to a genuine development. Though genuine Likes can exhibit natural 
peaks (Figure 5-2), these peaks are not followed by a significant and sharp drop, which can 
therefore be used to identify fake Likes.  
 
Figure 5-3 Timing of Unnatural Peaks with Respect to Funding and Life Cycle 
We further use our data to plot the date of the acquisition against the accumulated funding 
the campaign eventually received by the end of the campaign life cycle (Figure 5-3). Each 
circle represents the exact point in time when the unnatural peak occurred. On the y-axis, we 
depicted the fraction of the total amount of the accumulated funding a campaign raised. We 
see that the majority of creators try to increase the odds of success by making use of the 
artificial manipulation of Facebook Likes early in the campaign’s life cycle, represented by the 
dense cluster in the lower left corner. This is in line with findings on manipulative reviews 
which are commonly posted close to the launch of a product (Hu et al. 2011). The reference 
line assumes a linear increase of funding during the campaign life cycle. Drawing from the 
representation in Figure 5-3, we can also see that most campaigns are above the reference 
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line. This indicates that the manipulation hurts their funding progress, as they necessarily end 
up in the upper right corner at the end of their campaign. Several campaigns were even unable 
to attract any additional funding after the manipulation of Likes, as represented by the dots 
on the top end.  
5.4.2 Econometric Evidence 
5.4.2.1 Dynamic Effects of Fake Social Information on Decision-Making 
We now turn to our econometric evidence and the hypotheses testing for the effects of fake 
social information (in the form of Facebook Likes) on the decision-making of prospective 
backers on Kickstarter over time. We ran our first model for our econometric results as 
depicted in Table 5-2.  
Table 5-2 Results from NBREG for Additional Backers 
Model specification 1-1 includes a before/after dummy for the purchase of Fake Likes. In order 
to model the dynamic effects and to rule out rival explanations (1-2), we created a set of time-
Δ Backers Model (1-1) Model (1-2) 
Fake Likes (Dummy) -0.286*** (-14.723)  
Updates -0.027*** (-10.712) -0.012 (-1.856) 
Campaign category Included Included 
T-5  0 (0.0) 
T-4  -0.074 (-1.074) 
T-3  -0.135 (-1.959) 
T-2  0.005 (0.076) 
T-1  -0.048 (-0.793) 
T  0.689*** (11.964) 
T+1  0.089 (1.465) 
T+2  -0.174** (-2.749) 
T+3  -0.315*** (-4.853) 
T+4  -0.322*** (-4.939) 
T+5  -0.423*** (-6.324) 
Constant -0.146 (-1.689) 0.071 (0.394) 
BIC 95,731 24,874 
Log likelihood -47,781 -12,326 
Wald Chi² 582 1,016 
Campaigns 582 563 
Observations 20,090 5,132 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Emergence and Effects of Fake Social Information 81 
related dummies for the 5 days before, after and on the day of the artificial manipulation. 
Observations in Model 1-2 are thus restricted to be within an 11-day time period from the 
purchase of Fake Likes. 
For our first hypothesis, we consider the negative and significant coefficient of the Fake Likes 
Dummy in specification 1-1, clearly indicating a negative effect of non-genuine Facebook 
Likes. Consequently, campaign creators who try to increase the odds of success for their 
campaigns by acquiring fake Likes do in fact achieve the opposite, contrasting our expectation. 
However, when looking at the dynamic effects in model 1-2, we can observe a positive and 
significant coefficient for the first day following the artificial manipulation of Likes as we 
expected. In our second hypothesis, we argued that any positive effect will, however, be very 
short lived. In model 1-2 we see the predicted subsequent sharp drop in funding activities 
represented by the consecutively negative coefficient after T+1. This decline may be 
attributable to the possibility that backers who planned to participate anyway simply 
expedited their investment based on the non-genuine social information (H2). Due to this 
trigger, other quality indicators such as the number of backers, pledge amount or updates 
might lose their relevance in the aftermath of fake Facebook Likes. Figure 5-4 illustrates the 
development of additional backers per day before and after the occurrence of fake Facebook 
Likes. 
 
Figure 5-4 Average Daily Backers per Campaign Before and After Fake Likes 
5.4.2.2 Conditions for the Emergence of Fake Social Information 
While the effects of the fake social information on the decision-making of backers revealed 
interesting insights, we will now investigate the circumstances under which campaigns with 
fake Likes are most prevalent. For our third hypothesis, we argued for a negative relation of 
the quality of individual campaigns and the number of fake Likes. In order to test whether 
any correlation exists between the characteristics or the quality of individual campaigns and 
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the likelihood of any artificial manipulation of quality signals, we used a probit model (2-1 
and 2-2) with the occurrence of fake Facebook Likes as the binary dependent variable. Results 
are shown in Table 5-3. Though the model does not allow us to interpret the coefficients 
directly, we are able to interpret whether the respective characteristics have a positive or 
negative effect on the likelihood of the occurrence of fake Likes.  
Table 5-3 Results from the Probit Regression for Occurrence of Fake Facebook Likes 
One of the key elements of every crowdfunding campaign on Kickstarter is the campaign 
video. A high-quality video would, for example, make it more likely for potential backers to 
share the campaign via Facebook and could thus make it less attractive for the creators to 
acquire additional fake Facebook Likes. Surprisingly and in contrast to our hypothesis, we see 
that, if a video exists, the artificial manipulation of social information becomes more likely. 
The same is true for other quality signals such as the number of updates a creator provides 
during the campaign life cycle, the number of rewards, and the description length (see Table 
5-3).  
For our fourth hypothesis, we argued that creators with an extensive personal social network 
are less likely to engage in an artificial manipulation of Facebook Likes, as they should be able 
to spread the word about their campaigns more quickly and easily, therefore having no need 
for non-genuine Facebook Likes. Contrasting our hypothesis, we see a positive coefficient in 
Fake Likes (Dummy) Model (2-1) Model (2-2) 
Campaign duration (days) 0.004* (2.555) 0.007** (2.748) 
ln (funding goal) 0.120*** (9.514) 0.129*** (7.010) 
ln (number of rewards) 0.389*** (12.347) 0.370*** (8.043) 
Campaign updates 0.031*** (9.775) 0.027*** (6.371) 
Description Length (Characters) 0.195e-6*** (4.149) 0.166e-6* (2.368) 
Video 0.288*** (5.467) 0.159* (2.154) 
Campaigns created -0.013 (-0.818) -0.022 (-1.034) 
Facebook profile -0.045 (-1.187)  
ln (number of Facebook friends)  0.149*** (6.866) 
Campaign category Included Included 
Constant -4.676*** (-27.717) -5.757*** (-20.188) 
BIC 5,190 2,631 
Log likelihood -2,474 -1,203 
Wald Chi² 1,099 594 
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.198 
Observations 36,541 17,915 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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specification 2-2 meaning that creators with a larger social network are also more likely to 
acquire fake Facebook Likes7. 
We identified unnatural peaks in 1.6% of the campaigns on Kickstarter. Still, we showed in 
Figure 5-1 that these campaigns are not evenly distributed over the campaign categories. This 
difference was expected due to the different conditions within the campaign categories (H5a 
to H5c). We proposed that, as the intensity of competition within a category increases, 
campaign creators will be less likely to follow the market rules and more likely to acquire fake 
Likes. We thus measured the dynamic market crowdedness, market concentration 
(Herfindahl–Hirschman index), and inequality of daily pledges (Gini-Coefficient) for every 
category on each day in order to determine the intensity of competition. We therefore used a 
negative binominal regression model with the number of campaigns with Fake Likes as the 
dependent variable and the three market conditions within each category as the independent 
variable. The results in Table 5-4 suggest that, on Kickstarter, an increased market 
crowdedness does, in fact, increase the likelihood of artificial manipulations of social 
information in the respective category. This finding supports H5a. Contrary to H5b, backers 
are less likely to face manipulated Facebook Likes within categories where the funding is 
heavily concentrated on a few campaigns. Finally, artificial manipulations will occur more 
often in categories that exhibit a high inequality of funding measured by the Gini coefficient, 
providing support for the final hypothesis H5c. 
Table 5-4 Results from NBREG for Number of Campaigns with Fake Facebook Likes 
5.5 Discussion and Contributions 
After reviewing our descriptive and econometric evidence, we will now link these results to 
our initial research questions. For our first research question, we investigated how fake social 
                                                   
7 About 50% of creators connected their Facebook profile to their campaign, which enabled us to include 
the number of friends as a variable. Results in specification 2-2 include the number of Facebook friends of 
the creator, while 2-1 includes a dummy, if the creator connected their Facebook profile. 
Campaigns with fake Likes (count) Model (3) 
Crowdedness 0.328*** (4.470) 
Inequality (Gini Coefficient) 5.213*** (6.729) 
Concentration (HHI) -2.975*** (-3.731) 
Constant -2.083** (-2.621) 
BIC 2,645 
Log likelihood -1,306 
Wald Chi² 108 
Categories 15 
Observations 2,848 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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information in the form of Facebook Likes affects the decision-making of backers on 
crowdfunding platforms over time. Our analysis clearly shows that non-genuine social 
information does, in fact, influence the investment decisions of backers. The negative 
coefficient, however, shows that, overall, manipulation activities have a negative effect on 
backing behavior and thus virtually backfire, as the campaign creators achieve the opposite of 
what they originally intended. An explanation for this might be that some of the very internet-
savvy prospective backers notice a discrepancy between the number of Facebook Likes the 
campaign received and other performance indicators such as the number of backers and, as a 
result, reconsider investing in the respective campaign. Still, our econometric model showed 
that acquiring fake Facebook Likes could induce a short-term gain in backers. However, as 
fake Likes will not disseminate through Facebook’s social network, this gain cannot be 
expected to stem from any additional visitors to the campaign website but will rather be 
caused by backers who expedite their investment decisions based on the observed peak. It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that a positive peak in backers is directly followed by a sharp 
drop and decelerated growth rate in backers over time.  
For our second research question, we present several factors that potentially increase the 
likelihood of artificial manipulations of quality signals. First, our descriptive evidence shows 
that categories that include creative campaigns such as Art, Crafts, Dance, and Comics are less 
likely to be affected by fake Likes. This effect can possibly be attributed to the fact that these 
campaigns tend to be shared more via social media anyway (Berger and Milkman 2012; Thies 
et al. 2014) and creators of campaigns in these categories therefore see less need to acquire 
additional Facebook Likes. Second and contrary to our expectations, creators who invest more 
time and effort in creating and managing their campaign are more prone to acquiring fake 
Facebook Likes. A possible explanation might be that, as they have invested more, they feel a 
stronger urge to make their campaign succeed, even if this means that they game the system 
and draw on unethical behaviors. Furthermore, project creators of low-quality campaigns 
might be reluctant to heavily manipulate social information due to the rational expectation 
effect, meaning that, with an increasing discrepancy between the number of Facebook Likes 
and the quality of the respective campaign, more consumers will discount any information 
they receive (Lee et al. 2014). Third, we see that the conditions within the distinctive 
categories strongly influence the behavior of campaign creators with respect to an artificial 
manipulation of quality signals. Stronger competition increases the likelihood of fake 
Facebook Likes, while, contrary to our expectations, categories that are more concentrated 
are less susceptible to manipulations. A reason might be that creators who face competing 
campaigns of extremely high quality accept their fate more easily and are therefore more 
reluctant to manipulate their quality signals. On the other hand, a seemingly unfair 
distribution of pledges among the campaigns within a specific category fosters manipulations. 
Finally, we also provide evidence for the timing of the acquisition of fake Likes with respect 
to the funding raised and the campaign life cycle and found that the majority of creators 
acquire non-genuine Likes early in the campaign’s life cycle and many are unable to generate 
above-average funding afterward.  
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5.5.1 Contributions to Theory and Research 
To the best of our knowledge, ours is among the first studies focusing on the effects of 
quantitative fake social information on consumer decision-making in electronic markets using 
real-life longitudinal data. Although few previous studies have focused on the identification 
of fake quantitative social information, virtually no research has investigated the temporal 
effects that fake quantitative social information can have on consumer decision-making (e.g., 
Xie et al. 2012; Zhu et al. 2015).Therefore, our study makes several interesting contributions 
to theory and research. First, we shed light on the dynamic short- and long-term effects of 
fake social information in electronic markets by empirically showing that, even though a short-
term positive effect can be induced by an artificial manipulation of social information, the 
overall effect is negative. This result is especially interesting and novel as prior research has 
found that genuine social information has a positive (or no effect) on consumer decision-
making (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Duan et al. 2008b), which has also been shown 
for genuine Facebook Likes/Shares in the context of crowdfunding (cf., Thies et al. 2014). 
Due to these contradictory effects, the potentially distorting effects of non-genuine social 
information should be taken into account in similar research settings in the future. 
Second, we uncovered market and product conditions under which an artificial manipulation 
of quantitative social information is likely to occur. Even though there is a growing stream of 
research focused on uncovering non-genuine qualitative social information (e.g., Jindal et al. 
2010; Li et al. 2011), these studies have, with few exceptions (e.g., Mayzlin et al. 2014; Luca 
and Zervas 2016), neglected the circumstances under which this content is more or less likely 
to occur. As such, our study adds to previous research on fake social information by 
uncovering important boundary conditions for the detrimental effects of fake information on 
consumer decision-making. Furthermore, while past studies have largely focused on 
experimental data with cross-sectional and attitudinal outcomes, we were able to demonstrate 
the actual and binding consequences of fake social information in a real-life setting with 
observational data over several months. We therefore hope that, by uncovering these 
important boundary conditions for artificial manipulations, our study provides an impetus for 
further research in this context. Finally, and more broadly, we were able to confirm that, 
despite its relatively low information content, quantitative (fake) social information can have 
a substantial effect on consumer decision-making. This reveals that consumers consider 
Facebook Likes, genuine and non-genuine, as quality signals though they only reflect 
preferences and no actual consumer behavior. Our study thus contributes to social media and 
information systems research by advancing our understanding of the differential effects social 
information can have on consumers and by highlighting the role of artificial manipulations 
and its dynamic fluctuating (i.e., positive and negative) effect patterns over time. 
5.5.2 Practical Implications 
We also see practical implications that should be considered by the creators of campaigns and 
by the providers of crowdfunding platforms. Creators should be aware that, even though social 
information can be a decisive factor for campaign success and an important quality signal, 
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acquiring non-genuine Facebook Likes does not attract any additional backers because, unlike 
genuine Facebook Likes, fake Likes do not disseminate through Facebook’s social network. 
Therefore, this artificial manipulation of quality signals can only affect users who see the 
Facebook Like button directly on the web page and who visit the campaign webpage anyway 
for other reasons. Even though we see that a short-term gain can be induced, our findings 
demonstrate that non-genuine Facebook Likes have a negative effect on the outcome of 
crowdfunding campaigns. 
For platform providers, our study provides insights on both the extent of manipulation as well 
as under what conditions and campaign characteristics it is most prevalent. Though our results 
might help platform providers to identify campaign creators who acquire non-genuine social 
information, punishing their actions might not be necessary because, according to our 
findings, they do not gain an advantage over honest campaign creators. Still, manipulative 
actions might hurt the overall reputation of the platform and long-term effects need to be 
considered. 
5.6 Limitations, Further Research, and Conclusion 
Our study provides important insights for both research and practice. However, we 
acknowledge certain limitations that have to be considered when interpreting the results. 
First, as the dynamics of crowdfunding are different from those in a traditional e-commerce 
setting between a seller and a buyer, the applicability to this context might be limited. Even 
though we used a large dataset over a long period of time, we limited the scope of our study 
to Kickstarter, which also narrows the generalizability of our results. Second, we believe that 
the crowdfunding community is not truly representative for other electronic markets, as they 
can generally be characterized as very internet-savvy. We therefore suspect that the effects of 
non-genuine social information on the decision-making of a more representative sample might 
be different, but not necessarily weaker. Third, we were unable to compare the effects of 
different types of social information (e.g., Twitter Tweets) in this study, which would further 
increase the validity of the results. Fourth, we only considered the effects of the occurrence of 
fake Facebook Likes on backers. However, one could imagine that fraudulent behavior by a 
few black sheep among the campaign creators could be contagious and spill over to the rest 
of the community, thus creating negative externalities for the entire ecosystem. Finally, we 
are aware that our algorithm to identify the acquisition of fake Likes is not a perfect indicator 
and might classify very few campaigns as fraudulent even though they are not and vice versa, 
equivalent to false positive (Type I) and false negative (Type II) errors of a diagnostic system. 
However, in several robustness checks, we altered the fake Likes identification algorithm to 
tighter and looser configurations and received identical result patterns. We therefore expect 
the proportion of these wrongly classified campaigns to be negligible and they should thus 
not distort our results. 
Overall, our study reveals that manipulated social information has a very short-term positive 
effect on backers’ funding decision in a crowdfunding campaign. However, this short-term 
peak is followed by an immediate, sharp drop in the number of backers funding the campaign 
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reaching levels that are lower than prior to the occurrence of the non-genuine social 
information, leading to a total negative effect over time. Additionally, we provide evidence 
that market conditions and campaign characteristics play an important role in shaping the 
likelihood of manipulations to occur on a crowdfunding platform. We hope that this study 
will serve as a springboard for future research on the effects of non-genuine social information 
in electronic markets and give food for thought to the diverse stakeholders of platform 
ecosystems. 
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The rapidly growing crowdfunding market allows individuals and organizations to raise funds 
for a diversity of projects. Potential investors, however, face uncertainties about the quality of 
the projects as well as the characteristics and behavioral intentions of the project creators due 
to a lack of publicly available and unbiased information. By analyzing 33,420 crowdfunding 
campaigns running on Kickstarter from January to August in 2015, we find that campaigns of 
project creators who are able to signal certain personality traits through their project 
description and video are more likely to succeed and to be shared via social media. More 
specifically, project creators who are able to convey openness and agreeableness are more 
likely to succeed with the adoption and diffusion of their campaigns compared to those 
signaling neuroticism. Our findings demonstrate that potential investors pay close attention 
to the way project creators present themselves and their projects on crowdfunding platforms. 
Project creators should therefore evaluate how to best communicate the favorable aspects of 
their project through their project description and video. Implications for future research and 
practice are discussed. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Crowdfunding allows individuals as well as organizations to raise funds for a diversity of 
projects through an open call on the internet. Contrary to the traditional approach of 
fundraising, crowdfunding is focused on collecting rather small contributions from a large 
number of individuals (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012). According to an industry report, 
the combined crowdfunding market was worth approximately $16 billion in 2014 and is 
predicted to grow 100 percent in 2015 (Massolution 2015). The growing success and 
increased media attention for crowdfunding platforms such as Indiegogo and Kickstarter has 
made crowdfunding an increasingly attractive alternative for sourcing capital as well as 
marketing activities. This development resulted in significant attention for the concept among 
practitioners and academics alike. 
As crowdfunding platforms are two-sided markets, network effects between project creators 
and investors (backers) are prevalent (Eisenmann et al. 2006). While project creators seek to 
attract backers by creating compelling campaigns, prospective backers often need to make 
their investment decisions based on limited and potentially biased information. Given that 
there is little to no publicly available information such as customer reviews for backers to 
evaluate prior to the investment decision, the project description and video provided by the 
project creator on the campaign web page become the primary source of information for 
backers. Therefore, the lack of credible and reliable information about the campaign and 
especially the project creator’s characteristics and behavioral intentions poses a serious risk 
for the backers. The inherent information asymmetry between project creators and backers 
can have a dampening effect on the backers’ decision to invest (Agrawal et al. 2014; 
Belleflamme et al. 2014). However, prior research in related fields suggests that in settings 
featuring high information asymmetry the ability to signal favorable aspects, such as reliability 
or potential success to prospective investors through the language of a proposal, can be a 
decisive factor in raising funds. For instance, within the context of initial public offerings, 
firms can reduce information asymmetries for potential investors through the wording of their 
prospectuses (e.g., Daily et al. 2005; Loughran and McDonald 2011; 2013). Due to the limited 
amount of information available prior to the investments, the rhetoric used in these brochures 
can send signals to the market, which can ultimately increase the potential investor's 
confidence or reduce the perceived risk.  
Similarly, research on lending-based crowdfunding has shown that individuals signaling 
autonomy, competitive aggressiveness, or the willingness to take risks via their project 
description on the crowdfunding website are more likely to get funded compared to those 
signaling empathy or warmth (Herzenstein et al. 2011b; Allison et al. 2013; Moss et al. 2015). 
These studies show that potential investors carefully consider the manner in which language 
is used to describe investment opportunities. It is well-accepted in psychology and marketing 
literature that human language reflects the personality, thinking style, and emotional states 
of the authors (IBM Watson Developer Cloud 2015). Still, the importance and effects of 
different personalities among individuals seeking funding has been largely overlooked. 
However, correlations between specific personality traits and the ability of individuals to 
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convince potential investors can be expected, as an individual’s personality can be associated 
with different work-related attitudes and behaviors. For example, while some traits can be 
linked to persistence in achieving self-set work goals or organized and effective behaviors, 
others can be associated with low confidence and negative reactions to work-related stimuli 
(Costa et al. 1991; Judge and Ilies 2002; Bozionelos 2004; Devaraj et al. 2008). Personality 
traits can capture the mindset and behavior of an individual and prior research in areas such 
as entrepreneurship has shown that investors base a lot of their investment decision on the 
entrepreneurs themselves, by considering specific personality traits prior to investing 
(MacMillan et al. 1985; Sudek 2006; Cardon et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2009). However, research 
on the role of personality in reward-based crowdfunding remains scarce.  
This paper seeks to fill this gap by investigating the language used in project descriptions and 
videos on Kickstarter, one of the largest reward-based crowdfunding platforms. We are using 
algorithms to infer the Big Five personality traits from project descriptions and video 
transcripts and study the effects of signaling different personality traits on the outcome of the 
respective campaign. Specifically, we operationalize the influence of particular personality 
traits and observe the effects on the adoption of the respective campaign in the marketplace 
and the diffusion in social media. Our research is guided by the following research questions:  
RQ1: How does signaling different personality traits on Kickstarter influence the funding decision 
of backers and ultimately the outcome of the respective crowdfunding campaign? 
RQ2: How does signaling different personality traits on Kickstarter influence the diffusion of the 
respective crowdfunding campaign in social media? 
Our study offers important contributions to research and practice. First, it is among the first 
large-scale empirical studies to examine the effects of signaling specific personality traits. In 
doing so, we are able to show that prospective investors on crowdfunding platforms consider 
the personality traits reflected in the project descriptions and videos provided by the project 
creators for decision support. This study therefore extends prior IS research, which was mainly 
concerned with the effects of different personality traits of individuals on their adoption and 
diffusion decisions (e.g., McElroy et al. 2007; Devaraj et al. 2008; Goswami et al. 2009). 
Second, it adds to the growing crowdfunding literature by showing that the way in which 
favorable and unfavorable personality traits are expressed in project descriptions and 
campaign videos can have a substantial influence on the prospective backers’ decision-making. 
Finally, and more broadly, our study builds on and enriches prior research on the Big Five 
personality traits (e.g., McElroy et al. 2007; Devaraj et al. 2008) and computer-aided text 
analysis (e.g., Short et al. 2010) to show that determining personality traits of individuals on 
a large scale using text analysis can open up new avenues for future research. 
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6.2 Theoretical Background and Prior Research  
6.2.1 Personality and the Five-Factor Model 
There is a growing stream of research on the effects of different personality traits in 
Information Systems (IS) research and in related disciplines. Researchers like McElroy et al. 
(2007) and Devaraj et al. (2008) encourage the IS research community to follow this endeavor 
as a deeper understanding of the different personality traits and their effects can not only help 
to conceptualize theory but also enables practitioners to better target their products and 
services. 
Personality can be understood as a person’s individual combination of traits, unique facets as 
well as thoughts (Barrick and Mount 1991; Devaraj et al. 2008). This dynamic set of 
characteristics therefore defines an individual’s cognition and behavior (Maddi 1989; McElroy 
et al. 2007). In recent years, especially the technology acceptance and adoption community 
analyzed personality traits with respect to IS. For instance, Devaraj et al. (2008) examined 
the acceptance of collaborative technology solutions and found that personality traits 
influence the perceived usefulness and intention to use. Furthermore, researchers show that 
an individual’s personality plays a critical role when receiving and evaluating information 
about products or services (Jahng et al. 2002; Patrakosol and Lee 2013). Different 
personalities value information and product presentation elements differently, which is 
reflected in their buying decisions (Jahng et al. 2002).  
An adjacent stream of research, which contributes to the understanding of personality in our 
research context, is entrepreneurship. Here, controversial results on the role of personality 
exist. Some studies observe an entrepreneurial personality but do not find any correlation 
between different personalities and venture success (Stuart and Abetti 1990). Other 
researchers, however, find a relationship between long-term venture survival and the 
entrepreneur’s conscientiousness (Ciavarella et al. 2004). Other studies suggest a link 
between a set of psychological attributes and financial performance (Begley and Boyd 1988). 
Findings also show that entrepreneurs have a different personality in comparison to corporate 
managers and small business owners (Begley and Boyd 1988; Stewart and Roth 2001; 
Ciavarella et al. 2004). A high need for achievement, internal locus of control, and risk-taking 
propensity are common personality traits among entrepreneurs (Korunka et al. 2003). Miller 
(2015) and Klotz and Neubaum (2016), however, emphasize the dark side of personality that 
is largely unexplored. Some positive aspects of personality might transform into 
aggressiveness, narcissism, or ruthlessness, which might hamper the growth and success of a 
new venture. Taken together, different personality traits of entrepreneurs have an influence 
on the working style and aspects of growth as well as the presentation of the ventures 
themselves. It is therefore not surprising that investors such as angel investors base a lot of 
their investment decision on the entrepreneurs themselves and consider specific personality 
traits prior to investing (MacMillan et al. 1985; Sudek 2006; Cardon et al. 2009; Chen et al. 
2009). 
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In order to measure the personality of individuals, psychological trait theory has brought up 
several models. However, there is considerable agreement among researchers that all 
personality traits can be categorized in five major dimensions, often referred to as the Big Five 
(Goldberg 1990). The corresponding model, called the five-factor model, is the most prevalent 
among researchers today (Barrick et al. 2001). It has been labeled as “the model of choice for 
the researcher wanting to represent the domain of personality variables broadly and 
systematically” (Briggs 1992, p. 254).  
Table 6-1 Big Five Personality Traits and the Associated Characteristics (McCrae and 
Costa Jr 1999; Lampe 2004) 
The FFM includes five primary personality traits (see Table 6-1): openness to experience 
(openness), conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Goldberg 1990; 
Costa et al. 1991). Trying new and different things as well as seeking for new experiences are 
key traits of individuals who score high in openness (McCrae and Costa Jr 1997; Judge and 
Ilies 2002; McElroy et al. 2007). These curious, open-minded, and creative personalities often 
come up with unconventional ideas and react flexibly to challenges but are also more likely 
to question authority (Costa Jr and McCrae 1995). Moreover, research suggests that people 
who score high in openness show a positive relationship between work accomplishment and 
self-set goals (Judge and Ilies 2002).  
Conscientiousness consists of tendencies to be intrinsically motivated, self-disciplined, and 
deliberate (McCrae and Costa Jr 1999; Devaraj et al. 2008). Conscientious personalities are 
therefore achievement oriented, ambitious, and hardworking (Barrick and Mount 1991; 
McElroy et al. 2007) and their plans are carried out very carefully with a focus on standards 
and norms (McCrae and Costa Jr 1999).  
Highly social, optimistic, active, and cheerful personalities are described as being extraverted 
(Watson and Clark 1997; McElroy et al. 2007). They are considered to be high performers in 
their work life and have the ability to work very well in teams (Barrick and Mount 1991; 
Barrick et al. 2001). However, extraverted personalities have also been characterized as being 
impulsive and dominant (Watson and Clark 1997; McElroy et al. 2007). 
Big Five  
personality trait 
Characteristics 
Openness Imaginative versus down-to-earth, preference for variety versus preference for 
routine, independent versus confirming 
Conscientiousness Well organized versus disorganization, careful versus careless, self-disciplined 
versus weak-willed 
Extraversion Social versus retiring, fun-loving versus sober, affectionate versus reserved 
Agreeableness Soft-hearted versus ruthless, trusting versus suspicious, helpful versus 
uncooperative 
Neuroticism Worried versus calm, insecure versus secure, self-pitying versus self-satisfied 
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Individuals who score high in agreeableness are likable, helpful, kind, gentle, and sympathetic 
(Graziano and Eisenberg 1997; Judge et al. 1999; McCrae and Costa Jr 1999). Agreeableness 
therefore defines a soft-hearted, trusting, and cooperative personality. It also indicates that 
individuals enjoy interpersonal interaction and teamwork, especially if this means to help and 
cooperate with others (Barrick et al. 2001). 
Anxious, sad, fearful, self-conscious, and paranoid individuals usually show high values in 
neuroticism (Judge et al. 1999; Bozionelos 2004), while emotionally stable and well-adjusted 
people score low values (Devaraj et al. 2008). Neurotic personalities demonstrate a lack of 
psychological and emotional stability and can have difficulties in managing stress (McElroy et 
al. 2007). Neuroticism can therefore be associated with several negative reactions to both life 
and work situations and can impact perceived and actual job performance (Judge et al. 1999; 
Barrick et al. 2001). 
Previous research shows that personality traits of individuals have an apparent and substantial 
influence on their behavior in a variety of contexts. However, prior IS research has almost 
exclusively been concerned with the personality of individuals and their varying adoption 
decisions. For example, researchers found that internet usage (McElroy et al. 2007) and the 
adoption of IT innovation depend on the individual’s personality (Goswami et al. 2009). To 
the best of our knowledge, no prior work has investigated the effects of signaling certain 
personality traits through text and video on the receiver’s decision-making processes. 
6.2.2 Information Asymmetries in Reward-Based Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding is a subset of crowdsourcing that enables project creators to collect relatively 
small financial contributions from a large number of individuals through an open call on the 
internet (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012). It thus creates a large, relatively undefined 
network of project stakeholders and consequently decreases the importance of other investors 
such as venture capitalists. 
Crowdfunding also offers a variety of incentives for backers to “pledge” for a specific 
campaign. These incentives mainly depend on the return the backers can expect from their 
contributions, which range from donations to company equity (Ahlers et al. 2015). On 
Kickstarter, the most common and salient type of return is a so-called “reward” that often 
allows backers to be among the first customers to sample the product or service financed 
through the campaign. In this study, we focus on this so-called reward-based crowdfunding, 
as it is the most widespread concept of crowdfunding today. 
Compared to other types of web services, reward-based crowdfunding is special as the 
investments made on crowdfunding platforms are especially risky as the return on investment 
is highly uncertain. This uncertainty results from the lack of a legal obligation to actually 
deliver the rewards to the backers. Also, the quality of the rewards remains unpredictable at 
the time the investment decision has to be made. The dynamics of crowdfunding are thus 
different from those in a traditional e-commerce setting between a seller and a buyer. Backers 
can be less certain that they will actually receive a return on their investment and have less 
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information about the object they are investing in compared to a regular buying situation, in 
which the product or service already exists (Agrawal et al. 2014; Belleflamme et al. 2014).  
Given that there is little to no publicly available information such as customer reviews to 
evaluate the investment ex-ante, backers’ primary source of information is the project 
description and video the creator has published on the campaign web page. Even though this 
content allows prospective backers to develop an attitude towards the campaign and the 
comprised rewards, this attitude is potentially biased due to the fact that it stems from a single 
source of information (Burtch et al. 2013). As the project creator alone controls the flow of 
information towards the backer and is thus able to overstate quality or withhold information, 
information asymmetries may arise between prospective backers and project creators 
(Mavlanova et al. 2012). This results in situations, in which the project creator possesses 
information that the backer does not have and in which the backer is unaware of the 
characteristics (e.g., reliability) and behavioral intentions of the project creator. In order to 
help the parties overcome these information asymmetries, the backer can make inferences 
from credible signals sent by the project creator (Stiglitz 1990; Biswas and Biswas 2004). 
Signaling theory is therefore concerned with the understanding of why certain signals might 
be reliable and could thus be relevant to the consumer in buying situations (Spence 1973). 
Signals, such as a product warranty, proved only to be credible if a seller offering a low quality 
has higher costs acquiring them compared to a seller offering a high quality (Kirmani and Rao 
2000; Connelly et al. 2011). 
Prior research on lending-based and equity-based crowdfunding platforms has shown that 
project descriptions provided by the project creators can be credible signals for prospective 
backers. For instance, product creators who are able to signal autonomy, competitive 
aggressiveness, or the willingness to take risks through their rhetoric are more likely to receive 
funding (Galak et al. 2011; Ahlers et al. 2015; Allison et al. 2015; Moss et al. 2015). Though 
all of these studies make important contributions towards understanding how the language 
used in project description can help to overcome information asymmetries by signaling 
meaningful characteristics to prospective backers, our study extends this stream of research 
in three important ways. First, even though other crowdfunding models such as lending-based 
and equity-based crowdfunding have been considered, there are some fundamental 
differences in the dynamics of the different crowdfunding models and the results of previous 
studies might therefore not apply to our context (Beaulieu et al. 2015). Second, while other 
studies focused on the project descriptions, we also examine the language used in project 
videos. Third, ours is the first study to consider the full spectrum of personality traits reflected 
in the project descriptions, drawing on the comprehensive five-factor model of personality. 
Albeit personality traits reflected in the project descriptions and videos might not represent 
the exact personality of an individual project creator (e.g., several project creators or other 
professionals might be the authors of a single project description), both information sources 
are the central means for project creators to express themselves to prospective backers. 
Therefore, the project description and video act as the face to the customer that can be 
manipulated by project creators in order to influence prospective backers. Previous research 
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found that individuals are able to perceive personality cues from different types of media, 
including text and voice (Nass et al. 1995; Moon and Nass 1996; Nass and Lee 2001) and are 
subsequently affected in their decision-making (Al-Natour et al. 2006; Hess et al. 2009). 
6.3 Research Methodology 
In order to examine the personality traits reflected in project descriptions and videos, we first 
collected data from the world’s largest reward-based crowdfunding platform Kickstarter. We 
then sent each project description as well as video transcript to IBM’s Personality Insights 
service via the application programming interface (API). The IBM’s Personality Insights service 
is part of IBM’s Watson computer system and is able to infer the inherent Big Five personality 
traits based on written text8. Third, we employed a probit regression model with the funding 
success as the binary dependent variable in order to assess the adoption of the campaigns. We 
then proceed to infer the diffusion of the campaign via social media, by employing a simple 
OLS regression with the natural logarithm of the number of Facebook shares as the dependent 
variable. We are therefore able to assess the influence of the different personality traits on the 
likelihood that prospective backers adopt a crowdfunding campaign or share it with their 
peers. 
6.3.1 Dataset 
Our dataset covers the period from January 18, 2015 to August 6, 2015 with a total of 47,526 
crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter that started and ended within this timeframe. 
Following previous research, we removed campaigns with a funding goal below $100 or above 
$1,000,000 from the sample as these projects may have different characteristics from the 
majority of campaigns (Mollick 2014). We also removed campaigns with project descriptions 
shorter than 100 words, because they are either incomplete or represent non-serious efforts 
to raise funds and, more importantly, IBM’s Personality Insights API requires a minimum text 
length of 100 words for the analysis. The final dataset consists of 33,420 campaigns, with 
3,580,579 backers and approximately $324,300,000 in pledges, resulting in an average 
pledge of $90.50 per backer.  
Besides the project description, the video, which is present on 63% of campaign web pages, 
is an integral part of many crowdfunding campaigns. We therefore used the Web Speech API9 
embedded in browsers such as Google Chrome to automatically transcribe the spoken words 
from the campaign videos into written text. This approach allowed us to transcribe almost 
20,000 videos over the course of several weeks, which, due to the length requirements of 
IBM’s Personality Insights API, resulted in 12,859 video transcripts that could be analyzed. In 
order to validate the performance of this approach and the accuracy of the corresponding 
transcripts, we exploited the fact that campaign creators are able to add subtitles to their 
videos and a small fraction of project creators actually uses this feature. We were therefore 
                                                   
8 https://watson-pi-demo.mybluemix.net 
9 https://dvcs.w3.org/hg/speech-api/raw-file/tip/speechapi.html 
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able to compare the provided subtitles of 625 campaigns with the results from the automatic 
transcription. For this comparison, we used Soundex, a phonetic algorithm, which is a 
standard feature in most database software, and achieved an average concordance rate of 
79% with a median value of 88% using a cosine similarity scoring. 
6.3.2 Measuring Personality Traits  
An individual’s personality traits are usually measured using interviews or questionnaires. 
However, these approaches offer limited scalability (de Montjoye et al. 2013) and would 
therefore be impractical for this study considering the high number of campaigns in our 
dataset. An alternative, yet promising way to infer personality traits is monitoring the use of 
language, as personality has a so called "top-down influence" on a person's conceptualized 
ideas (Fast and Funder 2008, p. 334). In other words, the way in which an idea is put into 
words, allows the inference of a person’s personality (Fast and Funder 2008). Therefore, 
automatic language-analyzing techniques bear a huge potential in identifying personality 
traits. In the course of automated language analysis, IBM recently launched Watson’s 
Personality Insights services, which can be used to measure an individual’s personality based 
on written text. IBM’s Watson is at the forefront of a new era of cognitive computing. The 
artificially intelligent computer system prominently showed its capabilities in fields such as 
medicine or finance but also competed publicly on the television game show “Jeopardy!” and 
won against former winners. 
The service, which we incorporated in this study, uses linguistic analytics to infer the 
personality traits as well as intrinsic needs and values of individuals based on the words they 
are using in communications such as email, text messages, and forum posts (IBM Watson 
Developer Cloud 2015). To infer the Big Five personality traits, the service uses the 
coefficients that are reported by Yarkoni (2010), derived by comparing personality scores that 
were obtained from surveys to Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). Many prior works 
used the LIWC psycholinguistics dictionary to find psychologically meaningful word categories 
from word usage in writings (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010; Lin and Viswanathan 2015). 
Once a text is sent to the Personality Insights service, it is tokenized and every token (word) 
is matched against the LIWC psycholinguistics dictionary in order to compute scores for every 
category of the dictionary. While self-reflective words about family, friends, work, feelings, 
and achievements as well as positive and negative emotions are used in this analysis, nouns 
such as names of people and places do not contribute to the personality inference (IBM 
Watson Developer Cloud 2015).  
For the sake of demonstration, we randomly selected one project description from Kickstarter 
about an innovative coffee grinder10 and show an excerpt of the input as well as the calculated 
output by IBM’s Personality Insights in Table 6-2. This text shows a high score in openness 
                                                   
10 https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/handground/precision-coffee-grinder-better-grind-more-
flavor/description 
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and conscientiousness, and low to medium values in neuroticism, extraversion, and 
agreeableness. 
Table 6-2 Example Text and the Output by Personality Insights 
6.3.3 Variables 
As Kickstarter is applying the “all or nothing” funding model, we choose to examine funding 
success as the outcome variable to measure the adoption, as a high number of backers or 
pledges does not necessarily reflect a successful Kickstarter campaign (Rakesh et al. 2015). 
For instance, although a campaign with 10,000 backers and $80,000 in pledges sounds 
successful, with a funding goal of $500,000, the project would still fail and all invested pledges 
would be refunded. On the other hand, a campaign with the same outcome and a funding 
goal of $50,000 can clearly be regarded as successful. 
As our second dependent variable, we chose the number of Facebook shares to reflect the 
diffusion of the campaign in social media, which has often been regarded as a crucial success 
factor for crowdfunding campaigns (Mollick 2014; Thies et al. 2014). As we are interested in 
the effects of personality traits reflected in the project descriptions and videos, we use the 
operationalized Big Five as our main independent variables: openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. As mentioned before, our independent 
variables were gathered from the textual description of the project, as well as the 
automatically transcribed videos. Following prior research in crowdfunding (Burtch et al. 
2013; Mollick 2014; Wessel et al. 2015b) we use a set of control variables to account for 
alternative explanations. Our control variables include the campaign duration, the funding 
goal, whether it contains a video, the category and currency, update usage, number of user 
comments, and the length of the text description.  
Input (751 words) Output 
“The idea to make a better coffee grinder started 
from something we called the ‘Crowdsourced 
Coffee Experiment’. We were attempting to apply 
a Japanese principle called Kaizen to our coffee 
routine. It wasn’t long before we learned how 
important a good grinder is to making better 
coffee so we purchased an entry-level manual 
grinder. The new burr grinder was a noticeable 
improvement over the blade grinder, however we 
couldn't help but notice areas for improvement. 
Since Kaizen means continuous improvement we 
started to look for better options. Yet after 
searching the market and seeing the same 
ancient designs being repeated over and over we 
finally thought, we can do better. […]” 
 
Openness
0.94
Conscientiousness
0.79
Extraversion
0.22
Agreeableness
0.39
Neuroticism
0.16
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6.3.4 Model 
As our first dependent variable funding success is dichotomous, a probit regression that 
specifies the probability of an outcome as a function of one or more independent variables is 
applicable (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). We model the probability of a funding success 
depending on several basic crowdfunding variables and the personality traits. We follow Long 
(1997) and formalize our mode: Pr y = 1 x = 	F xβ  
where F is the cumulative distribution function (𝜱) of the standard normal distribution for 
the probit model (Long 1997). The probability of witnessing a binary event given 𝒙 is the 
cumulative density evaluated at	𝒙𝜷. With our dichotomous dependent variable funding 
success, the model can therefore be described as following. 𝑷𝒓 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 1|𝒙 = 𝜱 𝛽S + 𝛽4𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦; + 𝛽Ucategory; + 𝛽X𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛; + 𝛽[𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒; +	𝛽] ln 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ; + 𝛽a ln 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙 ; + 𝛽d𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜; + 𝛽f𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜n_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ; + 𝛽h𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠; +𝛽4S𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠; + +𝛽44𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛; + 𝛽4U𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠; + 𝛽4X𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚; + 𝜀;  
where 𝜷𝒊𝒙𝒊 represents the independent variables and their coefficient, while	𝜀 acts as the error 
term. 
Our second dependent variable, diffusion of the campaign, is the natural logarithm of 
Facebook Shares. We therefore use an OLS regression with robust standard errors (Cameron 
and Trivedi 2005). The formalization is, analogous to the above, as follows: ln(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘	𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠); = 𝛽S + 𝛽4𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦; + 𝛽Ucategory; + 𝛽X𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛; + 𝛽[𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒; +	𝛽] ln 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ; + 𝛽a ln 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙 ; + 𝛽d𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜; + 𝛽f𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ; + 𝛽h𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠; +𝛽4S𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠; + +𝛽44𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛; + 𝛽4U𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠; + 𝛽4X𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚; + 𝜀;  
6.3.5 Robustness Checks 
In order to check for the robustness of our research approach, we ran alternative specifications 
and sub samples. First, we used different dependent variables as a success measure including 
the natural logarithm of the funding amount using an OLS regression (Ahlers et al. 2015) and 
the number of campaign backers by applying a negative binominal regression (Wessel et al. 
2015a). All results are in line with our original specification. 
As IBM’s Watson service indicates that the accuracy of their service scales with the length of 
the text, we also ran our original analysis with a subsample of descriptions in the 50% and 
75% quantile based on the description length, which came back with the same result patterns. 
6.4 Results 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix can be found in Table 6-3. Campaigns on 
Kickstarter draw an average of 91.01 backers while accumulating an average of $9,239 in our 
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observational period. The average funding goal is $25,329. In our data, 68% of the campaigns 
fail to reach their funding goal, while 32% succeed in the attempt to do so. Kickstarter is 
publicly recommending a 30-day campaign duration, while the mean campaign duration in 
our data is 32.4 days with a minimum of 1 day and a maximum of 73 days (Kickstarter 2011). 
63% of project creators upload a video for their campaign and project descriptions contain 
561 words on average. Values of the different personality traits differ in project description or 
the project video. For example, the openness trait, derived from project descriptions shows on 
average a very high score, while the video transcribed scores show moderate average values. 
Still, their correlation coefficients are relatively high, ranging from 0.37 to 0.47. On the other 
hand, extraversion scores much higher on videos than in the textual descriptions. The 
relatively high correlations in Table 6-3 between the different personality traits are in line 
with former research and studies (e.g., Anusic et al. 2009; van der Linden et al. 2010) and 
are well below the threshold level to be of serious concern for the regression analysis. Table 
6-4 shows the results of the econometric analysis. Models 1 and 2 are probit regressions with 
funding success as their dependent variable. Models 3 and 4 analyze the diffusion of a 
campaign through social media with an OLS regression for the number of Facebook Shares. 
The first column (1-1) is the baseline model, including all control variables and previously 
studied success factors. We then added the calculated measurements of the different 
personality traits in the second column of each model. We will first look at the control 
variables and compare our results with prior literature on reward-based crowdfunding. The 
increase in campaign duration is negatively associated with its adoption, as it can most likely 
be seen as a sign of a lack of confidence. Further, an increase of the funding goal decreases 
the chances of success, as it becomes more difficult to gather enough support (Mollick, 2014). 
On the other hand, projects with a high funding goal tend to be shared more often on social 
media. It is therefore crucial to find a realistic project goal, as the reciprocal effect of social 
media impact and backing behavior can be of reinforcing nature (Thies et al. 2014). Although 
the coefficient for the number of words in a project description is small, it shows a positive 
association between the length of a description and the adoption of a campaign, the 
underlying intuition being that a longer and more detailed description reduces the existing 
information asymmetry between creator and backers, better than a shorter description 
(Wessel et al. 2015a).  
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Additionally, both the existence of a video and providing an update show significant impact 
on a campaign’s chances of adoption and diffusion. Kickstarter highly recommends the 
creation of a project video in their frequently asked questions (FAQ). They also provide 
statistics, where the funding success rate of projects with a video are 50%, compared to a 30% 
for a campaign without a video (Kickstarter 2015a). While several studies reported that 
projects contain videos in 72% to 86% of all cases, having no video might be a signal for the 
lack of preparation (Mollick 2014; Wessel et al. 2015a). Furthermore, an active discussion 
around the project, measured by the number of comments, also increases the project adoption 
and diffusion (Mollick 2014). The coefficients in the baseline models are therefore in line with 
prior research.  
Table 6-4 Results of the Probit and OLS Regression  
Model (1-1) (1-2) (2-1) (2-2) (3-1) (3-2) (4-1) (4-2) 
Personal. traits 
inferred from 
Desc. text Desc. text Video Video Desc. text Desc. text Video Video 
Dep. variable Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Diffusion Diffusion Diffusion Diffusion 
Currency (CV) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Category (CV) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Duration -0.00918*** 
(-8.222) 
-0.00811*** 
(-7.197) 
-0.00837*** 
(-4.496) 
-0.00796*** 
(-4.241) 
-0.000741 
(-0.761) 
0.000347 
(0.361) 
-0.00124 
(-0.679) 
-0.000868 
(-0.478) 
Update 1.9*** 
(81.249) 
1.91*** 
(79.893) 
2.01*** 
(54.990) 
2.01*** 
(54.578) 
1.42*** 
(60.234) 
1.37*** 
(58.771) 
1.28*** 
(38.053) 
1.25*** 
(37.352) 
ln (Comments) 0.622*** 
(49.647) 
0.621*** 
(49.120) 
0.593*** 
(34.293) 
0.598*** 
(34.309) 
0.556*** 
(59.590) 
0.546*** 
(59.303) 
0.507*** 
(43.467) 
0.507*** 
(43.795) 
ln (Goal) -0.454*** 
(-50.423) 
-0.485*** 
(-51.791) 
-0.456*** 
(-29.755) 
-0.47*** 
(-30.184) 
0.0898*** 
(12.051) 
0.0721*** 
(9.761) 
0.267*** 
(18.805) 
0.253*** 
(17.968) 
Video  
(dummy) 
0.583*** 
(22.654) 
0.53*** 
(20.201) 
  1.17*** 
(49.329) 
1.07*** 
(45.084) 
  
Description 
length in words 
0.000124***  
(5.504) 
0.000105*** 
(4.531) 
0.0000375 
(1.227) 
0.0000256 
(0.831) 
0.000562*** 
(22.495) 
0.000542*** 
(22.045) 
0.000351*** 
(11.430) 
0.000342*** 
(11.273) 
Openness  0.314*** 
(3.434) 
 0.755*** 
(7.181) 
 0.644*** 
(7.939) 
 0.804*** 
(8.223) 
Conscientious.   0.201* 
(2.345) 
 0.117 
(1.092) 
 0.435*** 
(5.912) 
 0.221* 
(2.221) 
Extraversion   -0.00644 
(-0.084) 
 0.161 
(1.512) 
 0.489*** 
(7.095) 
 0.505*** 
(4.995) 
Agreeable.   0.228*** 
(3.393) 
 0.484*** 
(4.485) 
 0.323*** 
(5.319) 
 0.597*** 
(5.874) 
Neuroticism  -0.828*** 
(-9.947) 
 0.227 
(1.958) 
 -0.617*** 
(-8.366) 
 0.148 
(1.369) 
Pseudo R² 0.574 0.586 0.557 0.562     
R²     0.442 0.46 0.374 0.384 
Observations 33,420 33,420 12,859 12,859 33,420 33,420 12,859 12,859 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. A constant is included but not reported. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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As we are interested in the differential effects of personality traits reflected in project 
descriptions and video transcripts, we used the personality traits derived from the description 
text in model 1-2 and 3-2, while model 2-2 and 4-2 include personality traits based on the 
video transcripts. We will therefore now discuss our focal variables with respect to their effects 
on adoption and diffusion and whether their value stems from the project description or the 
video. With regard to the adoption of a crowdfunding campaign, openness, and agreeableness 
appear to be the driving factors, while neuroticism in the text description has a negative and 
significant impact. Conscientiousness and extraversion do not play a significant role in this 
context (Model 1 and 2). When considering Model 3 and 4, on the other hand, 
conscientiousness, and extraversion gain significance and become an important driver of 
diffusion. Again, neuroticism decreases diffusion as well as the adoption. With regard to the 
effects of videos, results are similar to the text descriptions, except that neuroticism is of no 
particular importance here. 
6.5 Discussion and Contributions 
This study was motivated by the observation that, despite prior research in the context of 
lending-based and equity-based crowdfunding, we know little about the differential effects of 
different personality traits reflected in the rhetoric used by project creators on crowdfunding 
platforms. We are able to show a strong link between personality traits and the adoption and 
diffusion of Kickstarter campaigns, by demonstrating that the way in which the Big Five 
personality traits are expressed in the project descriptions and videos has a substantial 
influence on the prospective backers’ decision-making. The results reveal that the personality 
traits openness and agreeableness are the main drivers of success, both in terms of the 
adoption as well as the diffusion of the campaign in social media, while conscientiousness and 
extraversion solely support the diffusion in social media. Neuroticism, on the other hand, is 
detrimental for both adoption and diffusion, when signaled through the project description 
and should therefore be avoided by project creators wanting to create a successful campaign.  
Our findings appear to be in line with prior research on personality traits, as people with a 
high score in openness are known to be creative, inventive, intelligent, and curious to 
experience new things (McCrae and Costa Jr 1997). Prior studies have shown a positive 
association between openness and learning proficiency as well as the willingness to engage in 
learning experiences (Barrick et al. 2001). Further, Judge and Ilies (2002) found that 
individuals who score high in openness to experience show a positive relationship between 
work accomplishment and self-set goals. All these ascribed attributes do in fact reflect the very 
nature of crowdfunding campaigns. The second main driver, agreeableness, consists of 
tendencies to be helpful, gentle, trusting, and trustworthy (Graziano and Eisenberg 1997) and 
prioritization of work and career success (Judge et al. 1999). These attributes, again, appear 
to be important factors for successful campaign creators and entrepreneurs. Especially 
trustworthiness plays a major role in crowdfunding due to high information asymmetries 
between campaign creators and potential investors. As we found only little difference between 
personalities in written and spoken language, our results are furthermore in line with the 
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fundamental idea behind personality traits in general psychology, being that an individual’s 
personality can be determined by their vocabulary (Fast and Funder 2008), which is most 
likely not changing when writing a text or speaking in a video. 
Our study extends and completes research from different areas. First, prior studies in IS and 
human-computer interaction (HCI) found that individuals are able to perceive personality 
cues from different types of media, including text and voice, which we could confirm in our 
study (Nass et al. 1995; Moon and Nass 1996; Nass and Lee 2001; Hess et al. 2009). Second, 
research on lending-based crowdfunding has shown that individuals signaling autonomy, 
competitive aggressiveness, or the willingness to take risks via their project description on the 
crowdfunding website are more likely to get funded (Herzenstein et al. 2011b; Allison et al. 
2013; Moss et al. 2015). Third, the entrepreneurship literature showed that in the context of 
initial public offerings the rhetoric used by those seeking funding can send signals to the 
market, which can ultimately reduce information asymmetries (e.g., Daily et al. 2005; 
Loughran and McDonald 2011; 2013).  
Our study makes important contributions to these streams of research and offers valuable 
insights for practitioners. First, to the best of our knowledge, ours is among the first large-
scale empirical studies to examine the effects of signaling specific personality traits. In doing 
so, we are able to show that in crowdfunding the personality traits reflected in the project 
descriptions and videos are considered by prospective backers and used for decision support. 
This study therefore extends prior IS research, which was mainly concerned with the effects 
of different personality traits of individuals on their decision-making (e.g., McElroy et al. 
2007; Devaraj et al. 2008). Second, it adds to the growing literature on crowdfunding by 
showing that the language used on campaign web pages can be a decisive factor for the 
success of crowdfunding campaigns and that specific personality traits such as openness and 
agreeableness can have a substantial influence on the prospective backers’ decision-making 
when reflected in the project creators’ rhetoric. Finally, and more broadly, our study builds 
on and enriches prior research on the Big Five personality traits and computer-aided text 
analysis (e.g., Short et al. 2010) to show that determining personality traits of individuals on 
a large scale using text analysis can open up new avenues for future research. We therefore 
encourage scholars to apply such means for further studies in other contexts such as e-
commerce, marketing, or related fields in order to evaluate the role of personality traits in 
these settings. 
6.5.1 Limitations, Future Research, and Conclusion 
While our study provides important contributions to research and practice, we acknowledge 
certain limitations that have to be considered when interpreting the results and implications. 
In calling attention to these limitations, we hope to simultaneously suggest avenues for future 
research. First, although reward-based crowdfunding platforms share many characteristics 
with other multi-sided and e-commerce platforms, in particular, the presentation of products 
or services with videos and text-based descriptions, crowdfunding certainly attracts a different 
audience, making our findings not directly transferable to different contexts. Therefore, our 
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findings and methodology should be validated in other settings. Second, we focused our 
attention on the personality traits reflected in project descriptions and videos. Obviously, 
other characteristics of these two information sources such as the formatting of the text or the 
visual component of the video can have an influence on the reader or viewer. Therefore, the 
analysis of these mediums is far from conclusive, but they do offer promising avenues for 
future research. Furthermore, we are aware of the fact that project descriptions and videos 
will often contain thoughts and attitudes from a group of project creators or even marketing 
experts rather than from a single individual. This means that the personality traits inferred 
from the project description and video transcript might not necessarily represent the actual 
personality of a specific individual. Third, due to length and methodology constraints, we 
focused on the Big Five personality traits that offer a broader taxonomy of an individuals’ 
personality. However, Costa Jr and McCrae (1995) offer a more fine-grained classification of 
these personality traits and distinguish six facets within each of the five dimensions that 
should be considered in future studies for a more detailed analysis.  
Finally, regarding our research methodology, some additional limitations should be 
considered. First, the usage of an external service such as IBM Watson or the Web Speech API 
should always be viewed with caution, as the underlying inferences are not fully transparent. 
Second, an individual’s personality traits are usually measured using interviews or 
questionnaires (e.g., Barrick and Mount 1991; Judge and Ilies 2002; Gosling et al. 2003). 
Even though our data-driven approach offers several advantages (e.g., cost-effectiveness, 
scalability, overcoming the intention-behavior gap), it needs further confirmation in other 
contexts. A combination of both approaches might provide a fruitful research field and could 
validate our results and methodology. Third, the quality of the video transcripts could be 
improved, as background noise or low-quality recordings can negatively influence the 
transcription. 
In conclusion, this study is an initial step towards understanding the effects of different 
personality traits reflected in project descriptions and videos in the context of reward-based 
crowdfunding. We hope to open up avenues for future research in this field, by demonstrating 
that the data-driven approach to measuring personality traits offers valuable predictive power 
for the assessment of the adoption in the marketplace as well as the diffusion of crowdfunding 
campaigns in social media.  
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7 Thesis Conclusion and Contributions 
Crowdfunding has become an increasingly successful alternative to traditional sources of 
capital and is used globally to raise funds for a diversity of projects and ventures. This thesis 
was motivated by this growing importance of crowdfunding and the arising challenges that 
need to be addressed in order to avoid information-related market failure in the long term. 
The purpose of the thesis is to understand how and why the behaviors and actions of the 
distinct groups of market participants in crowdfunding can influence the level of information 
asymmetry on crowdfunding platforms and, ultimately, the decision-making processes of 
potential backers. Against this backdrop, four studies have been conducted. The main 
theoretical and practical contributions of these studies, and of the thesis overall, are 
summarized and discussed in sections 7.1 and 7.2, respectively. Though the studies are 
focused on crowdfunding, with a special emphasis on reward-based crowdfunding, the 
contributions are not strictly limited to this context, as information asymmetries are a 
ubiquitous phenomenon in most platform-based business models. 
7.1 Theoretical Contributions 
Overall, the thesis provides a deeper understanding of the dynamics on crowdfunding 
platforms under asymmetric information. The studies included in the thesis have been 
conducted in order to determine how the behaviors and actions of platform providers, project 
creators, and backers influence these dynamics and, eventually, the decision-making of 
prospective backers. Though all four studies contribute to answering the research question, 
they are focused on different perspectives. In the following, each perspective is therefore 
discussed separately.  
Regarding the role of the platform provider, the findings of the first study have shown that 
changes in platform governance mechanisms can have considerable consequences for the 
overall dynamics among platform stakeholders. More specifically, by relaxing the screening 
or input control mechanisms, the platform provider Kickstarter removed an inherent quality 
signal, thereby potentially increasing the level of information asymmetry between project 
creators and backers. However, the results of the first study suggest that the platform users, 
who are faced with a larger variance in project quality after the policy change, shift their 
attention to alternative quality signals and focus more on the quality and characteristics of 
individual campaigns. These findings highlight that quality signals on platforms are fragile 
and vulnerable to shocks rather than static and stable over time. The study therefore provides 
valuable insights into the role of platform policy design, highlighting that the decision-making 
of platform providers can have profound effects on the dynamics among platform 
stakeholders. Furthermore, though input control as a critical market design mechanism has 
been examined in lending-based crowdfunding (Weiss et al. 2010) and other platform settings 
(e.g., Tiwana 2015), the study is the first to examine the effects of an extensive policy change 
on input control under conditions of a natural experiment. Hence, besides the contributions 
to the research on platform ecosystems, the study also contributes to IS control literature, 
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emphasizing the importance of applying input control in loosely coupled ecosystems such as 
crowdfunding platforms. 
Second, concerning the role of behaviors and actions of backers for the decision-making of 
future backers, study 2 and 3 provide several meaningful contributions. The second study 
revealed that backers consider both the prior-contribution behavior of other backers (intra-
platform) as well as social buzz (cross-platform) as important quality signals in the 
crowdfunding context. These signals can therefore help backers to mitigate uncertainties in 
respect to the quality of specific crowdfunding projects. Moreover, the analysis of the dynamic 
relationship between prior-contribution behavior and social buzz revealed that prospective 
backers primarily share campaigns within their social network to demand feedback from their 
peers before investing themselves, rather than sharing campaigns after investing in order to 
encourage others to do the same. It is therefore especially interesting that social buzz 
(primarily on Facebook) has a strong positive effect on the decision-making of prospective 
backers, even though sharing via social media does not necessarily mean that the person 
sharing the campaign is actually financially committed to it. In contrast, non-genuine social 
information in the form of fake Facebook Likes does not trigger the same response from 
backers. The reason is that fake Facebook Likes do not disseminate through Facebook’s social 
network, meaning that the only backers potentially affected by the increase in the number of 
Likes are those who see the Facebook Like button directly on the campaign web page. 
Therefore, even though a short-term positive effect can be induced by an artificial 
manipulation of social information, this effects stems from backers expediting their 
investment decisions based on the observed peak and the overall effect is negative. 
Consequently, besides advancing IS platform research, these two studies also contribute to 
social media research by enhancing the understanding of the effectiveness, diffusion patterns, 
and contextual dependencies of social buzz as a quality signal and of manipulations that might 
arise in this context. 
Finally, the thesis also provides several contributions concerning the role of project creators 
in crowdfunding and how their behaviors and actions might influence the level of information 
asymmetry between them and backers. As the growing success of the crowdfunding concept 
has turned many crowdfunding platforms into noisy, crowded, and competitive markets, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult for project creators to stand out from the crowd and 
distinguish themselves from their rivals. It is therefore not surprising that project creators 
make use of the information advantage they have over backers and try to game the system by 
manipulating quality signals in order to influence the decision-making of backers in favor of 
their own campaign, as described in the third study. The study also uncovers product and 
market conditions under which the artificial manipulation of quality signals is more likely to 
occur. For instance, project creators who launch their campaign in categories that are focused 
on creative projects (e.g., arts or comics) are less likely to engage in a manipulation. This 
effect can possibly be attributed to the fact that campaigns in these categories tend to be 
shared more via social media anyway. The study also reveals that project creators are more 
likely to engage in unethical behavior if their campaign is published in a more competitive 
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project category. The final study of the thesis also provides valuable contributions to IS 
research, by showing that personality traits project creators signal via their project description 
and video have an effect on prospective backers. Similar to other investors such as venture 
capitalists and angel investors, backers therefore, consciously or subconsciously, consider and 
evaluate personality traits as part of their decision-making processes (e.g., MacMillan et al. 
1985; Sudek 2006; Cardon et al. 2009). The results of the study have shown that the two 
personality traits agreeableness and openness to experience have a positive effect on the 
contribution and sharing behaviors of backers, while neuroticism, when reflected in the 
project creators’ rhetoric, has a significant negative effect. As individuals who score high on 
openness to experience and agreeableness have tendencies to be creative, inventive, 
intelligent as well as helpful, gentle, and trustworthy, it is plausible that these personality 
traits have the potential to mitigate uncertainties in respect to project outcomes in 
crowdfunding. 
7.2 Practical Contributions 
Beyond the theoretical contributions of the thesis, there are also a number of implications and 
actionable recommendations that should be considered by platform providers and 
complementors. Platform providers may use the findings described in the thesis in order to 
understand how and why certain market design mechanisms affect the information 
asymmetry between the market sides, thereby determining the platform’s long-term prospects. 
The results of the first study have revealed that platform participants show a strong and 
immediate response if input control mechanisms, which are part of the platform’s overall 
market design, are altered. Platform providers therefore need to be aware of any potential 
areas of conflict that might arise between complementors and end-users as a response to 
changes in the overall market design. The case of the policy change on Kickstarter has, for 
instance, shown that opening a platform to more complementors can have detrimental effects 
for the platform ecosystem. After the policy change, project creators made less effort to reduce 
the information asymmetry between them and potential backers and the platform also 
attracted a number of campaigns likely to be hoax that may be seen as a form of rebellion 
against the new relaxed policies (Lecher 2014). Overall, Kickstarter’s decision to alter the 
market design unbalanced the platform ecosystem as there were, apparently, no positive 
cross-side network effects that would have propelled the growth of the number of backers as 
a response to the sharp increase in the number of new campaigns and project creators. 
Therefore, if platform providers should decide not to enact screening or input control 
mechanisms for complements submitted to the platform in order to ensure a certain level of 
quality, they should instead design and employ other, soft mechanisms to encourage 
complementors to contribute high quality complements in order to reduce information 
asymmetries overall. Facebook, for instance, rewards the developers of highly engaging apps 
with further opportunities to attract users and was able to increase the average quality of third 
party apps offered on the platform following this strategy (Claussen et al. 2013). Though the 
growth of platforms will require the providers to frequently adjust and revise the market 
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design in order to react to the changing dynamics within the platform ecosystem, these 
adjustments require careful planning and testing in order to be able to predict the reactions 
of the platform participants.  
The other studies also give insights on how to improve the market design of crowdfunding 
platforms in order to mitigate uncertainties for backers. The results discussed in article 2 have, 
for instance, shown that social buzz can be a decisive factor for a campaign’s success. Though 
this effect strongly varies between the projects’ orientations (i.e., social projects are shared 
significantly less via social media compared to creative projects), overall, backers seem to 
perceive this type of social information as an important quality signal. Platform providers can 
therefore internalize the positive effects of the sharing behavior of backers by offering them 
additional incentives to spread campaigns via social media. This could be done either directly 
(e.g., lower transaction fees for backers who share a campaign) or indirectly through the 
project creators (e.g., additional or improved rewards for sharing a campaign). Other design 
improvements may include more prominently displayed share buttons and notifications, 
highlighting the beneficial effects of sharing a campaign.  
Though social buzz can be manipulated, as seen in the third study, this characteristic does not 
negatively affect the value of this type of social information as project creators who employ 
fake Facebook Likes do not gain an advantage over honest campaign creators. Nevertheless, 
platform providers should develop mechanisms to cope with such manipulative actions as they 
might hurt the overall reputation of the platform and could affect backers’ trust in social 
information as a quality signal. 
Finally, the results of the fourth study highlight the role of personality in the crowdfunding 
context, showing that the absence of more concrete quality signals amplifies the importance 
of rather subtle signals such as personality traits. Platform providers are therefore advised to 
develop and provide additional mechanisms that allow project creators and backers to 
communicate more directly and effectively. Similar to venture capitalists and angel investors 
who disproportionately focus on local investments in order to be able to meet entrepreneurs 
face-to-face, backers would benefit from a technology that allows a communication with 
project creators that closely resembles a face-to-face interaction. Such mechanisms could 
include live chats, video chats, or virtual reality features. 
Though the providers of crowdfunding platforms recently started to experiment with new 
market design mechanisms such as insurances in order to mitigate information asymmetries 
(cf., Burns 2015), a certain level of uncertainty will always be involved when making 
transactions via crowdfunding platforms. The reason is that general project risks will remain 
because crowdfunding platforms, unlike venture capitalists and angel investors, will rarely be 
able to provide mentorship to project creators after successfully raising funds. 
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